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1,000s+ From Thousands to Millions Des Milliers à des Millions 
ABC (PEA) Agro-Business Cluster Pôle d’Entreprise Agricole 
ABIP (PICA) Agribusiness Information Points Points d’Information Commerciale 
Agricole 
ABU Ahmadu Bello University (Nigeria)  
ADP Agricultural Development Program 
(Nigeria) 
 
AGRA Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa 
 
AGRODIA Association of Agri-Inputs 
Wholesalers and Retailers (Burkina 
Faso) 
Association des Grossistes et 
Détaillants d’Intrants Agricoles 
(Burkina Faso) 
AISSA Agricultural Intensification in Sub-
Saharan Africa  
Intensification Agricole en Afrique 
Subsaharienne 
AMEDD  Association Malienne d’Eveil au 
Développement Durable 
ANPAT  Association Nationale des 
Producteurs Avicoles du Togo 
AOPP  Association des Organisations 
Professionnelles des Paysans (Mali) 
APFOG Apex Farmers Organization of Ghana  
AUC African Union Commission  
BRS  Banque Régionale de Solidarité 
BSS (SAE) Business Support Services Services d’Appui aux Entreprises  
CAADP 
(PDDAA) 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Program 
Programme Détaillé pour le 
Développement d’Agriculture en 
Afrique 
CAM  Commission des Activités Maraîchères 
(Togo) 
CAP  Centrales d’Autopromotion Paysanne 
(Togo) 
CASE Competitive Agricultural Systems and 
Enterprises 
Systèmes Agricoles et Entreprises 
Compétitifs 
CC-P Consumer-Competitor-Price  
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CCPM  Comité de Communication des 
Produits Maraîchers (Togo) 
CIDA Canadian International Development 
Agency 
 
C.i.f. Cost-Insurance-Freight  
CMDT  Compagnie Malienne de 
Développement de Textile 
CPP Crop Protection Product  
DATE Diagnosis – Action Planning – Trying 
things out – Evaluation 
 
DCE District Chief Executive  
DED German Development Agency  
DGIS Directorate General International 
Cooperation (the Netherlands) 
Direction Générale de la Coopération 
Internationale (Pays-Bas) 
EAFF Eastern Africa Farmers Federation  
ECOWAS 
(CEDEAO) 
Economic Community of West 
African States 
Communauté Economique des États 
de l’Afrique de l’Ouest 
FEPAB  Fédération des Professionnels 
Agricoles du Burkina 
FCFA  Franc Communauté Financière 
Africaine 
FfF Farmers for the Future Paysans pour le Future 
FSAD Fertilizers and Sustainable Agricultural 
Development 
Engrais et Développement Agricole 
Durable 
FUPRO  Fédération des Unions de Producteurs 
(Bénin) 
GAABIC Ghana Agricultural Association’s 
Business Information Centre 
 
GAIDA Ghana Agricultural Input Dealers 
Association 
 




Virus/Acquired Immunity Deficiency 
Syndrome 
Virus de l’Immunodéficience 
Humaine/Syndrome d’Immuno 
Déficience Acquise 
HQ Headquarters Siège 
IAC InterAcademy Council (The 
Netherlands) 
 





ICRA International Centre for 
Development-Oriented Research in 
Agriculture 
Centre International pour la 
Recherche Agricole orientée vers le 
Développement 
ICRISAT International Crops Research Institute 
for the Semi Arid Tropics 
 
IER Institut d’Economie Rurale  
IFAD (FIDA) International Fund for Agricultural 
Development 
Fond International pour le 
Développement Agricole 
IFDC International Fertilizer Development 
Center 
 
IFA International Fertilizer Industry 
Association 
Association Internationale de 
l’Industrie des Fertilisants 
IITA International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture 
 
IPM Integrated Pest Management  
ISFM (GIFS) Integrated Soil Fertility Management Gestion Intégrée de la Fertilité du Sol 
MFI Microfinance Institutions Institutions de Micro-Finance 
MIR Marketing Inputs Regionally  Marché d’Intrants Régional 
MIS (SIM) Market Information System Système d’Information sur les Marches 
MISTOWA Market Information Systems and 
Traders Organizations in West Africa 
Renforcement des réseaux régionaux 
des systèmes d’information du marché 
et des associations professionnelles en 
Afrique de l’Ouest  
MMW4P Making Markets Work for the Poor  
MOU Memorandum of Understanding  
NCST (ENRC) National Capacity Strengthening Team Equipes Nationales de Renforcement 
de Capacités  
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development 
Le Nouveau Partenariat pour le 
Développement de l’Afrique 
NGO (ONG) Non-Governmental Organization Organisation Non Gouvernementale 
NRM (GRN) National Resource Management Gestion des Ressources Naturelles 
PLAR Participatory Learning and Action 
Research 
 
PO (OP) Producer Organization Organisation des Producteurs 
PP-C Product-Place-Cost  
PPP Public-Private Partnership Partenariat entre Secteur Public et 
Privé 
PRODEPAM  Programme de Développement de la 
Production Agricole au Mali 
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PTD Participatory Technology 
Development 
 
RAFIA Research, Support and Training for 
the Initiatives of Self-Development 
Recherche Action et Formation aux 
Initiatives d’Auto-développement 
ROPPA Network of Farmers’ Organizations 
and Agricultural Producers of West 
Africa 
Réseau des Organisations Paysannes 
et des Producteurs Agricoles de 
l’Afrique de l’Ouest 
SAADA Strategic Alliance for Agricultural 
Development in Africa 
Alliance Stratégique pour le 
Développement Agricole en Afrique 
SARI Savanna Agricultural Research 
Institute (Ghana) 
 
SCEO  Société de Commercialisation et 
d’Exportation des Oléagineux (Burkina 
Faso) 
SOCOAK  Société Coopérative Agricole de 
Kouroumari (Mali) 
SOTOCO Togolese Cotton Company Societé Togolaise du Coton  
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa  
TGC Transaction Governance Capacity  
USAID United States Agency for International 
Development 
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Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) faces several intimidating development challenges. Economic progress 
appears to be more difficult on this continent than anywhere else. Poverty and food insecurity 
are widespread and persistent. Rural communities in particular stand out as extremely 
vulnerable. A productive agricultural sector is essential for most of them. Yet, agriculture is a 
pivotal sector for everyone in SSA, and agricultural development is rightfully seen as a condition 
sine qua non for overall economic growth in this region.  
 
Recent debates on increasing agricultural growth to fuel development have brought much-
needed attention to the linkages between farm and rural non-farm sectors, and to rural-urban 
relationships. To strengthen linkages between farmers and markets and to increase their 
income-earning opportunities, new emphasis has been placed on input accessibility, value 
addition and market outlets. As a result, interest has increased in local economic development, 
commodity value chain development and in creating policy and institutional environments, 
which enable agriculturally linked enterprise development and trade. At the same time, 
alternative avenues are proposed for those farmers that mainly produce for their own 
subsistence needs.  
 
Linking farmers to markets is easier said than done, however. Rural communities operate 
within very limited windows of opportunity, and market integration is a risky venture for most 
of them. Misguided, hurried approaches to promote, nurture and ‘push’ market integration have 
tremendous potential to do more harm than good. This guide aims to propose a novel and 
pragmatic pathway for agricultural intensification and market development in SSA. We will 
argue for a cautiously implemented grassroots approach, which links to local ‘champions’ and 
empowers rural communities. Among other things, the approach calls for a reversal in 
development thinking – in other words from macro- to micro-economics. This is not to say 
that macroeconomics – or nation- and sector-wide policies – is without importance; rather, it is 
our opinion that economic development first and foremost develops from grassroots initiatives 
and the systemic and gradual empowerment of rural and urban citizens. It is also our belief that 
structural changes in policies and markets have a much better chance to take place when there 
is already some critical and powerful bottom-up support.  
 
The approach, known as Competitive Agricultural Systems and Enterprises (CASE), will be 
outlined in some detail in this document. CASE was developed by IFDC over a period of 
approximately eight years in collaboration with many partner organizations, including producer 
and trader organizations. In fact, CASE stems from a series of projects that involved another 
important IFDC approach to agricultural development – Integrated Soil Fertility Management 
(ISFM).  
 
In these ISFM projects, emphasis was put on agricultural productivity and in particular on an 
efficient combination of organic and mineral fertilization to increase yields and optimize 
fertilizer efficiency. It was quickly realized that for sustainable agricultural growth a more 
encompassing ‘reference framework’ was required – enabling researchers and facilitators to 
work together with farmers and other stakeholders on all sorts of interlinked areas, like rural 
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finance, competitive intelligence, and marketing issues. The alternative approach we were 
looking for had to be ‘light’ and ‘focused.’ Light, to ensure that the initiative would continue to 
be led by its own champions, and to avoid creating artificial competitive advantages; focused, to 
avoid the pitfalls of the many holistic – integrated – rural development programs we had seen 
and participated in. It is noted that CASE was developed in areas with major problems 
regarding agricultural intensification and agribusiness development (i.e., in areas with limited 
access to services and markets, with inadequate infrastructure and populated by ‘poor’ and 
‘vulnerable’ rural inhabitants). CASE claims to be useful in areas that have potential for 
agricultural intensification and agribusiness development, but where, for a variety of reasons, 
such dynamics do not happen automatically. 
 
The CASE framework comprises pillars, concepts and values (or design principles). The three 
pillars are:  
 
1. Agribusiness cluster formation 
2. Value chain development 
3. Strengthening of transaction governance capacities  
 
Though all three pillars are relevant and equally important, we will focus more on agribusiness 
cluster formation in this booklet. Agribusiness cluster formation is the strengthening of local 
capacity (i.e., of farmers, traders, business support and financial services within some restricted 
area) to learn, interact, and engage in coordinated action. The latter essentially aims for 
sustained integration in promising commodity value chains and for efficient bottom-up advocacy 
for business ethics and policy changes that improve transaction governance.  
 





We believe that competitiveness at various levels (i.e., cluster – value chain, local – national – 
regional) depends on an effective balance between competition and coordination. Development 
has been and sometimes still is pretty blind for the competitive playing fields that both drive and 
constrain business and innovation. CASE aims to provide a pragmatic, and probably less 
romantic, approach that values collective strategy, but with an adequate eye for (potential) 
conflict and exclusiveness. Our final goal is not collectiveness per se, but competitive strategy at 
cluster and chain levels.  
 
A critical issue that also requires effective balancing relates to the roles of the private sector 
and the government. Local entrepreneurs, including farmers, work within complex and often 
highly uncertain environments. The government plays an essential role (together with the 
private sector and the civil society organizations) to improve the institutional context to do 
business and to invest in research, education and training that supports professionalism and 




Finally, the three core values, or design principles, of CASE are:  
 
1. Ownership 
2. Empowerment  
3. Economic sustainability 
 
CASE works best when the ‘external’ facilitators do not compromise on any of these values. 
This means, among other things, that the local actors themselves should be in the ‘driver’s seat’ 
of agribusiness cluster formation. CASE facilitators essentially support the three pillars through 
capacity strengthening for action-research, for extension and networking, and for lobbying and 
advocacy. They provide guidance to a process of innovation and change; they are not driving it. 
  
This document describes the framework and some initial experiences with the CASE approach 
arising from the IFDC project ‘From Thousands to Millions’ (1,000s+). It is divided into three 
parts.  
 
Part 1 concentrates on the reference framework itself, and aims to link CASE with relevant 
theory in economics, management and communication sciences. It starts with a brief chapter on 
the issue of agriculture for development (Chapter 2). The relationship between agricultural 
growth and overall economic and pro-poor development is currently dominating the policy 
debate. This chapter aims to draw the larger picture within which IFDC and other agencies 
operate, and provides the background for the CASE approach. Chapter 3 introduces the three 
pillars of CASE. In the process of stimulating agribusiness development and of strengthening the 
first two pillars of CASE (i.e., agribusiness cluster formation and value chain development), two 
different ‘trajectories’ may be distinguished. These trajectories, characterized within CASE as 
key concepts, are competition and coordination. In Chapter 4 we discuss the ‘art’ to strengthen 
and to balance these two essential, but sometimes contradictory, drivers of competitiveness 
and innovation. Chapter 4 concludes with a section on competitive strategy.  
 
In Part 2, the emphasis shifts to CASE facilitation. Part 2, however, begins with a chapter on 
ISFM, to illustrate some of the learning-in-action that led to CASE. Chapter 6 tackles the design 
and implementation of CASE. The chapter starts with an introduction of the design principles 
(i.e., the CASE values). We distinguish three stages in the implementation process of CASE: 
mobilizing business ideas, action planning, and implementing action plans. These stages are 
labeled as the design elements and presented in Section 6.2. Finally, we come back to facilitation 
roles and the skills that we think are needed to act as a CASE facilitator. In Chapters 7 and 8, 
we will specifically refer to the 1,000s+ project. 1,000s+ is a regional project designed to scale-
up CASE. Chapter 7 presents the ‘project setting,’ describing the grant mechanism developed 
to support local entrepreneurship and the strategy that should lead a rich and diverse 
‘portfolio’ of business clusters. Some of the results achieved during the start-up phase between 
2006 and 2008 will also be briefly presented. Chapter 8 concludes Part 2, and focuses on two 
major cross-cutting themes within 1,000s+: finance and information. Finance and information 
are the ‘oils of business,’ but mobilizing finance for cluster and chain actors requires a strategy 
that combines grassroots and sector level action; the same is true for information, and in 
particular for what we will label competitive intelligence. Competitive intelligence involves the 




Part 3 presents in some detail several examples of agribusiness development in West Africa. 
The examples from Togo (Chapter 10), Nigeria (Chapter 11) and Ghana (Chapter 12) focus on 
aspects of agribusiness cluster formation activities – and are again based on results from the 
1,000s+ project between 2006 and 2008. Part 3 starts with an example from Mali (Chapter 9) 
and from another IFDC-coordinated project – Marketing Inputs Regionally (MIR). MIR concerns 
the input sector in Mali and is a perfect example of CASE ‘avant la lettre.’ In a second volume, 
we will focus more on these and other examples of CASE. The second volume will also contain 
more quantitative details on enterprise, cluster and value chain performance, before and after 
the ‘intervention.’ 
 
To end this introductory chapter, we would like to offer some words of caution. Whereas 
CASE, as used in 1,000s+, has undoubtedly demonstrated a degree of effectiveness in 
stimulating agribusiness literacy and initiative, the approach itself provides nothing more (nor 
less) than a reference framework for learning and action. It explicitly does not give any simple 
‘one-size-fits-all’ (or blueprint) solutions. Both prudence and (large amounts of) 
entrepreneurship are required to effectively deal with the inherent risks of increased market 
integration for producers and small-scale rural entrepreneurs. Facilitators are therefore 
encouraged to support critical self-assessment of the various actors and stakeholders in regard 
to their plans and strategies, including risk management. Moreover, quick successes are not 
what we should aim for. The proof is in the maintenance of competitive advantages and of 
profitable commercial relationships – beyond their initial establishment. This is a hard struggle 
which will require creativity and endurance, and in this very complex world, probably some 




1.1 Conventions used in this document 
 
We will use the same colors for the different agents (cluster, chain, business system) 
throughout the whole document. They are:  
 
 
The text contains several examples to support the main text and illustrate how CASE can work 
in practice. Elaborated examples are separated from the main text by a single grey line.  
 
We have also added a few discussion points that were often raised in training and coaching 
sessions on CASE (e.g., on the boundaries of an agribusiness cluster, on the ‘exclusion’ of 
intermediaries in value chains, etc.). Discussion points are separated from the main text by a 
double line. 
 
! Large exclamation marks are used for emphasis or as a warning when we feel that we 
have something to explain (e.g., a significant change in a concept). The reader is reminded 
that CASE emerged out of practice and reflection and we continue to consider CASE a 


















2. Agriculture and agribusiness as drivers of economic growth in 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
2.1 The case for agriculture as driver of rural and urban economies 
 
SSA is home to about 800 million people, of whom 60-70 percent lives in rural areas. Though 
poverty is not just a rural phenomenon, 70-80 percent of the poor (e.g., people living on less 
than $1 per day) live in rural areas. Despite the fact that agriculture accounts for only about 
20-40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in most SSA countries, the majority of the 
rural population depends predominantly on agriculture for food and income. In addition, a large 
number of city dwellers are also farmers and involved in a varied array of farming activities 
alternating from purely subsistence farming to intensive horticultural production. In many 
countries, the agricultural sector employs between 60 and 90 percent of the active population. 
Agriculture is therefore an important economic base for both rural and urban economies in 
SSA. 
 
At least 200 million of the 800 million people and between 25 and 50 percent of the 
smallholder farm families in SSA are seasonally, or even chronically, food insecure. Likewise, 
hidden hunger (i.e., shortages of micronutrients and vitamins) is widespread in SSA. Although a 
growing number of children seem to go to school, educational systems are weak and students 
often lack the strength and motivation to learn effectively. Again, poor health – often as a 
consequence of poor nutrition – and poor education disproportionately affect the rural 
populations. Whereas non-farm income is quite important for many rural households in SSA 
(contributing between 20 and 60 percent of total income), it is most easily obtained in areas 
with relatively ‘high’ farm incomes. For these reasons, agriculture is obviously a sector to focus 
on in order to improve food security and alleviate poverty. 
 
In most parts of the industrialized world, agriculture has been the basis for overall economic 
growth. Agriculture has numerous forward and backward linkages with other economic 
sectors, within both the rural and the urban areas. Timmer (1988), for example, summarized 




1. Increases the supply of food for domestic consumption 
2. Releases labor for industrial development 
3. Enlarges the size of the market for industrial output 
4. Increases the supply of domestic saving 
5. Earns foreign exchange 
 
These roles are often regarded as complementary, but they may in fact be quite contradictory. 
For example, increased agricultural productivity typically translates into lower per unit 
production costs, thereby effectively lowering food prices. Lower food prices, in turn, are 
supposed to provide incentives for investment in manufacturing and service sectors, particularly 
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in the early stages of their development.1 This seems to be a good thing, also because of the 
fact that the domestic markets in SSA are particularly demanding. As income distributions are 
highly skewed, there are only a limited number of consumers that have the purchasing power 
to pay a reasonable price for agricultural products. On the other hand, the benefits of lower 
commodity prices (for both food and raw materials) are merely relative and they should not 




The challenge for agricultural growth policies (and related programs) therefore lies in advancing 
beneficial linkages between agriculture and other key economic sectors, for which 
opportunities to develop competitive advantages exist. This is, of course, much more easily said 
than done. In addition, spin-offs should preferably occur as much as possible within local rural 
economies to stimulate pro-poor economic growth.  
 
Kydd et al. (2002) distinguish the following four types of linkages that may occur between 
different activities in rural economies:  
 
1. Direct upstream production linkages 
2. Direct downstream production linkages 
3. Investment linkages  
4. Indirect consumption (or expenditure) linkages  
 
                                            
1 Paul Collier (2007) argues that other developing countries, in particular China and India, have developed 
considerable competitive edge and economies of scale in low-cost manufacturing (and servicing) industries, and in 
doing so have significantly constrained the opportunities for SSA countries to develop along similar patterns of 
growth. 
2 That is precisely why several authors referred to the 2008 increase of commodity prices on the world market 
(due to, among other factors, rapidly increasing wealth and changing consumption patterns in Asia, and biofuel 
production) as a ‘blessing in disguise’ (i.e., potentially beneficial for all those farmers that may have the capacity to 
produce for domestic and international markets but catastrophic for poor urban consumers and many other rural 
net buyers of food). 
The doubtful benefit of low world market commodity prices 
 
Mazoyer (2001) convincingly argued that low world market prices for food were to a large extent 
responsible for keeping farmers (and low wage laborers on large-scale farms in Latin America) in 
developing countries ‘trapped’ in poverty. International commodity markets were, in Mazoyer’s 
words, ‘residual’ markets (i.e., the prices on these markets merely reflected extremely low wages on 
outsized [‘latifundi] farms in Latin America and distorted policies in the U.S., the European Union 
countries and some Asian exporting countries). As a consequence, these producers were able to sell 
surpluses on the world market below the real production costs. Farmers in SSA were, in general, 
unable to compete against such prices; when cheap food imports were allowed to invade domestic 
markets, the impact was even worse. In addition, steadily increasing prices for agricultural inputs 
(fertilizers, in particular) further undermined the potential for sustainable agricultural development 
and intensification.  
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The linkages describe the way additional income is circulated through a local economy. The 
boundaries of the local economy serve to make a difference between a positive linkage (spin-
off, ‘multiplier’ effect) and a negative one (or leakage). Figure 1 below presents – schematically – 




Figure 1. Linkages and leakages in a local – rural – economy (adapted from Kydd et al., 2002) 
  
 
In Figure 1, the growth linkages are indicated in green, the leakages in red and the major factors 
that cause development in yellow. Competitive advantages, for instance, are supposed to lead 
to increased employment, which in turn may trigger a series of spin-offs, starting with rises in 
real wages, which in turn may trigger the demand for locally produced goods and/or services. 
When the local capacity to expand the production of goods and/or services is high enough, 
such additional demand may be produced without (too much) inflation. Inflation offsets the 
gains and should be considered as a ‘leakage’ effect. Employment again leads to rising incomes, 
which installs a virtuous circle in the local economy. It is crucial to understand the arbitrariness 
of the notion of a local economy, as used here, and its consequences. The larger the area under 
consideration, the larger is the potential multiplier effect. In fact, what we define as a leakage – 
from the perspective of a local region A – may be seen as a multiplier when we look at a much 
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Nonetheless, there are certain leakages that should be considered as a loss for SSA countries. 
They are two-fold:  
 
 Leakages that occur due to lack of re-investment, when social and socio-political 
networks limit innovation and expansion of trade within the SSA region, and because of 
uneconomic ‘saving’3 
 Leakages that cut across the SSA boundaries when growth triggers higher imports – i.e., 
from outside SSA – or when revenues are invested outside of SSA4  
 
Agricultural policy and programs have to deal with this complexity and with the dynamic 
interactions both within rural economies and between local – rural – and national, regional and 
international economies. As a result, the policy measures needed to accelerate agricultural 
growth and to ensure its impact on overall economic development are far from obvious and 
interfere with a large and often relatively unknown set of factors. Such factors include the 
degree of inequality in the distribution of assets and incomes, prevailing rural-urban linkages and 
over-ruling policies with regards to the currency exchange rates and the ‘openness’ of the 
economy. Indeed, policies also tend to interact with each other. Structural adjustment 
programs have heavily impacted on the institutional capacities within developing countries and 
on state – civil and private sector – relationships. The almost total dismantling of key services 
for the agricultural sector (e.g., research and technology development, extension and other 
public information services) is just one major example.  
 
It is important to bear in mind that within SSA countries, rural economies and conditions for 
agricultural production differ widely from one country to another. Food security, agriculture 
and agriculturally linked activities can be influenced by an array of conditions including: 
 
 Climate 
 Soil characteristics 
 Population densities 
 Hard and soft infrastructure 
 Land tenure landscapes 
 Rural-urban linkages including opportunities for value addition 
 Governance institutions 
 Law enforcement capabilities, business ethics and policies  
 
The heterogeneity of agricultural production systems and rural economies defies every attempt 
to propose a blueprint approach to agricultural and economic development, especially pro-poor 
approaches. A differentiated, context-sensitive approach to agricultural development in SSA is 
                                            
3 See Delgado et al. (1998) for a review of agricultural growth linkages, with specific focus on SSA. See Fafchamps 
(1999) for one of several papers on the dominant role of (in)formal networks that shape – and contain – market 
development in SSA or his book, summarizing Fafchamp’s work to date on market institutions (Fafchamps, 2004). 
See Chabal and Daloz (1999) for a treatise on socio-political networks and how such networks may profit from 
disorder (e.g., the lack of an overarching hierarchy, whether through government or corporations). 
4 There are no hard figures about the amount of money Africans have invested offshore. The Economist however, 
makes mention of an estimated 40 percent of privately held wealth that is invested offshore (Economist, 2004). 
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also strongly recommended by an ambitious study executed by the InterAcademy Council 
(IAC) upon request of Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the United Nations, and 
involving a large number of senior academics and experts all over the world (IAC, 2004). The 
report identified four crucial agricultural production systems, which are deemed to hold the 
most promise for investment and support from the research-to-extension continuum: 
(1) maize-based systems, involving also cotton and livestock production; (2) mixed cropping 
systems of cereals and tubers; (3) irrigated production systems (rice); and (4) agro-forestry 
systems, in particular those based on coffee, cocoa, oil palm and/or rubber. We will refer to 
this advice later in this document. 
 
2.2 Agricultural development back on top of the development agenda 
 
In the process of economic development, the share of agriculture in GDP decreases, along with 
the number of farmers and agricultural workers employed. Nevertheless, the long-term process 
of structural transformation of economic sectors does not imply that policymakers in 
developing countries should not invest in agriculture and use all of agriculture’s revenues, in 
particular from the exports of primary products, to stimulate manufacturing and other 
economic sectors (Timmer, 1988). Urban biases in economic policies, often inspired by socio-
political reasons, have a meager track record.  
 
Direct investment in the agricultural and agriculturally linked sectors decreased considerably 
between the 1980s and 2000 for various reasons, including donor perceptions of and, perhaps 
disappointment with, results of rural and agricultural development projects. However, after 
decades of relative neglect, agriculture is finally receiving increased attention from both SSA and 
donor governments, as well as from other donors. As a result, agriculture genuinely appears to 
be back on the agenda. The World Bank, in a report specifically dedicated to the agricultural 
sector, suggests a reconsideration of agriculture and its potential role for overall development 
(World Bank, 2008).  
 
Three different phenomena may have played a role in the revival of attention for the 
agricultural sector in developing countries, in general, and SSA, in particular: 
 
1. The widespread prevalence of poverty, especially in the rural areas in SSA and Asia, 
points to the need to re-consider agriculture as a contributor to economic growth. As 
2015 approaches, lack of achievement towards the first Millennium Development Goal 
(i.e., eradication of hunger and poverty) in different continents and regions is receiving 
more and more critical attention. This critical attention often leads to reversals in 
thinking. 
2. Increases in commodity prices have triggered worldwide attention on food security (and 
sovereignty) and agricultural productivity. Whereas the recent surge in food prices has 
not continued, there is sufficient reason to expect considerable upward pressure on food 
prices in the long-term, probably accompanied by higher variability. A steady upward 
trend may be expected as a result of increased demand for cereals in Asia (e.g., urban 
populations of China and India) related to improving welfare and changing diets (i.e., meat 
consumption) and the biofuel movement. Agriculture has traditionally provided food, feed 
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and fiber,5 but fuel seems to have been added to its scope of work. Among other things, 
higher variability will result from speculation, decreasing supply elasticity and 
uncoordinated policy responses. 
3. Enthusiasm and reluctance vis-à-vis the still largely unknown opportunities offered by 
biotechnology has direct implications and applications for agriculture, involving research 
communities, industries, consumers, and policymakers worldwide. 
 
The centerpiece of Africa’s agricultural policy is the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Program (CAADP) developed under the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD). Endorsed by African heads of state and government in 2003, CAADP 
aims to increase public investment in agriculture together with other regional and national level 
policies and declarations. CAADP targets accelerated growth in agricultural productivity at 6 
percent per year, the promotion of dynamic intra- and inter-country markets for agricultural 
commodities, promotion of agro-food export chains and the achievement of more equitable 
distribution of wealth. According to CAADP, agricultural growth is not only the basis of 
economic growth, it is also a vector of pro-poor growth, benefiting the rural and urban poor. 
Nevertheless, trade-offs exist between profits for poor consumers (including many net buyers 
in rural areas) and poor producers. Unfortunately, the implementation of the integrated and 
coordinated approach as foreseen within CAADP has been slower than expected. 
 
Several organizations have committed to providing increased attention to the agricultural sector 
and agriculturally linked development. The initiative for an Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa (AGRA), started by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller 
Foundation, also provides a startling example of a new commitment to provide support to 
agriculture and to rural populations in SSA. Nevertheless, despite the increased interest and the 
growing number of publications and workshops, it still seems premature to take for granted an 
effective implementation of a vast program for agricultural progress. Historically, whether 
promoted by donors, governments, or regional institutions in SSA, development plans for SSA 
have a poor implementation record. As we also will discuss later, the translation of ‘plans’ into 
viable action is not always as straightforward as it may initially appear. The avenues for 
development are context-sensitive, dependent on many factors such as leadership and 
motivation at various levels within the society. Vague notions of ‘what’ to accomplish are often 
quite useless for development facilitators and practitioners, who have to decide on the next 
best step (i.e., ‘how’ to get agriculture moving). In addition, contradictory approaches continue 
to exist in regard to the means to foster agricultural growth. Two fundamentally opposing 
schools of thought currently exist: 
 
 The ‘massive’ aid (or ‘threshold shifting’) flow idea, enabling poor farm (and other rural) 
households to climb out of the ‘poverty trap.’ Massive aid flows will boost the assets of 
farmers beyond a minimum level, and reinforce investment in remunerative activity. 
Contrary to this approach is the idea of cautious investment without distorting markets 
                                            
5 With regards to uses of agricultural products in SSA, we should also add pharmaceuticals and building and 
cooking materials (e.g., straw, timber).  
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and discouraging private individual and collective initiatives based on homegrown 
processes.6  
 The ‘push’ versus ‘pull’ arena: pushing agricultural growth by improving producers’ access 
to agricultural inputs, and by fostering technology development or pulling agricultural 
development through a focus on farmer and product (i.e., output) market linkages, often 
including post-harvest technology development, thereby adding value.7 
 
In this document, we will advocate a grassroots approach to stimulate agricultural and 
agribusiness development; an approach that carefully combines action research, advisory and 
brokering services to support innovativeness and competitive strategy at enterprise, cluster and 
chain levels. We also argue for context-sensitive approaches, tailored to the ambitions and 
needs of so-called local ‘champions,’ and adapted to the variety of conditions that are prevalent 
in SSA. CASE facilitators do not select regions and products, and we do not claim that CASE 
will work everywhere in SSA. Sustainable agribusiness development is not easy to achieve and 
hinges as much on the availability of local champions as on the competitive potential of the 
location (i.e., is this region adequate to produce this commodity for that market?). In fact, a 
major fallacy of many prevailing agricultural growth propositions in SSA is their claim to 
universality. The diversity of conditions in SSA and the unpredictable nature of the human being 
simply defy any blueprint solution.  
 
                                            
6 Jeffrey Sachs (see Sachs, 2005) is currently the most important advocate of a ‘massive aid’ approach, advocating a 
‘big push’ through blueprint approaches and by making use of campaign-like methods. See Cabral et al. (2006) for a 
critical comment on the Millennium Villages project – started by Sachs cum suis. Easterly (2006) probably contains 
the most belligerent analysis of the ‘massive aid’ strategy and, in fact, of most of the international and bilateral 
development aid over the last decades. 
7 Certainly, the rapid rise of commodity prices on world markets provides novel arguments for ‘pushing’ 
agricultural production through improved access to inputs and technology transfer, in particular for agricultural 
products that may compete on world markets either directly through exports, or indirectly by substituting for 
more expensive imported commodities. However, to supply food to poor consumers (i.e., to ‘net’ buyers of food 
in both urban and rural areas) and to promote growth of domestic markets (through value addition and by 
optimizing multiplier effects), the challenge of promoting efficient market linkages will likely remain. Note the 





Discussion: Small family-based farming and entrepreneurship  
 
An issue that frequently pops up in discussions on agricultural intensification and market development in 
SSA is whether smallholder (family) farmers are sufficiently equipped to trigger accelerated agricultural 
growth and agribusiness development.8 Larger, commercially oriented farms, for instance, may profit 
more from economies of scale and may also have easier access to input and produce markets. Linking to 
both upstream input traders (retailers) and downstream processors and traders involves investment in 
social relationships and access to financial means, which gives the larger farms a relative advantage. The 
issue here is mainly about scale, and not so much about the family-based nature of farming. Larger farms 
typically also profit from a family-based structure because this increases flexibility, stimulates inter-
generational learning and decreases, to some extent, the monitoring (e.g., supervision) costs.9 The 
agricultural sector in SSA is mostly dominated by smallholder farmers, however. Any reasonable 
roadmap for growth should therefore be based on the involvement – and maybe gradual transformation 
– of these smallholder farmers. In addition, the transition to larger farms will, in many cases, imply 
significant changes in land tenure (property) systems, enabling the more competitive farmers to buy or 
to rent additional land from others. The individual and societal consequences of such profound 
institutional changes are not so easy to oversee (Dangbegnon et al., 2003). For now, the most sensible 
strategy, from our point of view, is based on smallholder farmer investment and participation and on 
competitive collective strategies (i.e., cooperatives and other producer organizations [POs]) to 
strengthen linkages to markets. 
 
  
                                            
8 See Hazell et al. (2007) for a paper on this issue. 
9 Several POs have made family-based farming a key issue in their advocacy work – arguing that policymakers 
generally disregard rural families and smallholder farms as the basis for agricultural (and agriculturally linked) 
development. See the website of the Network of Farmers’ Organizations and Agricultural Producers of West 
Africa (ROPPA), www.roppa.info. 
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Essentially, the Competitive Agricultural Systems and Enterprises (CASE) approach is an actor-
oriented grassroots approach to agricultural and agribusiness development, based on action-
oriented interactive learning and empowerment processes. The approach has benefitted from 
insights from management science and institutional economics. However, it developed largely 
from practical experience – in particular IFDC’s ISFM projects implemented between 1998 and 
2005 in several West African countries.10 During the ISFM project period, so-called ‘learning 
plots’ were designed and implemented together with village-level producers and resource 
persons, often from National Agricultural Research and Extension services. Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) also became involved to stimulate adoption of more efficient use of 
expensive ‘external’ inputs, including improved seeds, fertilizers and crop protection products 
(CPPs) (Gross et al., 2005). Whereas farmers were generally quite enthusiastic about the 
lessons they had learned from the learning plots, the emphasis on agricultural productivity alone 
was clearly insufficient to address the multiple challenges that the farmers were facing. These 
challenges were related to the accessibility as well as the affordability of ‘external’ inputs, the 
perceived lack of market outlets and the financial risks associated with the use of ‘external’ 
inputs under very uncertain conditions. As a consequence, the ISFM projects progressively 
supported many other types of activities, including:  
 
 Strengthening of producer groups to pool demand for agricultural inputs and link and 
negotiate with suppliers. 
 Networking between producer groups and traders and/or agro-food processors.  
 Support to POs to improve collective marketing strategies of specific 
commodities/products. 
 Support to local entrepreneurs – often originating from the farmer community – to 
establish or improve management of storage warehouses, and processing strategies 
(equipment, marketing).  
 Support to producer groups and local entrepreneurs to formulate business plans and link 
with financial institutions.  
 Training of business support services (BSSs) to provide market intelligence to producer 
groups and/or local entrepreneurs and to facilitate research-action on inventory credit 
systems, market analysis and marketing strategies.  
                                            
10 The ISFM projects were supported by the International Fertilizer Industry Association (IFA) through the 
‘Fertilizers and Sustainable Agricultural Development’ (F&SAD) project and United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) through the ‘Farmers for the Future’ (FFF). IFAD also co-funded activities directly related 
to ‘technology transfer’ of ISFM. IFA still co-finances activities within 1,000s+, mainly fostering input supply linkages, 
and capacity-building of POs and input dealers (e.g., pooling of demand, business and financial management, 
negotiation, advisory services – all related to agricultural inputs). 
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 Support to POs to implement farmer-to-farmer extension services, also involving rural 
radio and local NGOs.  
During the initial stage, these activities were simply referred to as agribusiness development.  
 
It soon became clear that the most successful experiences had some characteristics in common. 
CASE developed out of this recognition, and only after an intensive period of experiential 
learning. Pillars, key concepts and values (or design principles) together form the CASE 
reference framework that is being used within several IFDC-coordinated projects and in 
particular the 1,000s+ project. The three pillars, which are the focus of this chapter, are: 
 
1. Agribusiness cluster formation, or the strengthening of local level capacity for innovation 
and entrepreneurship, involving a diversified array of actors and stakeholders 
2. Value chain development, aiming to link farmers to consumer segments, emphasizes the 
integration of other local actors (i.e., the local entrepreneurs who are also part of the 
agribusiness cluster) 
3. Transaction governance capacity-building, which involves both public and private 
stakeholders, and fosters improvements in the institutional environment for agribusiness 
development  
 








In this figure, the agribusiness cluster is illustrated by the five inter-connected circles. The 
agribusiness cluster links farmers, local entrepreneurs (involved in supplier and channel value 
chains), bankers (financial services) and BSS in the target region. The commodity value chain is 
visualized as the grey arc at the bottom. In practice, market integration may concern more 
commodities, and commodity value chains, but a certain degree of specialization in commercial 
orientation fits well with our agribusiness cluster philosophy. We will come back on this issue 
later. The institutional environment appears in the figure as the blue arc on the left. It refers to 
governance institutions in the widest sense and includes business ethics and regulations. 
Strengthening the institutional environment obviously involves not just policymakers and civil 
society, but private sector agents as well. Again, in CASE, specific attention may be given to 
local (decentralized) levels of governance.  
 
 It is noted that previously ISFM was also mentioned as one of the main pillars (Maatman et 
al., 2007). Progressively, however, it appeared that ISFM – though critical in all the target 
areas – was not always perceived by farmers (and local entrepreneurs) as their first 
priority to strengthen linkages with markets. It was felt that ISFM, and all agronomic 
issues related to increased agricultural productivity, should be seen as an integral part of 
agribusiness cluster formation. We will come back to agricultural productivity and ISFM in 
Chapter 5. 
 
3.2 Agribusiness cluster formation 
 
Farms and agriculturally linked firms in SSA are increasingly engaged in a competitive battle to 
improve profits and to stay ahead of their competitors. Essentially, such strategies focus on the 
costs to produce or to process, store or transport a product, the quality of the product and its 
delivery. Sustainable competitive advantages, however, rarely rely solely on farm or firm 
performance but on the joint performance of an array of inter-linked actors, including input 
suppliers, managers of POs and of collective warehouses, processors and local or (sub-) 
national level traders. This ensemble of inter-linked local and non-local actors form a 
(commodity) value chain (see next section). Farmers and other local entrepreneurs who 
regularly sell part of their produce are ‘integrated’ in one or several commodity value chains.  
 
Market integration is risky (Figure 3) and it would be wrong to suggest that local actors simply 
stand to win from participation in value chain development. In fact, without sufficient 
information and bargaining power, local actors may quickly see their economic rents squeezed 
and captured by better organized actors, up or down the commodity value chain. Additionally, 
and perhaps more insidiously, they often carry the greater risk burden. For example, in the case 
of prolonged drought, farmers will bear the costs of re-seeding; when harvests fail, they may 
even be forced to use other non-farming revenues or to sell some of their livestock to 
reimburse the loans that were obtained to purchase agricultural inputs or equipment. Dwindling 
prices when supply exceeds demand may also squeeze farmers’ returns. In certain cases it may 
even lead to the canceling of contracts because traders can obtain the products easier and/or at 
lower costs in neighboring markets. We argue that effective and largely profitable participation 
of local agents in commodity supply chains depends on many things but mainly on the capacity 
of these local agents to learn and work together, to innovate and to implement coordinated 
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action. It is emphasized that capacity, from our perspective, comprises individual competencies 
(technological and managerial) as well as collective ones. As we all know, collective capacity 
develops from relationships among farmers themselves (‘horizontal’ relations), between farmers 
and other local entrepreneurs (local processors, traders) downward and upward in the value 
chain (‘vertical’ relationships), and with local-level service providers. Such relationships 





















Figure 3.  Market integration is risky! 
 
 
The idea to concentrate on and nurture the competencies and inter-relationships among local 
actors is also grounded in management theory. According to Porter (1998), the following 
determinants shape regional or national competitive advantages for a certain ‘industry’ in a 
specific location (the industry cluster, see Box):  
 
 Industry structure (number of actors involved, production costs and volume of sales, 
equipment and other capital invested) management and rivalry strategies within the 
specific location 
 Demand conditions within – or at close distance – from the specific location 
 Presence of related and supporting industries (including microfinance institutions [MFIs] 
and BSSs) 
 Factor conditions (labor/skills, capital, natural resources) within the specific location  
 
= local environment  
? ? ??? ?? ?? ??? 
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Input supply chains 
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The factor conditions have received ample attention in the past and they determine the region’s 
(or the nation’s) comparative advantage. However, building competitiveness on comparative 
advantages (such as low labor costs) is seen by Porter cum suis as a self-defeating strategy. 
Comparative advantages may provide a starting point, but strategies based on such advantages 
alone are often easy to replicate. Competing industries in other regions and nations may quickly 
take over. Therefore, a competitive strategy should – eventually – address the other three 
determinants as well. This includes attention to:  
 
 Strengthening of ‘industry’ structure within the region, i.e., improving the nature of rivalry 
between firms/farms, competencies (technical, managerial) and bargaining power 
relationships with suppliers/buyers 
 Development of home demand relationships to improve linkages with end-user markets 
and enable firms/farms to respond adequately to changes in consumer preferences and 
quality requirements in channel and buyer value chains 
 Development of related and supporting industries (e.g., to improve services, decrease 
transaction costs and/or increase returns to investment in industry-specific infrastructure 
and research and development) 
 
The notion of cluster formation, as one of the CASE pillars, naturally evolves out of this 
location-specific competitive advantage framework. What does this mean for our specific case 
of agribusiness development in SSA? Again, agribusiness cluster formation aims to strengthen 
individual and collective competencies, and professional inter-farm and farm-firm relationships 




The term ‘cluster’ was coined by Michael E. Porter, one of the world’s leading authorities on 
competitive strategy and international competitiveness. Porter emphasizes in his book The 
Competitive Advantages of Nations that the competitive industries of a nation are never evenly 
distributed across the country. Instead, successful industries tend to have strong and nearby (!) 
vertical (immediate buyers, end-users, suppliers) and horizontal (technology/business development 
and financial services, competing firms) relationships. Both attract and profit from related industries 
(industries that contribute specific complementary activities). Nations typically have only a few 
successful industry clusters (Porter, 1998).  
 
N.B. With ‘industry’ we refer to actors involved in the same activity (milling of cereals, processing of 
horticultural crops, production of cereals or production of rice). The boundaries of the ‘industry’ 
depend on the ‘activity’ that is being considered, and on the geographical scale (region, country, 
world). From our perspective, an ‘industry’ may consist of all farmers in a particular region involved 




Figure 4.    Schematic representation of an agribusiness cluster 
 
 
Often such local entrepreneurs are either farmer groups in the process of professionalization 
and progressively accepting the idea that professional POs may need specialized staff, or sons 
and/or daughters of farmers that have started an agriculturally linked enterprise. Agriculturally 
linked enterprises may prove effective on both sides of the production segment by selling 
inputs, renting equipment, providing storage facilities and post-harvest processing. However, 
agribusiness clusters comprise not just the local agents (actors) directly involved in the flow of 
goods – through a commodity value chain. They also comprise the supporting services, which 
provide information, capacity-building and finances (i.e., stakeholders).11 We generally 
distinguish between financing institutions (mainly MFIs – at the local level) and BSSs. The 
agribusiness cluster is illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
It is central to our argument here that all actors and stakeholders of any agribusiness cluster 
have a common agenda. This common agenda is determined by the product that is produced, 
processed, stored and traded, and – to a lesser extent – by the specific market segment that is 
                                            
11 Local level policymakers, though not explicitly included here – they are part of the third pillar – are often seen as 
another group of stakeholders in the cluster formation process. 
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targeted with this product.12 The notion of a common agenda may or may not be explicitly 
recognized by some or all of the actors and stakeholders involved. Awareness of inter-linked 
interests among actors and stakeholders is a critical factor as it enhances collaboration and 
reduces the risks of opportunistic activity that may undermine cluster competitiveness. We will 
return to opportunism and the need for stronger coordination in the next chapter. Not all 
actors living in the same locality automatically belong to the same cluster. Groundnut and 
tomato producers do not necessarily share the same cluster, even when they are both farming 
in the same region. If both grow tomatoes and sell part of their production through the same 
‘channels,’ both will be considered as members of the tomato cluster. In addition, farmers that 
specialize in groundnuts may be part of the groundnut cluster as well.13 BSSs with specific skills 
in groundnut processing may not be part of the tomato cluster. On the other hand, BSSs with 
generic skills in agricultural extension may provide services to both groundnut and tomato 
producers and be considered as stakeholders in both clusters.  
 
Agribusiness clusters do not develop without explicit attention. They need local actors who 
invest substantially in getting the right people together and who drive the formation process. 
We call such actors the ‘local champions.’ If the process is supported or triggered by a BSS, we 
define the BSS as the facilitator or the catalyst.14 Sometimes, the cluster formation process is 
driven by an external actor, e.g., a wholesaler or supermarket chain subcontracting a series of 
producers to supply a commodity. We define such an actor as the lead firm, not as the local 
champion, and not as a facilitator (catalyst). 
 
In the next example we describe an agribusiness cluster in Togo that comprises two different 
types of producers: one group that grows maize (and is willing to invest in growing a specific 
variety of maize as feed for dairy farming) and the other comprised of dairy farmers and their 
association, that are progressively intensifying their dairy farms to cover increasing demand, 
mainly from urban citizens in southern Togo. 
 
                                            
12 To a lesser extent, because groundnut producers that produce for different markets (e.g., local/urban, or local 
market for non-processed/processed groundnuts) may share common concerns with respect to input supply 
relationships, varietal selection, agricultural production technologies, etc. Whereas the ‘barriers to entry’ are quite 
low for many value chains supplying relatively cheap food products for local and urban markets, farmers may leave 
channel choices open and supply the same groundnuts through different value chains. 
13 Obviously, there might be some ‘inter-relationships’ between tomato and groundnut production, and clusters 
within the same region (e.g., when financial services are provided by the same institutions for both the 
commodities or when buyers [traders] are interested in groundnuts and tomatoes for the markets that they serve, 
etc.). These linkages provide opportunities for diversification. 
14 BSS refers to an organization that provides business support services. BSSs can be private/public organizations, 
for profit and not-for-profit. In Chapter 6, on facilitating CASE, we discuss in more depth the meaning and scope of 





Example  The yellow maize cluster in the coastal area of Togo: an interesting lesson 
 
In the first half year of 2007, contacts were established between maize producers and poultry farmers 
within the Association Nationale des Producteurs Avicoles du Togo (ANPAT). The idea was quite 
simple: There are a growing number of poultry farmers in southern Togo. Many of them rely on 
expensive, imported products to feed their chickens. On the other hand, there is a large group of cereal 
producers looking for a reliable market. In fact, both groups were active in different clusters and 























Figure 5.  Schematic representation of the initial poultry cluster in Southern Togo to which 
the cereal farmers were not connected 
 
Several meetings were organized and an informal agreement was finally reached on quantities 
(170 metric tons [mt], to be provided by the POs of Afagnan, Ahépe, Tabligbo and Agbélové 
communities, all in the southern coastal area of Togo) and prices (100 FCFA/kg for the normal local 
varieties of white maize and 120 FCFA/kg for yellow maize). The maize would be collected at the farm 
gate after drying and packaging by the farmers. ANPAT was supposed to propose a formal contract to 
the POs. The four POs received a first draft contract, but for various reasons the final contract was 
never signed, and as a consequence, the amendments proposed by the POs were not taken into 
account. Collectively, only 64 mt were delivered by the four POs.  
 
A closer look reveals that ANPAT asked the farmers not to use CPPs after harvest; CPPs are normally 
used by farmers to avoid insect attacks. The farmers agreed to this, on the condition that ANPAT would 








however, and their visits were scattered over a period of six weeks. After the 2007 harvest, the maize 
price quickly rose (due to bad harvests) and the producers decided not to wait for ANPAT but to sell 
part of their stock at the local market. This included a delivery of 50 mt of maize to the hospital in 
Afagnan. Increased insect damage also affected their choice. The financing of purchases appeared to be a 
problem as well. Only a few members of ANPAT provided funds, and ANPAT had to pre-finance the 
purchases from its own reserves. According to ANPAT, however, the payment was not delayed because 
of insufficient finances but due to the low average weight of the bags collected (only 86 kg on average 
against the expected 100 kg). Apparently, the bags were not weighed at the point of delivery and 
farmers made use of local bowls of varying volumes to fill the bags.  
 
Despite the difficulties, all actors insist that they like to continue with the exercise of bringing two 























Figure 6. Schematic representation of the poultry cluster in Southern Togo with cereal 
farmers supplying yellow maize to feed the chicken integrated. 
 
 
No party seems to be ready to take the initiative. This is still very much left to the cluster advisor of 
IFDC/1,000s+, who acts as the facilitator. The experience demonstrates several lessons: (1) the 
importance for all parties to better understand their shared interests, and to evaluate their own and 
each other’s capacities to honor engagements (e.g., funding mechanisms and logistics management within 
ANPAT); (2) to push contract negotiations to their conclusion (i.e., informal agreements are not 
enough, contracts also need to anticipate risks, yield/price fluctuations and clearly define responsibilities 
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Discussion: The boundaries of an agribusiness cluster 
 
A question often asked is what does ‘local’ mean, or how are the geographic frontiers of any 
agribusiness cluster defined? There is no simple answer to this question and probably not even just one 
‘right’ answer. The most important consideration, however, is that cluster actors typically should be able 
to meet each other regularly, in order to build trust, to understand each other’s business, and to 
monitor inter-firm/farm agreements. In the context of SSA, in particular due to the bad shape of many 
roads in rural areas and the tendency to ‘distrust’ the stranger, this may lead (initially) to a very limited 
geographic area, involving just a few neighboring villages. Preferably some bigger towns and business 
centers should be within a reasonable distance to enable farmers to link up with local enterprises and to 
develop insights into consumer preferences (i.e., the ‘demand relations’ mentioned earlier). Such insights 
including consumer feedback are crucial to strengthen competitive strategies and to develop new ideas 
with respect to products and market development. With time, the geographical area of the agribusiness 
cluster may expand, entailing more or less radical changes in communication strategies. In a recent 
training program, a participant from Burkina Faso asked if the National Agricultural Research Institute, 
which was regularly involved in the mentoring of farmer-field schools in the southern part of the 















Figure 7.  Locality and cluster agents: example from Burkina Faso 
 
 
Our preference, under the given circumstances, was to consider the research institute, which was based 
at a relatively large distance from the farmers, as ‘external’ to the cluster. In fact, the costs of the 
services were relatively high as they included substantial expenditures for travel and DSA of key staff 
involved. It was therefore advised to look for a local BSS that could (gradually) take over part of the 
services provided by the national research institute. The researchers of the national institute would still 
be involved, in the short-term for the training of the key staff of the local BSS, thereafter, for technical 




Facilitation of farmer-field school by 
research institute, located in the centre 
of Burkina Faso (over 200 km distance) 
Southern part of Burkina Faso  
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3.3 Value chain development 
 
The overwhelming attention to value chain development over the last decade or so is certainly 
inspired by an increasing awareness of the complexity of strengthening the participation of 
smallholder farmers and entrepreneurs in domestic and global markets.15 This awareness stems 
from the unsatisfactory results of single actor and/or locally restricted rural development 
interventions, and also by macro-economic adjustments. The former failed to connect local 
actors and stakeholders durably to other agents, and the latter failed to bring widespread 
market development. Both failed to advance the private sector beyond its already limited 
confines.16 As a consequence, emphasis has shifted from government policies and sector-specific 
and more or less territorial approaches to development, to the inter-relationships between 
farm-households and other local and non-local actors actually or potentially involved in market 
development. 
 
What is a value chain? A value chain describes a range of activities that are necessary to bring a 
product or service from its conception through the different phases of production to the final 
consumers. It may also include the final disposal of the product or service after use (adapted 
from Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000). Value chains describe inter-linked activities both within and 
between firms and farms, and traverse several economic sectors. A key issue is that value is 
being added at each segment in the chain. Value can be added to a commodity in several ways: 
by producing it (as farmers do), by transforming it (as processors do), by making it accessible at 
the right place and time (as traders do) and by adding services to it (as some traders do – e.g., 
agro-input dealers that provide advice to farmers).  
 
The notion of the value chain is somewhat ambiguous. Much of the earlier value chain literature 
concentrates on the intra-firm value chain (i.e., on the flow of the raw materials and sub-
products within the factory until the finished product). The term ‘supply chain management’ 
largely refers to such firm level management of supply chains, including the buying (sourcing) of 
the raw materials. For our purposes, it is sufficient to keep in mind that value chains may 
comprise both intra-firm and inter-firm relationships. Nevertheless, we tend to concentrate on 
the inter-firm relationships, and thus on the flow of the product from one segment (i.e., chain 
function) and actor to another.  
 
                                            
15 Recent contributions are Bijman et al., 2006; Ruben et al., 2007; and Vorley et al., 2007. It is noted that much of 
the literature on agro-food value chains is devoted to international chains – e.g., exports of agro-food products 
from SSA – and the impact of globalization (and supermarket-led global value chains) on smallholder farmers. A 
totally different set of contributions, involving both researchers and practitioners, comes from the ‘making markets 
work for the poor’ (MMW4P, Ferrand et al., 2004) movement; MMW4P also includes attention for integration of 
‘poor’ consumers in domestic and world markets (Prahalad, 2006). 
16 See Collier et al. (1997), Jayne et al. (2002), Kherallah et al. (2000), World Bank (2002) and Dorward et al. (2004) 
for discussions on this issue. Kherallah (2002) and Jayne et al. (2002) emphasize incomplete and poor 
implementation as limiting the potentially positive effect of structural adjustment. The World Bank (2002) points to 
failing institutions to support market development, an argument supported by Dorward et al. (2004) though 
focusing specifically on transaction costs and coordination problems in value chains. Collier et al. question the 
adequacy of the adjustment strategy as policymakers in developing countries were generally unwilling – or unable – 





A simple presentation of a value chain is given in Figure 8.  
 
 
Figure 8. Schematic presentation of a value chain  
 
In fact, Figure 8 can be said to contain several value chains (i.e., the agro-input value chains and 
the commodity value chain that brings the product from the farmer to a precise consumer 
segment). The chains that supply inputs to farmers are quite different from the chains that 
transform and supply a commodity to their final consumer. Seed, fertilizer and CPPs, all involve 
different value chains as well. Market integration of farmer-entrepreneurs, as a result, involves 
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Another notion that frequently causes some confusion, in particular in francophone countries, is the 
concept of a filière. Whereas in principle the differences with a value chain approach or analysis do not 
seem significant (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000), the use of a filière approach in agribusiness in SSA 
actually often suggests a much broader orientation – i.e., involving several value chains at once (e.g., 
the filière riz in Mali comprises all rice farmers in Mali and all other actors involved in processing and 
marketing of rice). The emphasis in a filière approach is on the systemic relationships between input 
distribution, production, processing and trade for a specific commodity; each sector (e.g., production) 
is in itself regarded as a sub-system. As a result, the filière approach puts less emphasis on the specific 
actors that are involved in the various segments (e.g., input distribution, transport, production, 
processing, etc.) and the degree of interrelation and connection between these actors. In our opinion, 




1. Upward integration in agro-input value chains 
2. Downward integration in commodity value chains 
 
A word of caution on the notion of a consumer may be needed here. Farmers are consumers 
too (e.g., of agro-inputs); many farmers are buyers of agricultural produce for home 
consumption. Whereas availability and affordability are essential chain characteristics to supply 
agricultural products to consumer segments, these characteristics are equally important for 
agro-input supply chains that target smallholder farmers. 
 
CASE promotes the use of a very specific actor-oriented notion of a value chain. The value 
chain, from our perspective, involves only those actors that effectively engage in the 
transactions of a product on its way to its final form and destination. Value chains are 
supported by financial and business service providers. A transporter who does not ‘own’ the 
product, but simply brings the product from one ‘owner’ to another, is seen as a service 
provider. In doing so, we only consider those actors as part of the value chain or the business 
system, who really have something to share. They stand out to gain directly from knowing each 
other better (i.e., trust), from learning together and/or sharing of information, and from 
improved coordination of action (and investment).  
 
In Figure 9, a highly stylized example is given of various value chains involving mango producers 
and traders in Mali.  
 
How many different (mango) value chains do we see here? There are quite a lot, actually, if we 
follow the rationale of the CASE approach to the letter. In fact, the chain that leads directly 
from producers in Koulikoro to consumers in the same area has to be distinguished from the 
chain that targets the same consumer segment but involves intermediary local traders. The 
chain that leads from the mango producers in Koulikoro via traders to Bamako is another one. 
This chain is, by the way, not the only one that serves the consumers in Bamako. There is 
another value chain, which involves the mango producers from the Sikasso Region and the 
traders that buy their mangoes and supply these to the same market. When two value chains 
supply the same market segment, competition may come into play. The competition may be 
between the producers from the two regions, if the traders involved are the same (e.g., they 
buy mangoes – directly or indirectly – from the Sikasso and Koulikoro Regions) or operate 
within a well-coordinated network. Producers from Sikasso and Koulikoro may also coordinate 
their activities – as to decrease the level of, or even avoid competition. The more we would 
know about the whole system, the more detailed the diagram would become. Local traders 
may be distinguished from traders that operate from a distance (e.g., from Bamako). Collectors 
may be linked to a specific group of traders (e.g., the exporters). In addition, the stringent 
quality requirements in the mango export chain will lead to subordinated value chains for those 
mangoes that have been selected. Note: the chain map presented lacks substantial information 
in terms of volumes that flow through each channel; it also lacks detail on costs and profit 
margins. Such information may not always be available or easy to collect, and not all actors will 
have the same capacity (and incentive) to invest in collecting this information. We will come 





Figure 9. Example of different mango value chains in Mali  
 
 As the number of inputs and intermediary goods grows, the value chain network may become 
quite complex to describe (and to visualize). As with all methodologies to structure a problem 
situation, simplification is essential. The most important question when drawing a value chain or a 
network of value chains (‘value chain mapping’) is not whether all actors are presented, but 
whether  it presents sufficient detail to analyze major bottlenecks (e.g., access to inputs) and 






S1, S2: Mango Producers (Sikasso region, Mali) 
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Tiger nuts may provide a means to diversify 
sources of income for farmers in the cotton 
areas of southern Mali. Currently, the tiger nuts 
are sold on local and urban markets; tiger nuts 
are used in several local dishes. However, 
producers have started to contact their 
Burkinabe colleagues to discuss opportunities for 
collaboration. Demand for tiger nuts on the 
world market is growing; in particular, Spain 
imports large quantities. Contacts with exporters 
have already resulted in contracts worth over 50 
million FCFA (US $100,000). The main concern 
of the tiger nut producers is to raise their 
productivity through appropriate fertilization. 
The photographs respectively show a learning 
plot (see Chapter 5), women sifting the straw 
and the sand from the nuts, packaging of the tiger 
nuts for transport, and transport of the tiger 
nuts. 
 
(Top photograph by Alain S. Traore; all  others 








Example: Soybean value chains in southern Togo 
 
Several soybean value chains in southern Togo are supported by 1,000s+. Whereas in central and 
northern Togo soybean was seen as an interesting leguminous crop in rotation with maize or cotton, it 
was decided in 2006 that more specific attention should be given to soybean producers and to 
opportunities to link actor groups in clusters and through value chains. PVD, a local NGO, formerly 
supported and trained by the German Development Agency (DED), was identified as a BSS to kick-
start this process and, in particular, to facilitate intensification and market development. Unfortunately, 
due to poor seed quality and bad rainfall, yields in 2006 were catastrophic. Germination rates were 
below 5 percent in many farmer fields, and limited seed availability constrained opportunities for re-
seeding. Despite the difficult circumstances, producers reiterated their interest in soybean production 
because of its ease of cultivation, modest input requirements and positive impact on soil fertility. As 
demand for soybean was growing, producers felt they could capture significant margins on soybean 
production – sometimes far beyond returns on cotton production. Markets are, however, relatively 
little known and perceived as highly volatile; soybean is also not yet perceived as a commodity for 
home consumption.  
 
To ensure producers of a ‘secure’ market for at least part of their soybean production, 1,000s+ 
contacted Agrinova, a trading company involved in, among other things, the import of vegetable oils 
and the export of soybeans. Between January and May 2007, Agrinova started a series of discussions 
with 17 POs involved in soybean production in southern Togo, to negotiate prices and to ensure itself 




Agrinova developed a business plan, which has been submitted to the ‘Banque Régionale de Solidarité’ 
(BRS) in Togo. This will enable Agrinova – a starting enterprise – to pay producers immediately upon 




In June 2007, a contract was signed 
between the 17 POs and Agrinova in 
Togo, involving 264 producers, who will 
grow soybeans on an area of about 90 ha 
– which is five times the area on which 
































3.4 Transaction governance capacity-building 
 
The concept of transaction governance capacities has been taken from C.K. Prahalad’s inspiring 
book, ‘The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid.’ In the words of Prahalad, “transaction 
governance capacity is about making the entire process as transparent as possible and consistently 
enforced.” The third pillar of the CASE approach was initially labeled as the ‘strengthening of the 
institutional environment for agribusiness’ or ‘lobbying and advocacy for an enabling 
agribusiness environment.’ Both definitions were basically acceptable, although somewhat vague, 
all-encompassing, and with little direct linkage to the first two pillars of the CASE approach. In 
fact, the CASE approach is not meant to address the huge challenge of improving overall 
institutional frameworks at regional and (sub-)national levels. The more limited notion of 
transaction governance capacity is to the point because it draws attention specifically to those 
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Cluster formation and value chain development have a greater chance to flourish when the 
rural (or agribusiness) investment climate improves. Governance here refers to all sorts of 
institutional arrangements that facilitate and generate coordination. We take institutions as 
encompassing norms, business ethics, laws and (micro-) regulations and even organizations.17 
Institutions may have a public character, i.e., established through government or civil society, or 
a private character, e.g., induced by a lead firm specifying the quality characteristics of a certain 
product. 
  
We distinguish three aspects of governance:  
  
 Rule-making 
 Rule-monitoring  
 Rule-enforcement  
 
Rule-making governance refers to the processes by which laws, rules (micro-regulations) and 
standards are set by government institutions, civil society and/or the private sector. Of course 
no standard set is a ‘governing’ principle immediately; legitimacy of the public, civil society and 
private sector agents involved in setting such principles may still have to be assured. The 
‘power’ of lead firms and consumer associations may also play a role and directly or indirectly 
influence cluster and chain actors to live up to their expectations. Rule-monitoring governance 
is about the processes by which adherence to laws and standards set is checked. This can be 
done by the actors involved in the ‘industry’ or the value chain, or by BSSs specifically hired or 
established for such tasks. From our CASE perspective, rule-enforcement relates to all the 
processes that enable cluster and chain agents to comply to laws, rules and standards set, as 
well as to the capacity to exercise sanctions (including ‘exclusion’ from the specific cluster or 
value chain).18 
 
To avoid confusion, we will refer to transaction governance capacity only when we deal with 
the wider business environment. Agribusiness cluster formation and value chain development 
deal with the institutional arrangements specifically designed and implemented at a cluster or 
chain level. In practice, we will not always be able to make a clear distinction between the wider 
institutional environment (also referred to in this document as the ‘windows of opportunity’) 
and cluster- or chain-specific arrangements; in particularly when the micro-regulations are in 
fact tributary to government policy, prevailing business ethics or otherwise inspired by wider 
institutional dynamics.  
                                            
17 Transactions within organizations follow a separate set of rules, which are typical for the organization. 
18 The classification is very much in line with Kaplinsky and Morris (2000), who distinguish legislative, judicial and 
executive governance. Their distinction refers, from our perspective, a bit too much to laws and governance 




Figure 11. The business environment (including Transaction Governance Capacity [TGC]) 
























The late Joseph Houngnonvi, extension agent and prefect of Klouekanme community (Benin), 
actively sustained changes towards more land tenure security, in particular for women and young 
farmers. After complaints of women farmers involved in ISFM learning plots, who were unable to 
reap the fruits of soil fertility investment (as landowners often withdrew the land from them after 
only one season), he introduced a ‘formal’ contract, enabling farmers to rent land from larger 
landowners for a certain period. Typically, such contracts would involve land just planted with palm 
oil trees, and the contract would cover the period until these trees reached maturity (three to 
four years).  (Photograph by A. Maatman) 
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Kwaebibirem fish farmers visiting Tropo 
Farms in the Volta Region in 2008 to lobby 
for a larger supply of fingerlings. The 
farmers used the visit to learn about how 
floating hampers (in the background) can be 
used to produce fish in running water. 
(Photograph by Victor A. Clottey) 
 
 
Example:  The CASE approach used to support fish farming in the Kwaebibirem 
District of Ghana 
 
In 2007, a group of farmers in the Kwaebibirem District interested in fish farming and eager to convert 
some of the so-called ‘waste’ land into aquaculture contacted the secretariat of IFDC partner Apex 
Farmers Organization of Ghana (APFOG) to assist in developing their business and association. 
Following the request, the consortium to which APFOG belongs, the Ghana Agricultural Associations 
Business and Information Centre (GAABIC), visited to the ponds and held meetings with association 
leaders and the directorate of both the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and the Ministry of Fisheries. 
As there were fish traders among the membership of APFOG, the farmers were linked to the fish 
traders who visited the ponds. Subsequently, the ponds were harvested and the fish sold, creating a 
linkage between the farmers and the fish traders from Accra. The fish farmers expressed interest to join 
APFOG and started procedures to legalize their association by registering with the Registrar’s General 
Department and APFOG. They are now full-fledged members of APFOG under the name Kwaebibirem 


















The fish farmers’ association was faced with an inadequate supply of fingerlings. The collaboration with 
the Ministry of Fisheries enabled the Kwaebibirem Fish Farmers’ Association to be included in the 
national fingerlings distribution program. The objective of the program is to distribute fingerlings (male 
tilapia) to fish farmers across the country to increase fish production. As a result, the association 
accessed 55,000 fingerlings through Tropo Farms. Feed for the fingerlings was also provided free of 
charge by the Ministry of Fisheries. Though the initiative is a step in the right direction, the support was 
insufficient as compared with the promised 200,000 tilapia fingerlings by the ministry. The association is 







The Association is taking steps to get its own source of fingerlings. One of its members in Nkawkaw has 
started producing fingerlings for his own farm and for those of other members. The technique he uses 
still needs some improvement because he is not able to produce all the male fingerlings that are 
required. The APFOG secretariat contacted Aqua Farms to have some members of the Kwaebibirem 
Fish Farmers Association included in their training program to learn techniques of sex-reversal and hand 
selection of male fingerlings. 
 
A major challenge in this cluster area is access to land. The presence of minerals in the area, mainly 
diamond, has compounded the issue because much of the land that was originally meant for agricultural 
purposes has been turned into mining areas.  For this reason traditional leaders and policymakers are 
reluctant to release land to fish farmers. Since most fish farmers and potential fish farmers have 
expressed their concern about this, GAABIC facilitated meetings to address the problem. They met with 
the traditional leaders to seek their assistance and met with the district chief executive (DCE) and the 
Kwaebibirem District Assembly to ask them to lend support to the initiative. Finally, as a result of the 
official launching of the Kwaebibirem Fish Cluster in October 2007, all parties to seek their assistance, 
traditional leaders, the district assembly and the Kwaebibirem Fish Farmers Association, are 
collaborating to ensure the success of aquaculture in the district. The DCE continues to play a key role 





Aqua Farms – a new actor in the fish 
cluster ready to build capacity and supply 




4. Competition and coordination. In search of a delicate balance 
 
Agribusiness cluster formation and commodity chain development depend on the capacities and 
competencies of the major stakeholders and the relationships between them. These 
relationships are shaped by two interacting concepts: (a) competition and (b) coordination.  
 
 
Figure 12. Schematic representation of agribusiness clusters, value chains and (sub-)national 
BSSs and MFIs involved in value chain development 
 
 
Schematically, the following ‘playing fields’ for competition and/or coordination are 
distinguished:  
 
 Between similar actors and stakeholders involved in the agribusiness cluster (e.g., farmers 
competing against each other to optimize agricultural productivity; farmer-controlled 
economic interest groups, pooling demands for inputs, or collecting and distributing market 
information; study-groups who invest and work together to solve specific problems) 
Value Chain 




Input suppliers  
Farmer 
Cooperative (processing, storage) 
Retailer 
Agribusiness Cluster (ABC) 
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 Between the different actors and stakeholders involved in the agribusiness cluster (e.g., 
farmers negotiating with BSSs on the contents and costs of their services; farmers working 
together with local entrepreneurs to analyze market – and channel – opportunities) 
 Between the agribusiness cluster and its actors and up- and down-stream actors involved in 
the same commodity value chain 
 Between similar agribusiness clusters, in various locations (e.g., collaboration between 
actors from different clusters to avoid non-respect of contracts with ‘external’ buyers, 
and/or limit price falls as a consequence of large uncontrolled fluctuations in supply) 
 Between agribusiness (cluster and value chain) actors and the government (competition 
between public and private enterprises; or dialogue with decentralized authorities to define 
complementary public investment, which strengthens business performance)  
 
In the next two sections we will give some specific attention to the notions of competition and 
coordination. Contrasting competition and coordination have proven to be efficient in 
stimulating a better and shared understanding of the issues at stake in agricultural and 
agribusiness development. Competitive strategy, which is dealt with in Section 4.3, profits from 




Competition drives or motivates innovation, and innovation is generally considered the 
principal process by which competitiveness is established and maintained.  
 
Innovation may refer to technological as well as organizational and inter-organizational or 
institutional change. Regarding value chain development, the current notion of upgrading is 
gradually replacing (or encapsulating) the concept of innovation. Upgrading puts less emphasis 
on the ‘newness’ of technologies, procedures and/or arrangements. Upgrading refers to all 
sorts of measures and pathways that strengthen the competitiveness at firm, cluster and/or 
value chain level. Such pathways also include simply ‘doing old things a little bit better’ or 
‘copying/adopting best-bet technologies from others.’ In this document, we will make no major 
difference between both concepts. Innovation and/or upgrading in business involve the 
following two aspects: 
 
1. Improving the product or service concerned (in terms of costs, quality and delivery) at : 
a. Enterprise (farm/firm) level 
b. Cluster level (through better relationships and logistics) 
c. Value chain level (through better relationships and logistics) 
2. Expansion of the consumer segment (market) that is served. A distinction may be made 
between: 
a. Expansion of the number of consumers served within an already known 
market/segment 
b. Targeting a totally new consumer segment (e.g., ‘richer’ consumers) 
 
Competition in agribusiness is progressively changing from firms/farms operating within the 
same industry, to competition between agribusiness clusters and, subsequently, between 
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different commodity value chains supplying the same market segment. Such changes are 
important to keep in mind. In CASE, we tend to concentrate on the ‘direct’ competitors, i.e., 
firms/farms, clusters and/or value chains supplying a similar product to the same consumer 
segment. From this point of view, the producers of potatoes in the Sikasso Region (Mali) who 
all produce for the Bamako Market are largely competitors. Producers of onions for the local 
market and those that produce for a supermarket chain are not direct competitors. Of course, 
many producers do not supply for just one market segment and may therefore compete in 
different arenas. Suppliers and producers are not seen as direct competitors because they 
occupy different functions. However, they are opponents in one of the many negotiation 
processes in the value chain. Their relative bargaining power is considered here as a 
competitive force. 
 
Figure 13 schematically presents the competitive playing fields for the tomato producers in 
northern Togo who serve a specific consumer segment (Lomé Market for fresh tomatoes). 
Competitive forces are presented for two different value chains involving tomato producers 
from two regions (A and B), supplying the same market segment.  
 
Obviously, the tomato producers within the same region (region A in Figure 13) will compete 
against each other to minimize production costs and to ensure quality and delivery 
characteristics agreed upon with the trader/traders involved. Differential factor productivity 
translates into higher profits. Therefore, if some producers succeed in decreasing the 
production costs against others who do not, their profits might increase. Larger profits also 
enable producers to invest in agricultural inputs that strengthen productivity further. This 
depends on the prices that the farmers are able to negotiate with the traders. Traders that are 
aware of the decreasing production costs and who have strong bargaining power may insist on 
re-negotiating the price. Too much competition between tomato producers in the same region 
may become devastating for the competitive position of all of them. This may occur if tomato 
producers try to make individual deals, by proposing lower prices than the minimum price 
advised by the PO of the regional tomato producers. In the long run, the tomato producers in 
region A have something to gain from ‘healthy’ competition, which restricts the degree of 
rivalry and includes tomato producers collectively in the innovation process. Supply from region 
A may also augment if there is additional effective demand or if their market share can be 
increased. In doing so, the tomato producers may compete more intensely with other 





Figure 13. Competitive forces in a (tomato) value chain 
 
 
Tomato producers in region A may also gain from cluster formation by linking up with input 
suppliers, BSSs and MFIs, thereby decreasing the costs or improving the quality of the tomatoes 
produced. Cluster advantages are more difficult to copy than individual farm-level advantages 
and may be more profitable and of longer duration (i.e., they raise the barriers to entry). Finally, 
the agribusiness cluster may strengthen its integration in specific tomato value chains through 
vertical integration or through more ‘exclusive’ input supplier-clusters and cluster-buyer 
contracts. The latter will generally involve a shift to more specific and higher quality products, 
with opportunities for branding. We talk of vertical integration when actors invest in additional 
activity located down- or upwards in the commodity value chain, e.g., when a tomato producer 
invests in drying tomatoes or when a PO invests in buying and distributing inputs.19  
                                            
19 For those interested in management theory. The example describes precisely the five competitive forces, as 





Suppliers’ (agro-input dealers) bargaining power Buyers’ (traders) bargaining power 
Tomato producers industry 
Tomato cluster – region A 
Threat of new entrants (i.e., 
producers that will start 
producing tomatoes for the same 
market segment)  
Rivalry between tomato 
producers, at the same location 
 
Rivalry at different locations 
Threat of substitute products (other 
products that could substitute for ‘fresh’ 






Discussion: The role of intermediaries  
 
Discussion on the role of intermediaries may be useful here. The term may lead to some 
misunderstanding. Almost all actors could be considered intermediaries because most chain agents deal 
with both up- and down-stream agents. However, we normally use the term ‘intermediary’ only for 
those actors involved in the distribution of a product (i.e., inputs, outputs) and not in any transformation 
(production, processing). Collectors of agricultural produce, traders and retailers are all intermediaries. 
Market chains in SSA are often characterized by a series of intermediaries between the producer or 
manufacturer of agricultural inputs and the farmer, and between the farmer, processor and the 
consumer. Some of these intermediaries may offer little real added value and are merely there because 
the business network simply functions that way. Vertical integration of POs may be an efficient means to 
bypass intermediaries. However, cautiousness may be required to ensure that the PO is effectively 





























Input dealer in Sikasso (Mali) and Jean-Luc Z. Sanogho, 
staff member of the Institut d’Economie Rurale (IER). 
Small-scale retailers play an important role in supplying 
fertilizers to horticultural (and other non-cotton) 
farmers in the Sikasso/Koutiala region. (Photograph by 
Arno Maatman) 
 
Transport of cereals by motorbike in 






Commodity value chain development in SSA is severely hampered by high transaction costs. 
With transaction costs we mean all the costs involved in preparing, making and monitoring, 
ensuring the exchange. For a buyer, this includes:  
 
 Finding out what product/service is wanted  
 Finding out where to find it and at what cost 
 Going there, waiting for the person 
 Bargaining or negotiating a contract 
 Monitoring (e.g., of labor), and all other activity necessary to ensure that all stick to the 
agreement 
 
The seller has more or less similar costs, including all costs related to enforcing payment. 
Commission costs for brokers are also part of the transaction costs. Transaction costs are 
different from ‘transformation’ costs, which include all costs related to production, processing 
and transportation of the commodity. Transformation costs add value to the product, whereas 
transaction costs do not. When transaction costs are too high, the exchange may not take 
place. If this happens, economists speak of a transaction failure. Three sources of transaction 
costs can be distinguished (adapted from Dorward et al., 2004): 
 
1. Costs related to risk of corruption: Corruption is a socio-politically constructed 
mechanism to ensure privileged access of public agents to the economic rent accruing to 
targeted private sector agents. Corruption involves rent-raiding and refers in a certain 
way to the opportunism of government officials (see below).20  
2. Costs related to risk of opportunism: Opportunism refers to inefficient behavior of other 
economic agents from the viewpoint of the entire commodity value chain. Opportunists 
are actors that cannot be trusted, or that abuse monopolistic bargaining power. 
Opportunistic behavior includes any failure of an agent to comply with (in)formal 
agreements, e.g., simply because alternatives seem more profitable to him/her.  
3. Coordination costs: Coordination is needed between agents in the same commodity 
value chain because the returns to their activities (investments) are inter-dependent, e.g., 
when an investment somewhere in a commodity value chain depends on complementary 
investments further down or further upwards in the same chain. This may quickly become 
a ‘prisoner’s dilemma,’ when no single actor is willing to invest first, if he is not assured of 
the actions of the other actors. This is especially true for inter-related investments in 
commodity value chains in a context of thin and fragmented markets as is the case in 
much of SSA.  
 
 
                                            
20 Rent-raiding is an appropriate term here because it acknowledges that the government is entitled to some kind 
of rent-seeking in commodity value chains as a consequence of their effective involvement (effective law/contract 
enforcement, establishment of proper regulations and services for quality control, truth-in-labeling, investments, 
e.g., in research and development), Dorward et al., 1998. 
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Coordination problems often stem from a lack of reliable information with regards to the 
capacities of other actors potentially involved in parallel activities and/or investments to live up 
to their promises. To supply high-quality potatoes to an upper market consumer segment in 
Ouagadougou, producers may need to invest in high-quality seeds and improved crop 
management methods. Traders need to invest more or less simultaneously in timely 
transportation, and appropriate packaging and handling of the superior quality potatoes. Other 
actors may be involved, e.g. the seed supplier, the truck driver, and an MFI. The lack of 
confidence in the ability of the trader to develop sustainable linkages with his or her clients may 
deter the producer from investing. A lack of trust from the MFI in the ability of the producer to 
respect the crop management methods and to assure timely delivery may cancel the loan. The 
loan could also be canceled if the MFI is simply unaware of the existence of a trader or 
uncertain of the reliability of a trader who seems to be willing to buy the superior quality 
potatoes.  
 
Within the context of CASE, coordination problems, refer to difficulties in aligning activity (and 
investment) in actor groups (such as POs), or within clusters and along value chains. Aligning 
activity requires institutional arrangements (or coordination mechanisms). Four different drivers 
of coordination (mechanisms) are distinguished:  
 
1. Informal/formal (i.e., contractual) relationships between cluster and/or chain partners that 
ensure alignment of activity  
2. Organizational development, i.e., through horizontal and vertical integration, or by 
integrating financial (self-financing) and BSSs  
3. Regulations – e.g. laws or policies that stimulate coordination – enforced through 
government  
4. Business ethics, as part of culture, or enforced by business associations and/or civil 
society 
 
We refer to the first set of mechanisms as ‘alliances’ and to the second one as ‘do it yourself.’ 
Alliances also include the relationships along value chains as enforced and supervised by a lead 
firm (e.g., a supermarket chain). The cotton marketing boards are an appealing example of the 
third case. Here, so-called ‘hard’ (i.e., exogenously established) institutional arrangements 
ensure coordination. The state-owned marketing board assures access to credits and inputs, 
and exercises monopolistic power on the cotton purchasing and exportation (see also the box 
on interlocked contracts). Though the failures of many state-owned marketing boards are well 
documented, the private sector, left to itself, has not been able to overcome the coordination 
problems.21 Legislation and business ethics are part of transaction governance capacity 
(Section 3.3). 
                                            






Example: (Cluster) Financing – strategy  
 
In several cases, POs and local entrepreneurs already have relationships with financing institutions, in 
particular the MFIs. Access to credit remains severely limited, however, due to several interacting 
factors: lack of quality loan applications, high interest rates (due to the perceived riskiness of the loan 
application and lack of saving and/or guarantee funds), and limited capacity of MFIs to provide long-term 
loans (availability of capital). In addition, MFIs typically provide small amounts of loans to each client 
through credit rationing. 1,000s+ implemented a series of local training workshops involving POs, local 
entrepreneurs and MFIs to strengthen capacities of local actor groups in formulating and negotiating loan 
applications and in  building trust among the local actor groups and MFIs.  
 
The fear for coordination risks of loans at the MFIs can be reduced by showing the cluster linkages 
and/or chain relationships that are established by the loan applicant and by explaining how chain 
coordination is ensured. In addition, coordination risks can be reduced through chain and/or cluster 
financing, in which the loan application is developed jointly by two or more inter-linked cluster and chain 
actors. Each actor then receives a part of the loan, which enable him/her to align activities and 
investments. 
 
The 1,000s+ project approached the ‘Banque Régionale de Solidarité’ in Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso and 
Mali to expand opportunities to access credit for partner organizations. The BRS is a relatively new 
structure and very much willing to consider loan applications related to agricultural production (e.g., 
inputs, storage of agricultural products, small-scale equipment for processing and trade). They accept 
applications from ‘marginal’ groups, but processing is lengthy for both parties. IFDC ensures BRS of 
technical backstopping to loan applicants. Coordination risks are further reduced because IFDC ensures 
that each loan application is part of a coordinated action plan at cluster and chain levels. The partnership 
between IFDC and BRS has been formalized through an MOU, signed in May 2007 in Burkina Faso and 
in June 2007 in Togo.  
Interlocked contracts 
 
Formal or informal contracts between two or more parties, involving a series of inter-related 
agreements over a certain time period – e.g., to enable production by agent A and to secure access 
to (part of the) output for agent B – are called interlocked contracts. Interlocking of transactions may 
be quite efficient to ensure access to inputs (easier to obtain by a ‘larger’ trader) for a certain group 


















4.3 Competitive strategy 
 
CASE aims to improve competitiveness and therefore supports competitive strategy at 
enterprise, cluster, and chain levels. Again, all the different actors and stakeholders within the 
same cluster and within the same value chain have their own resources, objectives and 
strategies. They may compete with each other in order to reduce production costs even 
further and, to increase profits; they will make use of their ‘bargaining’ power to optimize 
returns to investment and profits. They also share a common objective, i.e., to supply the 
targeted consumers with the commodity they are expected to ‘want’ in terms of availability (in 
time, space), quality and price, and to ensure that the commodity chain outcompetes alternative 
competing chains supplying similar products.  
 
Competitive strategy is difficult to achieve in an environment of opportunism and distrust. In 
Section 4.1, we argued that too much rivalry undermines competitiveness. The same could be 
said for negotiations that are too stringent between different actors of the same value chain: 
the entire chain becomes weaker if one of the actors is unable to re-invest in his/her business. 
In Section 4.2, we argued that corruption, opportunism and coordination problems raise 
transaction costs (and risks), and that relatively high transaction costs undermine local 
economic growth. The actual situation in SSA is that (too) many smallholder farmers are 
tempted to engage in markets, and that they are scattered and inefficiently organized. Farmers 
in SSA still generally sell incidental ‘surpluses’, i.e., surpluses not planned beforehand. Whereas 
the volumes of these surpluses vary per farmer, for most traders they are small. The 
predominance of many smallholder farmers bargaining on often remote spot markets with only 
a few buyers (or buyer networks) affects the farmers’ profits and may even impede 
transactions. As a result, smallholder farmers often appear locked in a system of ad-hoc sales 
and cautious partial integration in markets (Fafchamps, 2004). In addition, the incentives for 
traders to compete on those scattered spot markets are minimal and they often assert 
Signature of MOU between IFDC (Togo) and BRS-Togo (left), and IFDC (Burkina Faso) and 
BRS-Burkina Faso (right). Photographs by A. Diallo (Burkina) and U. Rudiger (Togo). 
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themselves to a precisely defined, and maybe even mutually negotiated, area. Transactions of 
larger volumes occur – if at all – through relational and trust-based networks of collectors and 
small-scale traders, reaching out to a limited number of markets (and/or farmers).22 These 
intermediaries subsequently suffer from more or less the same disadvantages as the local 
farmers and micro-enterprises; much work for meager benefits with a high degree of risk. The 
same argument holds for input value chains, which only serve a small, often well-known, 
clientele of POs. 
 
At this point, it could be argued that the principal role of a facilitator within the CASE approach 
is to support the various actors and stakeholders involved, in finding an effective balance 
between competition and coordination. The reader is reminded, however, that competitiveness 
requires uniqueness: a unique product tailored to the needs of the targeted market segment. 
This requires entrepreneurial capacity at the level of the input supplier, the producer, the 
cooperative, the processor, the trader, etc. ‘Smart’ coordination and ‘healthy’ competition 
along the value chain and within the agribusiness cluster are important but not sufficient 
conditions for such uniqueness.  
 
The art of balancing competition and coordination engages many actors and stakeholders at 
different levels and with different capacities, roles and interests. A careful approach seems 
indicated to support the various actors in developing the relationships that support healthy 
competition and nurture the interactive processes required to learn smarter coordination. Such 
a learning process preferably starts with some concrete activity, linking producers in a target 
region together, or linking BSSs to a PO, to upgrade internal processes of production, 
transformation or trade, or to access information on markets, consumer preferences and 
competitor strategies. Trust gradually develops through repeated exchange, more insight in 
each other’s contribution (investments, distribution of risks and of the returns to investment) 
and the realization of common interests. Since risks form an important part of any coordination 
problem, risk minimization strategies, including models to share risks among actors and 
stakeholders, may need to be integrated explicitly in the search for ‘alternative’ coordination 
mechanisms.23 Healthy competition and smart coordination are in fact institutional 
arrangements. Novel arrangements also generate so-called adaptive expectations, which may 
sustain growth and enable a continuously larger portion of the rural population to contribute to 
                                            
22 Networks can be established through bottom-up and top-down mechanisms, or – more often – a combination 
of both. They generally rely partly on socio-familial relationships, partly on processes of trust-building. Networks 
tend to protect themselves from ‘competitors’ through socio-political alliances and ‘power play,’ and may gradually 
evolve into business cartels. All (profitable) networks risk elite capture.  
23 External shocks (weather, price fluctuations of inputs, services and substitute products) and unexpected 
behavior from cluster or value chain agents cause risks. Risk minimization strategies comprise: (1) risk avoidance 
through investment in irrigation, vertical integration and other comprehensive control mechanisms such as peer-
controlled networks, (2) risk reduction through portfolio development, (cautious) sequential decision-making, 
investment in confidence building, information- and risk-sharing mechanisms and (3) insurance. Insurance has 
considerable potential to strengthen coping capacity but may be costly and vulnerable to opportunism (‘moral 
hazard’) and will only work if the risks insured do not occur frequently.  
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and profit from market-driven development (Arthur, 1988).24 At some point, the action may 
also include advocacy and/or lobbying in support of ‘healthy’ competition at higher hierarchical 
levels.  
 
Figure 14 shows the major competitive playing fields in agribusiness: between producers (and 
within other actor groups), between the stakeholders in the same agribusiness cluster, between 
the actors of the value chain, and between value chains. It now also illustrates some 





























Figure 14. Illustration of coordination mechanisms in agribusiness development 
                                            
24 Adaptive expectations are instrumental in pushing ‘self-reinforcing’ processes of market development. It refers 
for instance to the belief of economic actors that when a process or activity starts to grow in size, these will 
continue to do so (‘snowball effect’). 
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Input shops managed by POs may not only 
strengthen access to appropriate inputs for 
producers in the more remote areas; they 
also strengthen professionalism. In northern 
Mali, IFDC supported POs to establish input 
shops. The POs involved buy inputs 
collectively with retailers/wholesalers in 
Bamako. They re-package inputs (in smaller 
quantities) and employ temporary staff able 
to provide advice on input use. The input 
shop also serves to collect produce and 
facilitate networking between traders and 
producers.  
 
POs in central and southern Mali have also 
started input shops. Whereas the input 
shops in northern Mali fill in a crucial gap 
(the absence of on-the-spot input dealers), 
the input shops in other areas have to 
compete with local-level input dealers. 










5. Interlude. Integrated Soil Fertility Management (ISFM) and 
‘learning plots’ as a starting point to build confidence and 
understanding of farmers’ realities 
 
Improving agricultural productivity is a key element in agribusiness cluster formation. 
Agricultural productivity often depends on making better use of ‘external’ agro-inputs. In fact, in 
most parts of SSA, agricultural intensification without using external inputs (better seeds, 
fertilizers, and in some cases appropriate CPPs) and without using them efficiently, is almost 
unimaginable. Current use of improved seeds, fertilizers and CPPs is extremely low throughout 
SSA; significant increases are needed to reverse accelerated erosion and soil fertility decline and 
to boost food production. This holds in particular for the more densely populated areas in SSA, 
where markets provide opportunities for agricultural intensification.25 
 
In this chapter, we will briefly discuss ISFM as a means to improve agricultural productivity. 
IFDC promoted ISFM through so-called ‘learning plots.’ The design and implementation of 
‘learning plots’ mostly follow a farmer field school approach. In the ISFM projects, the sites 
were selected in such a way that agricultural intensification was a realistic option, and the 
learning involved both productivity and economic issues. The ISFM projects led to the CASE 
approach. At the end of this chapter, the reader will understand how CASE not only 
complements ISFM but why it is so different as well. 
 
5.1  Integrated Soil Fertility Management (ISFM)  
 
ISFM refers to the judicious use of mineral fertilizers combined with locally available organic and 
mineral amendments to increase land productivity while maintaining or enhancing soil fertility. 
The basic rationale behind ISFM is simple: using organic resources alone to sustain soil fertility 
and increase productivity is a losing battle. Organic inputs generally have low nutrient contents, 
and large amounts of them would be required to maintain soil fertility levels; therefore, 
sufficient quantities are seldom available. Similarly, the opposite strategy, the sole use of 
inorganic fertilizers, is often not viable. It may lead to yield gains in the short term but usually it 
is unaffordable to the smallholder farmer, may have a negative influence on soil fertility (through 
e.g., acidification) and may lead to declining yields in the long term.  
 
 
                                            
25 Please note that population density is a relative concept. Whereas population density may be considered (too) 
high in relation to the natural resource base, and with reference to a largely agriculturally oriented society that 
makes only very limited use of ‘external’ inputs, such a density may still be considered quite ‘low’ to trigger market 
development through specialization and agriculturally linked economic growth (Van Keulen and Breman, 1990, 
Breman and Debrah, 2003). There are several (though too few) examples of agricultural intensification processes 
in SSA, directly triggered by urbanization and strong rural-urban linkages (Tiffen et al., 1994, Wiggins, 1995). The 
relative scarcity of such examples however already confirms the tenacity of ‘rural poverty’ and the multitude of 
























The best strategy to improve productivity and maintain soil fertility in SSA is therefore a 
combination of inorganic and organic fertilizers, in which the inorganic fertilizer provides most 
of the nutrients and the organic fertilizer increases soil organic matter status, structure and 
buffering capacity. Combined use of inorganic and organic fertilizers improves efficiency of both 
nutrient and water use. The increases in fertilizer-use efficiencies enable farmers to maintain or 
increase production while reducing financial risks and reversing soil fertility degradation 
(Wopereis and Maatman, 2002). IFDC and partner organizations have produced a large number 
of viable ISFM options for the West African environment (IFDC, 2005).26 
 
ISFM is a key component of 1,000s+ and other IFDC-coordinated projects. In most regions, 
agricultural intensification necessitates the use of fertilizers. As fertilizer prices continue to rise, 
the efficiency with which fertilizers are used is critical to farmers, particularly for smallholder 
farmers in SSA who lack the financial means to buy enough fertilizers. In addition, the variable 
context within which most farmers produce warrants the need to incorporate risk management 
strategies in ISFM, e.g., by applying fertilizers sequentially (following seed establishment and 
rainfall distribution) and by combining ISFM with soil and water harvesting and conservation 
technologies. ISFM is promoted through so-called ‘learning plots.’ 
 
                                            
26 See Clottey et al., 2006, for some learning experiences on composting in northern Ghana. 
(Left) Farmer applying fertilizer to her tomato field (Benin); (Right) Litter park (Burkina Faso). 
(Photographs by Willem-Albert Toose [left] and Arno Maatman [right]) 
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5.2 ‘Learning plots’27 
 
Learning plots are guided group learning processes and bring together farmers, extension staff, 
researchers and possibly other stakeholders. Learning plots provide the opportunity for these 
stakeholders to study and understand a range of alternative technologies that all aim for 
agricultural intensification and improved efficiency of fertilizer use. Simultaneously, the process 
of experimentation, including facilitated sessions to observe, analyze and evaluate alternative 
technologies and agro-ecological processes, enables farmers to strengthen their innovative 
capacities. As a result of both the joint experiments with alternative technologies and the larger 
lessons learned in terms of improved innovative capacities, each individual farmer supposedly 
selects and fine-tunes the ‘system’ that is most appropriate for his or her own specific agro-
ecological and socio-economic situation. Learning plots are therefore not an end in themselves, 
but rather a vehicle to trigger individual and collective learning processes. The learning plot 
methodology is based on social and experiential learning theories.  
 
 Social learning: Learning processes organized around learning plots always take place in 
groups. Learning in a group permits members to exchange experiences and ideas, discuss 
possible options, deliberate arguments and compare perspectives to develop new insights. 
Exchange with other farmers (groups) including those outside the village increases access to 
information. The social learning process provides a favorable environment for innovation: 
information sharing becomes more natural and new knowledge may be acquired much more 
easily. Being part of a group or a social network makes approaching other actors (i.e., 
traders, inputs dealers and credit institutions) easier too.  
 Experiential learning: The facilitation of learning plots is based on theories of experiential 
learning and non-formal adult education, which argue that adults learn best if they feel a 
need to change a situation and when the learning topic is closely linked to that situation and 
their experiences (Kolb, 1984). Facilitation of learning plots aims to value farmers’ 
knowledge and is grounded in their experiences and actual agricultural practice; the 
emphasis is on the inventory, appraisal and adaptation of alternative ideas rather than on the 
adoption of one specific technological package. In practice, this means that farmers decide 
which topics will be addressed in the learning process and how the learning process will be 
structured and implemented. The learning process may, for instance, deal with the 
development of a better understanding of actual practices and their consequences, the 
improvement of actual technologies or the development of new, alternative technological 
options. Farmers may also decide that instead of technology development, institutional 
change has become the significant learning objective of the group. Shifting learning processes 





                                            


















Several participatory approaches such as Participatory Learning and Action Research (PLAR) 
(Defoer and Budelman, 2000), farmer field schools (FAO, 2000) and Participatory Technology 
Development (PTD) (Jiggins and De Zeeuw, 1992), also make use of group processes and relate 
to experiential learning theories, as described above. In addition, the specific tools and methods 
proposed by these approaches are also being used for learning plots. The main difference 
between learning plots described here and the participatory approaches is in the intimate 
linkage with agricultural intensification processes, including issues such as credit, purchases of 
inputs, processing and sales of agricultural outputs. As a part of the CASE approach, the 
learning groups proactively strengthen linkages with input and output markets and seek to 
improve their competitive advantage within specific commodity value systems. This implies that 
farmers and other stakeholders learn to deal with a much larger spectrum of inter-related 
complex issues, which stem from poor socio-economic infrastructures, business cartels, poorly 
known consumer preferences and (contradictory) national agricultural and trade policies. The 
learning plots have a more specific focus (i.e., intensification) but comprise a very broad area of 
(learning) activities. 
 
More specifically, ISFM projects typically involve coaching and training farmers on issues such as 
economic profitability and efficiency.28 Consequently, a learning plot primarily focuses on 
farmers who are interested in and willing to invest in increased market integration. In view of 
the argument that adults learn best if the learning topic is closely linked to their situation and 
experiences, farmers’ groups engaged in learning plot activities preferably include several 
farmers who already have some experience with more intensive agricultural practices and with 






                                            
28 Efficiency here relates the results to the use and costs of the various resources involved in the agricultural 
production process, including financial, natural and human (and social) capital. 
Learning group (Togo).  





Learning plots for cotton in Benin 
 
Between 2006 and 2009, IFDC coordinated a project at community level in two cotton-producing 
regions (Banikoara and Dassa-Zoumé) in Benin. The two regions served as learning centers for 
improving competitiveness of the cotton sector. Interventions concentrated on (1) ISFM and 
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) methods to improve productivity and sustainability of cotton 
production systems on degraded soils; (2) improved quality of cotton produced through better 
harvesting and storage methods and more efficient use of CPPs; (3) improved market access for both 
cotton and other agricultural products; and (4) advocacy and lobbying capacities of farmers’ and 
traders’ organizations. The overall objective was to strengthen the capacities of village-level producer 
groups to reduce poverty and improve livelihoods, and to increase sustainability of cotton production 
and natural resource management. The project was linked to the 1,000s+ project. It was anticipated 
that by the end of the project, 10,000 farmers would have the capacity to increase sustainable cotton 
productivity by 30 percent and to increase family incomes by 30 to 50 percent. The organizational 
capacities of farmer groups in the pilot areas would have improved.  
 
Despite a very late start of the project in 2006, 25 learning plots were installed with a major focus on 
learning IPM methods. ISFM activities began earlier. The farmer learning groups met regularly at the 
field site for monitoring and application of IPM methods (‘threshold-based’ pest management) and 
training. The learning process was highly appreciated. Yield levels obtained at the learning plots were 
without exception two or three times higher than normal yields. Production costs were lower 
because of a decrease in the use of CPPs. In ‘threshold-based’ pest management, CPPs are carefully 
used, based upon regular observations of the (type of) insects present in the field (and the plants) and 
the level of infestation. No routine treatments are applied. To apply ‘threshold-based’ management 
properly, farmers should be able to identify the various insects appropriately and determine the 
degree of infestation. Learning plots, the use of visual tools (photographs, drawings) and exchange 












In 2007, more emphasis was put on the scaling-out of learning plot exercises on IPM and 
complementary research-action on ISFM methods. To this end, subcontracts were established directly 
with the POs, with adequate competencies in participatory action-research and extension. Learning 
plot exercises were implemented in 80 villages, of which 60 were in the Banikoara Region and 20 in 
the Dassa-Zoumé Region. Various ISFM methods were tested, depending on the resources of the 
farmers involved (particularly, the possession of livestock): having several pens to rotate animals, 
manure production by keeping animals in stables or temporarily fenced fields,  incorporating crop 
 
Production of manure in litter parks. 
(Photograph by Kokou Djagni) 
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residues in the cotton fields, and combining organic matter application with chemical fertilizers – the 
latter mainly during the cropping season. Yields and productivity were consistently higher on the 
learning plots than on the control fields, even when discounted for the additional labor involved.  
 
The implication of the POs in the design and implementation of the ‘learning plots’ was very useful as 
it encouraged the participation of a large number of producers and the dissemination of information.  
The producer groups were also able to renegotiate the prices for the CPPs when used for ‘threshold-
based’ pest management. There were (at the time) no differences between the types of products used 
for ‘threshold-based’ pest management and the classical treatments. Farmers applying the latter 
typically buy packages of inputs, whereas farmers who want to try out ‘threshold-based’ pest 
management buy smaller quantities and often only one specific product at a time. Input dealers 
wanted to discourage farmers from using ‘threshold-based’ pest management and therefore asked 













The proactive involvement of women producers in the training and learning sessions was received 
with considerable approval – by both male and female producers. Women often do the harvesting, 
and are generally more often in the fields (for weeding, etc.) and are likely to be the first ones to 
observe insect infestations. As a consequence, they play a major role in increasing the efficiency of 
cotton production, including harvesting hand-picking methods. Unfortunately, most training and 
capacity-building efforts are oriented toward the ‘owners’ of the fields, the men – who are not always 
the ones that do the work, nor the ones that regularly supervise the work. Women are also involved 
in farmer-to-farmer extension. A stimulating role was also played by rural radio (in the Banikoara 
Region). Several programs were developed to discuss learners’ experiences. The programs attracted 
the attention of other cotton producers and stimulated exchange between cotton POs.  
 
An interesting learning topic arose towards the end of the project: the management of varying stocks 
of CPPs as the incidence of pests and diseases is not known beforehand. Farmers would prefer to buy 
the CPPs at the moment t they need them. At that time, however, input dealers have run out of stock 
and treatment may start too late. This may not be a crucial issue  now, but it is a totally new one. 
With ‘classical’ treatment strategies, the required volumes of CPPs are more or less known 
beforehand, as the use of CPPs normally follows pre-determined recommendations that do not 
depend on insect and pest manifestations as they appear during the season. Adequate management of 
stocks of CPPs, if the demand is not known beforehand, requires that researchers, extension agents 
and farmers  ‘predict’ the probabilities for various insect infestations per region; it also requires 
coordination between managers of local and regional stocks of CPPs – whether done by the POs 
themselves or by private input dealers. Aat the time, however, availability of inputs for cotton and 
Training session on cotton harvesting in 
the field (Photograph by Edi Kpogan)  
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non-cotton production was an even more challenging problem in Benin, and consequently the primary 
concern of producers and their organizations.  
  
 
In several regions, the ISFM projects could be considered successful. A major problem 
remained the selection of the sites and the identification and selection of farmer groups. 
Farmer-market integration is a risky endeavor. The more the activity is seen as a ‘project 
activity’, the higher the chance that farmers engage opportunistically, or, that they have a 
limited sense of responsibility for the outcomes, even if they are interested and willing to co-
invest. Opportunism here refers to farmers that participate for the wrong reasons (from our 
perspective!). They either want to stay informed of what the project is doing in their 
community to ensure that it will not influence existing power relationships, or they simply hope 
to profit from some free inputs. Even really interested farmers may perceive the project and its 
staff to be their safety net, i.e., when things go wrong, the project will act (and pay). Such 
situations occurred frequently when prices dropped after a good harvest and farmers 
experienced major difficulties selling their produce and reimbursing the loans that were taken 
to purchase the necessary agro-inputs. Clearly, the project needed to do a better job in the 
identification of local champions and the promotion of effective ownership of the innovation 
and market-integration process. A reversal of thinking and in design of the projects was needed 
to effectively stimulate farmer entrepreneurship. The reversal involved a shift from thinking ‘for’ 
poor smallholder farmers to thinking ‘with’ local champions. As a result, also the importance 
that we attached to our own ‘expert’ perceptions of what the major market opportunities 
were and which actors and regions had the highest potential advantages to serve these markets, 
had to be adjusted. The first question we had to ask ourselves was how to identify and how to 






6.  Mobilizing ideas, empowering people and facilitating change  
 
CASE suggests an approach that is based on the potential of real (effective, sustainable) 
competitiveness, an approach that strengthens the capacities of rural champions and inter-
linked actors to innovate technically and economically and to lobby and network for their own 
future. This is much more easily said than done. In this chapter, we will discuss some major 
lessons learned with regard to the profession of facilitating changes from the grassroots and for 
the long term. We will do so by first addressing the three key values or design principles of the 
CASE approach: ‘ownership,’ ‘empowerment’ and ‘sustainability.’29 The ‘key-values’ are essential 
for the effective implementation of the CASE approach. Then, in Section 6.2 we will discuss the 
major steps in the design and implementation of CASE. Three stages are distinguished: (1) the 
mobilization of business ideas; (2) the development of action plans; and (3) the implementation 
of – and support to – action plans. In Section 6.3, we will return to the concept of facilitation; 
what does it mean (to us), and what are the major requirements for being a ‘good’ facilitator.  
 
6.1 CASE values (or design principles) 
 
Ownership 
Agribusiness clusters can only become effective and sustainable when driven by the local actors 
themselves. Competitive strategy depends on local champions who innovate and act to involve 
other actors and stakeholders in a coordinated strategy. Agribusiness development defies the 
notion of an external (and exclusive) ‘problem solver’! Instead, agribusiness cluster formation 
requires locally driven mechanisms for continued (and interactive) learning, exchange of 
information and innovation. CASE supports local ownership by emphasizing (and sometimes 
ensuring):30 
 
 Championship of local actors and stakeholders. They control the agribusiness cluster 
formation process  
 Co-financing of activities foreseen in the action plan (see below) by farmers and local 
entrepreneurs  
 Communication strategies that stimulate internal flows of information among the strategic 
players involved 
 Availability of technical assistance from professional (public and private sector) business 
support services  
 Organizational strengthening to promote joint (interactive) learning and coordinated action 
and to link grassroots organizations to regional and (inter)national organizations/ 
associations for advocacy and lobbying 
 
                                            
29 Note that increased competitiveness and ownership of the processes of agribusiness cluster formation and 
maintenance are the principal drivers behind economic (and also social) sustainability. 
30 See also Binswanger and Atyar, 2003. 
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Careful design and facilitation of multi-stakeholder platforms and decision-making procedures 
are needed to ensure effective dialogue among the various layers of stakeholders. Paternalistic 
or top-down relationships, which limit ownership of the agribusiness cluster formation at the 
‘grassroots,’ should be avoided.31  
 
To strengthen ownership at the level of the producers and/or local entrepreneurs and to 
involve local BSSs, a two-pronged approach is necessary. In this dual approach, the local actors 
are the owners of a cluster formation process or action plan. The owners may opt to, or may 
even be advised to, subcontract – partly with funds from ‘outside’ (e.g., IFDC) – the BSS. The 
BSS may, in turn, receive additional capacity-building and training through the project in order 
to improve its services. The relationships are shown schematically in Figure 15.32 Privileged 
relationships between the CASE facilitator and (sub-)national and local BSSs should be avoided. 
Again, this is contrary to normal practice. Most development projects and support programs 
operate through preferred BSSs, or become otherwise entrenched in the ‘kingdom’ of just one 



















Agribusiness cluster formation and value chain development involve several actors and 
stakeholders with different competencies and negotiating power. The process invariably yields 
uneven outcomes that also change over time. Agribusiness development is a competitive ‘game’ 
                                            
31 It is noted that the concept of ownership used here is essentially related to the innovation process itself (and the 
problem situation, Section on Empowerment) and not (necessarily) to the decision-making procedures with regard 
to a granting mechanism. 
32 Some caution is warranted in regard to the status and professionalism of the local actors, including their capacity 
to formulate and negotiate appropriate contracts with BSSs and to ensure timely payment. In addition, an excess of 









(1) Support (including grants) to ‘owners’ of cluster 
formation process/plan  
(2) Contract between ‘owners’ and BSSs 




and often generates both winners and losers.33 A major aim of the CASE approach is to ensure 
the effective (more equal) participation of relatively vulnerable groups (farm households, firms 
and also the more vulnerable groups within farm-households and firms). Their participation 
should result in an increased ability to raise their income and improve their livelihoods, not just 
for the duration of a project but well beyond. There are no easy roads to ‘empowerment.’ The 
only thing a CASE facilitator can do is to organize support to strengthen the capacity of the 
more vulnerable groups through advice, coaching and training. Whatever the choice, he/she 
engages in a power struggle! 
 
Briefly consider the concept of ‘power’ itself. Ultimately, power is about the freedom to make 
choices (Hogan, 2000). Empowerment in the CASE context refers particularly to the ability of 
individuals and organizations to make informed enterprise choices and to protect their 
investment. This includes, at a minimum, the following aspects:  
 
 Access to information and knowledge of the business in which the actor or actor group 
operates.  
 Access to financial means and ability to cope with ‘external’ shocks (through own reserves 
or insurance).  
 Degree of horizontal organization and strength of bargaining power vis-à-vis other cluster 
actors and up- and downward-value chain agents.  
 Vertical relationships (alliances) with other cluster actors and the ability to shift to other 
actors and channels if needed.  
 
Empowering action often encounters numerous barriers and blockages including political, social, 
cultural and economic. Business cartels, undisclosed agendas of policymakers and other 
powerful actors and skewed information networks all undermine the quest of vulnerable groups 
for more equality and effective participation in agribusiness development. In several cases, a 
radical transformative approach may be required. The intention of the transformative approach 
however should preferably not be to break with the past in the most brutal way but to support 
local initiative to articulate, negotiate and implement change that improves equality. An 
approach that explicitly aims to demonstrate the benefits of effective participation to the more 
powerful actors (in terms of cluster and/or chain performance and competitiveness) as well 
may progressively widen the scope for inclusiveness and empowerment. 
 
Facilitators and facilitating organizations can play an active role in the empowerment strategy by 
assisting farmers and local entrepreneurs to lobby for more information, for better services 
from public and private organizations, for the protection of and respect for their rights, and for 
transparency at the relevant levels of policymaking. Capacity strengthening to re-balance power 
                                            
33 In the long run, agricultural growth for economic development will probably be beneficial for a large majority of 
the population and may even have a relatively greater impact on poor farmers and consumers alike (Chapter 2). 
However, in the short and medium term, any process of transformational change inhibits elements of struggle and 
loss; agribusiness clusters and value chains are often perceived by the actors and stakeholders themselves as arenas 
and agribusiness development as a complex game, with sometimes pretty unfair characteristics. See Stewart (1995) 




relationships should always start with a careful consideration of the actual situation. This may 
include cluster and value chain analyzes that reveal the distribution of profits, in-depth study of 
the negotiation processes linking vulnerable groups to suppliers and/or buyers, and appraisal of 
the financing and information systems (who has access to what) and of the business 
environment (the ‘windows of opportunity’ for the various stakeholders involved). 
 
An inclusive approach needed to reach out to all the relevant local actors and to avoid 
marginalization of the more vulnerable groups is not necessarily contradictory to the CASE 
approach, which fosters rather exclusive competitive processes. Whereas an inclusive approach 
is needed to start an innovative process and stimulate new actors’ involvement, some 
exclusiveness is needed further in the process to stimulate competitiveness and avoid 
opportunists from taking advantage of the investments of others. The challenge lies in the 
design of mobilization strategies to which poorer and more vulnerable people can easily adhere. 
The facilitator may, for instance, try to mobilize women or the youth explicitly, or to involve 
families living with or affected by HIV/AIDS. Moreover, innovativeness is not an inherent 
characteristic of the wealthy, powerful classes; instead, learning groups that discourage the 
‘automatic’ participation of any group – including the powerful ones – are often more 






Examples: Participation of women in agribusiness cluster and value chain development 
activities in Benin, Togo and Niger 
 
In collaboration with BSSs, the 1,000s+ project developed an inventory of female-led enterprises and 
women groups involved in agri-food processing and trading in larger urban centers in several countries 
in West Africa. Local BSSs were also asked to identify local-level women cooperatives involved in 
agricultural production, processing and/or marketing of agri-food products, which could be linked to 
other actors in emerging agribusiness clusters and/or value chains. The results exceeded expectations. 
Several female entrepreneurs could almost immediately be linked to producer groups involved in 
agribusiness cluster formation activities. For example, in Togo, Yayrali is an enterprise that processes 
soybean into milk and tofu; Rose Blanche and Socmel are two enterprises processing cereals into 
nutritious and baby food products; Mesifa processes fonio grains into milk and ice cream products. 
Contacts have been made with female-run enterprises and women associations involved in the 
processing of agricultural products in Benin (Achiribo, a women association of tomato processors and 
traders, and Awokonera, a union of female palm nut processors and traders of soap products) and 
Niger (a women group of rice processors and traders in Gaya Amont; the women union ‘Sape Kgoe’ 






MESIFA (Togo), a female-run enterprise, 
processes fonio into milk and ice cream 
products, which are sold in Lomé.  
(Photo by Edi Kpogan) 
 
SOCMEL (Togo), another female-run 
enterprise, makes baby food and nutritious 
flours from cereal products.  








The enterprises were supported to develop business plans and to strengthen their visibility through 
participation at trade fairs. Local women associations received training in processing techniques 
(improving the quality of palm oil and palm oil based soaps, braising rice; and processing cassava into 
flour and different grades of ‘gari’) and marketing. Women associations in southern Niger also started a 















Members of Awokonera (Benin) 
explaining the soap production process 
to Edi Kpogan, 1,000s+, gender and 
HIV/AIDS specialist. The soap is highly 
valued within local communities as it 
contains no soda and has a neutral smell.  





Sustainability in agricultural and agribusiness development refers to the capacity of all actors and 
stakeholders involved to maintain competitiveness within their respective industries, without 
compromising the livelihoods of others working in the same target area or of future 
generations. In this regard, sustainability has three dimensions: economic, social and ecological 
or environmental. We will start with economic and social sustainability which are conditions 
sine-qua-non for ecological sustainability. In other words, the incentives to invest in ecological 
sustainability require economic and social safety. 
 
The economic sustainability of any activity fostering agribusiness cluster formation depends on 
the adequacy with which real potential competitive advantages are transformed into actual ones 
and on the efficiency with which ‘exit’ strategies are implemented. Social sustainability depends 
on the degree to which the community as a whole is affected by the activity and on whether 
the changes induced by this process will be accepted by the community and strengthen social 
capital or not. 
 
Economic support programs often combine poor design, based on a poor understanding of 
entrepreneurship and business dynamics, with ‘haste.’ Such programs run, as a result of their 
quest for quick impact, a very high risk of weakening markets and social capital instead of 
strengthening them. Take the example of a project that supported a group of women to 
become local beer (‘dolo’) brewers. The women had limited experience with beer brewing, but 
when asked about their ambitions, they couldn’t think about anything else than to increase their 
share in the dolo market. The project provides them with better materials and equipment and 
some advisory services to upgrade the processing and improve their marketing skills. Obviously, 
these brewers will be able to sell their dolo below the price of other brewers, and they 
probably will do so to increase their market share. Their competitive advantages are 
temporarily and largely ‘artificial,’ however, and it is likely that their market share will decrease 
as soon as the support ends. In the meantime, brewers that have invested their own funds will 
be losing money and may even decide step out of business. Unfortunately, several projects have 
created artificial, unfair and non-sustainable advantages in a specific area or for a specific target 
group through misguided investment and support.  
 
CASE facilitators must therefore analyze the situation together with the principal actors and 
stakeholders involved in the feasibility study of the business and/or cluster formation activity; 
such an analysis typically includes an effort to come to understand competitor strategies in 
other – perhaps better situated – regions. This is not to say that initiatives for successful 
agribusiness development should always start in the more ‘favorable’ regions (with regard to 
agro-ecological characteristics, as well as its location vis-à-vis the targeted market segment, and 
the costs involved to transport the product to this market) (Schreurs et al., 2001). Even very 
remote communities may have specific knowledge and skills (and may sometimes have access to 
areas with very specific agro-ecological conditions) to produce a unique product for which 








Discussion: Should we then just forget about ecological sustainability? 
 
Efficient linkages within the agribusiness cluster and adequate integration of local actors in attractive 
commodity value chains will increase incomes and allow for multiplier effects and overall economic 
growth. It is our belief that sustainability in all its dimensions (including the ecological one) essentially 
follows empowerment and economic growth and not the other way around.34 In other words, increased 
competitiveness influences both the capacity of and the incentives for (willingness) to the local actors to 
invest in social capital and sustainable land resource use. 
 
This is not to say that sustainable land resource use is irrelevant; on the contrary. It is obviously crucial 
to safeguard the natural resource base on which all (small-scale) producers depend. Soil nutrient 
depletion and environmental degradation are severe constraints to agricultural intensification in several 
areas of West Africa. It is also noted that natural resources do not only provide the basis for agricultural 
production, they also offer a range of other critically important services and products, including wild 
food products (e.g., edible leaves), staking materials and firewood.   
Policymakers and BSSs that offer environmental services need to be involved throughout the 




6.2 Design elements: from business ideas to action plans 
 
To implement CASE at least three steps need to be taken:  
 
1. Interesting business ideas from local champions need to be identified 
2. Business ideas will need to be discussed and translated into action plans. These action 
plans will foster competitive strategy involving the local champions and any other relevant 
local and non-local value chain actors. 
3. Action plans need to be implemented. The process and the results need to be monitored 
and evaluated.  
 
Mobilizing business ideas 
The CASE approach explicitly aims to support entrepreneurship from the grassroots. We 
believe that the best way to do so is by ‘searching’ for the (emerging) farmer and other local 
entrepreneurs and aligning support activity to their business ideas. This is easier said than done. 
Development professionals have been educated for a very long time to solve problems. Some 
                                            
34 Though many farmers and other local actors will quickly agree on the importance of ecological sustainability, this 
may be more related to their perceptions of our (or the donor’s) interests than an adequate translation of their 
major concerns.Moreover, facilitators entering the target regions with 4x4 vehicles and an ‘ecological footprint’ 
that is a multiplier of that of their target group, may feel uncomfortable promoting sustainability first, while dealing 




of them even pretend to ‘know’ both the major problems and the most appropriate solutions in 
a particular region or for a specific target group. It is not easy to adopt a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude. 
This is exactly what is needed, however. Any other attitude will compromise what is crucial in 
CASE: championship. Entrepreneurship is out there; the only way to link up with emerging local 
entrepreneurs and to make them champions is by putting their business central.  
 
There are several ways to identify and mobilize business ideas: 
 
 By communicating the program and its purpose to the members of national and regional 
stakeholder organizations such as business associations and POs, or through chambers of 
agriculture/industry 
 By making use of the media, including rural radio, newspapers, distributing information at 
social events, trade fairs, etc.  
 Through proactive ‘searching,’ e.g., by being alert to opportunities at trade fairs, through 
study tours, networking with members of action-research platforms and fora, and with 
industry and chain leaders. The subscribers of web-based market information systems may 
provide an interesting target group as well. 
 
The formats to present a business idea should be kept as simple as possible to also enable the 
less literate and those with limited time to apply for support. All business plans that are being 
received need screening. Such screening involves two different ‘aspects’ of the idea:  
 
1. The champion: His/her character (reliable?), competency (experience?) and capital (co-
investment?).  
2. The idea itself: Is this something that could work in that area and for the targeted market 
(has the market been specified?)? 
 
The screening obviously needs to be done very carefully. It is critically important to stay as 
neutral as possible and to avoid ‘bias’ (e.g., when certain ideas match better with personal 
priorities). Plain wish lists and obviously infeasible plans have to be discarded. Those who have 
‘seen’ success elsewhere and want to apply it in the target area are more difficult to identify. 
Copying success from elsewhere is not a problem per se. When the original actors are close 
and serve a similar market, however, the idea should be discarded. The same holds for actors 
that have no experience at all in the proposed business. They simply fail the ‘competency’ 
criterion. An intelligent CASE facilitator will recognize a lack of originality and may then decide 
to discard the idea or to look for additional information. External advisors may need to be 
hired, in case of doubt, to visit the entrepreneur and discuss his/her ideas. 
 
Action planning 
At the end of this stage, the business idea will have been transformed into a comprehensive, 
one-or-more year plan that supports the champion and other related actors and stakeholders 
as well. The agribusiness cluster and the value chain concepts come into play here. In fact, it is 
up to the CASE facilitator to invite the champion for a deeper analysis of the idea. Such an 
analysis may take considerable time and involve visits to the targeted area and rapid appraisals 




It is crucial to identify and keep track of the various actors and stakeholders that should be 
involved throughout the whole process. The champion may be a bit reluctant at the beginning 
to accept that the project will not concentrate on his/her capacity alone. True entrepreneurs, 
however, will quickly understand that they cannot do this all by themselves. The most difficult 
parts of the process are how to identify the most relevant stakeholders and where (in what 
activity), when and how to get them involved. The CASE facilitator has to be extremely careful 
here. In fact, there are many stakeholders or otherwise interested parties (including potential 
competitors), all with different backgrounds, resources, competencies and interests, and all 
engaged in different networks and alliances. These alliances shape a highly dynamic and 
competitive environment. Naïve facilitation in these ‘marshlands’ of competitive playing fields 
may cause a lot of unneeded trouble. What then? The answer, unfortunately, is not that 
simple.35 Let us limit ourselves here to the following observations of the process:  
 
 It may be useful to make a list or map of the so-called ‘problem-owners,’ i.e., all 
stakeholders directly or indirectly affected by the proposed action or business idea.36 
 A rapid appraisal may serve to identify the problem-owners’ various perspectives on the 
business idea. 
 Some in-depth inquiry may be needed to deepen the understanding of the various 
competitive forces and playing fields and to better understand the true ‘potential’ of the 
business idea (market analysis).  
 The agribusiness cluster and the channel options should be identified and described, as well 
as the various stakeholders and actors that are (or may become) engaged in these. It might 
be useful to distinguish between stakeholders that stand out to ‘win’ from the idea and 
those that might lose. A distinction should also be made between stakeholders that will be 
interested to actively participate (the ‘movers and shakers’), those that will follow, and 
those that might want to block (part of) the process (for various reasons, including 
reluctance to accept social change, or jealousy). 
 For each activity, the leadership (who will take the initiative and who will be held 
responsible for the outcomes, if needed), the agenda and the network of anticipated 
participants should be defined. How the network will engage with other inter-linked 
stakeholders may have to be discussed and agreed upon beforehand as well.  
 
The CASE facilitator should also be quite clear about the rules of working together within the 
framework of the action plan; these include what will be financed and what will not, how the 
funding will be implemented, how subcontracts will be monitored and if something else is 
expected from any of the participants, e.g., specific information to satisfy M&E requirements. 
 
The action plan includes the most important support activities required to achieve 
competitiveness at enterprise and cluster levels. It should also identify the channel options that 
are available to supply the commodity from the targeted area to the targeted market. If needed, 
                                            
35 This is, in fact, a complex negotiation problem 
36 The notion of ‘problem-owner’ is taken from Checkland and Scholes (1999). The concept is extremely useful for 
development workers – and its use may help them to avoid taking over problems from the (real) ‘owners’; the 
focus should be on the capacity of the problem-owners to do something about their situation. 
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some specific attention may also be given to coordination mechanisms along the value chain. 
The support services that foster agribusiness cluster formation may be classified as follows: 
 
1. Strengthening of individual – farm/firm – competencies, comprising:  
a. Managerial (logistics, human resources, finances) aspects 
b. Technical aspects 
2. Establishing and/or improving horizontal relationships (i.e., between similar actors), 
comprising:  
a. Organizational issues (including accountability, membership strategies) 
b. Managerial aspects 
c. Technical aspects 
3. Vertical integration (at cluster level, mainly POs) 
4. Establishing and/or improving cluster relationships, comprising: 
a. Down- and up-stream value chain linkages (involving local actors) 
b. Relationships of local actors with local BSSs 
c. Relationships of local actors with local MFIs 
d. Relationships of local actors with local policymakers 
 
Support activities to value chain development are quite similar to those of cluster formation 
building, as described above. In agribusiness cluster formation, the emphasis is put on the 
capacities of and the linkages between local actors and stakeholders, whereas value chain 
development concerns both local and non-local chain actors.  
 
Implementing action plans 
Business support services are the heart of the CASE approach. Hence, choosing the right BSS 
to execute part or the entire action plan is important. From our perspective, the choice of the 
BSS should be, as much as possible, in the hands of the local champions (cluster 
actors).Preference should be given to those BSSs that are in close proximity to the cluster 
actors and that can potentially become a stakeholder within the same cluster. It is also 
important to understand the precise nature of each of the proposed support services:  
 
 Networking/brokering services 
 Facilitation of action-research 
 Training, coaching and advisory services  
 
Networking services foster relationships (e.g., learning networks, cluster and chain alliances).  
‘Action’-research may not be the best term to use here. We are in fact referring to all 
facilitation services that nurture experiential and interactive learning, with the aim to improve 
or establish coordinated action. Such learning may focus on technology issues (with regard to 
production, processing or packaging), as well as on organizational and institutional issues. 
Training, coaching and advisory services may focus on management and performance 
monitoring, accounting and finance, competitive intelligence, negotiation and communication. 
Not all BSSs have skills in all fields (see the box below); for some services, specific competency 
is required that cannot be subcontracted with a nearby BSS. In such cases, preference may be 






The attentive reader will have noticed that the notion of the CASE facilitator is no longer clear. 
In fact, in the first stage, the CASE facilitator is probably directly linked to the project or 
program that is in charge of promoting CASE; in the second and third stages, the CASE 
facilitator may be the same or another staff member from the project or a subcontracted BSS. 
In case the service is implemented by a BSS, the project staff member will be involved, whether 
directly or indirectly, in the process of facilitating the subcontracting process. Therefore, 
facilitation may occur at different levels. We refer to training, coaching and advising as 
facilitation as well. These services often strengthen the competencies of a restricted sub-group 
and therefore enhance the ‘power’ of this group, probably at the expense of other actors in the 
same cluster and/or chain. Some authors prefer to use the notion of facilitation mainly for the 
more ‘neutral’ act of linking actors together. We do not follow that convention here. In this 
document, CASE facilitation comprises all sorts of BSSs and thus is much more than the (more 
or less) neutral brokering act alone.  
 
Finally, a last word of caution for the CASE facilitator: Do respect champion- and problem-
ownership! Do not take it all on your own shoulder! 
 
 
What is a BSS? 
 
There is some discussion with regard to BSSs as organizations. What are they? We simply define 
them here as all organizations (including enterprises) that provide support services to producers and 
agriculturally linked enterprises (providing training, consultancy and advisory services, information and 
marketing assistance and business linkage or brokering services).  
 
BSSs can be public or private organizations; they can be not-for-profit (NGOs) or profit-making 
enterprises. Any unit of a PO that purposefully offers assistance to their members is a BSS; and all 
public research and extension services are labeled here as BSSs.  
 
Some organizations will offer a wide array of services whereas others may offer only highly 
specialized assistance (e.g., business-to-business relationships, subcontracting, competitive 
intelligence). A useful distinction may be made between ‘operational’ and ‘strategic’ support services; 
operational services involve support for day-to-day operations, and strategic services foster the 






The picture on the left shows the container of the innovated chili paste (green chili), produced by 
Agrocomplex (Togo). The problem was that the opening of the bottle was too narrow, and cooks in 
hotels and restaurants complained that their spoons didn’t enter easily; the paste was difficult to 
remove form the container. Now, with the new container (right) the spoon enters easily and hotels 
and restaurants are satisfied; since the improvement, demand for the product has significantly risen. 
Agrocomplex has started a publicity campaign involving television commercials. The action-research to 
improve the bottles and appreciate the market was co-financed by the 1,000s+ project. It also involved 
a series of laboratory tests as well as an input credit scheme to provide adequate seeds to out-growers. 
(Photographs Udo Rudiger) 
 
6.3 CASE and facilitating change 
 
Before we address the professional skills required to facilitate change, some inherent difficulties 
and contradictions in facilitating rural innovation and agribusiness development – and in making 
use of the CASE framework – may need to be clarified. The following two specific problem 
areas are highlighted:  
 
 Facilitating both homegrown processes and empowerment – which implies making 
‘choices’ – in complex problem situations with various ‘problem-owners’ and ‘product 
champions’  
 Maintaining ‘focus’ and facilitating specialization in risk-prone environments with local 
actors, minimizing risks and ensuring (food) security through diversification of livelihood 
strategies 
 
First, facilitators of change support homegrown initiatives and preferably work together with 
local champions to strengthen innovative processes. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
situation in which facilitators work is not neutral; in fact, it is often better described as a 
development arena. As a result, facilitators are obliged to analyze power relationships and to 
anticipate possible winners and losers. Inclusiveness and empowerment point to the need of 
proactive facilitation involving vulnerable target groups and problem-owners. This may create 
tension when the choice (with whom to work and what capacity-building activities to 
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implement) affects power relationships in agribusiness clusters and value chains. Although 
choices for support activities will in principle not be made by the facilitator alone but in 
consultation with the local champions and only after a cautious process that involves actual and 
potential actors and stakeholders, choices are inevitable. However, at times a clear division of 
roles makes a huge positive difference. It might be argued, for instance, that the roles of trainer, 
coach and advisor should not be combined with that of a ‘neutral broker’ (discussion the end of 
Section 6.2).  
 
Secondly, CASE promotes a focused facilitating strategy, involving preferably just one well-
targeted commodity. The individual and collective professionalisms required to develop 
competitive edge from the grassroots (i.e., at the local level) may indeed contradict the capacity 
needed to manage highly diverse farming systems to ensure food security and minimize risks. 
These risks, and the ones added because of increased market integration, should not be 
underestimated, nor should the project take over all the (new) risks associated with market 
integration. This simply does not lead to sustainable development. Instead, a clear distinction 
should be made between food security and safety net programs, and programs that foster 
entrepreneurship in farming. The first programs aim to support the vulnerable food-insecure 
groups, without ‘pushing’ them into a new (often even more uncertain) future. The latter on 
the contrary, do take farmers to new and risky environments, and should only be implemented 
with farmers that understand the associated risks of increased market integration, and that are 
willing – and capable – to take these risks. The ‘business ideas’ should be theirs so that they 
know that they will be responsible for the outcomes as well. Obviously, this does not prevent 
the CASE facilitator from discussing with the local actors (and stakeholders) how risks can be 
effectively reduced and shared to stimulate specialization and agricultural transformation. There 
still is a lot of work to be done in this area.37  
 
Now, what are the characteristics of a good CASE facilitator? Let us first re-define the major 













Figure 16. Major task areas for a CASE facilitator 
 
 
                                            
37 Specialization of BSSs – facilitators – themselves should also be considered as an essential part of such a process. 
Networking/brokering & facilitating 
coordinated action (inter-
organizational capacity) 




learning & action-research 
(interactive learning capacity) 
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The competencies required for networking and brokering are different from those required for 
facilitating an action-research process or for training, coaching and advisory services. 
Networking and negotiation skills are more important for the ‘broker,’ and the advisor often 
needs specific knowledge and experience, in addition to communication skills. A few capacities 
that every CASE facilitator will need are: empathy, a capacity to listen (communication skills) 
and to ask the right questions (analytic skills), common sense and practicality, and a learning-by-
doing attitude. The capacity to avoid ‘fixing problems your way’ may be given special attention 
here. A common mistake of the ‘brokers,’ for instance, is to push farmers into a contract with a 
larger enterprise; often without much discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of the 
contract in particular, and contract-farming in general; often without inquiring about the 
character of the targeted entrepreneur and the ‘real’ capacity of his/her enterprise; and almost 
always without exploring alternative options together with the producers involved. Whereas 
this sometimes helps to establish relationships quickly, it almost always culminates in disaster, 
i.e., in one of the parties failing to respect the clauses of the contract. This is not surprising, as 
both parties probably lack sufficient information and both may see the contract as the 
facilitator’s decision, not theirs. Similar problems may arise in other task areas of the CASE 
facilitator, such as when the topic of an action-research program is enforced by the facilitator, 
or when an interactive, experiential learning process is orchestrated by the facilitator and not 
led by a local champion or the learners’ network. Such mistakes are more common than one 
might think, simply because many of these facilitators try to ‘fix a problem’ and also genuinely 





Discussion: Do we need professional facilitators?  
 
One last question that is rarely asked but is nevertheless quite essential: is professional facilitation (i.e., 
facilitation by project staff or through a local or non-local BSS) needed at all, and if so, why exactly, and 
for how long? Indeed, people learn and change continuously without any external guidance. Farmers, 
local entrepreneurs and other stakeholders are often used to working in groups and exchanging 
experiences. Why then interfere? Why facilitate? From our viewpoint, it is the dynamic and to some 
extent ‘novel’ context of agricultural intensification and market development that provides the 
justification for guidance or facilitation of individual and collective learning processes. Increased 
integration into market systems and commodity chains is risky for farmers and local entrepreneurs in 
SSA. Cluster and value chain actors are confronted with rapidly changing market regulations and 
government policies. They need to establish new contacts to purchase inputs and/or equipment, to sell 
their products, and to acquire access to credit and information. Professional facilitators are instrumental 
in finding a way through the sometimes overwhelming amount of information: they can support cluster 
and chain actors with value chain and market analyzes, with the organization (and facilitation) of 
commercial meetings and study visits, and search for more effective (or alternative) channel options and 
market linkages. The experience to date with facilitating CASE confirms the above, and points in 
particular to the following: (1) Facilitation of complex processes of market integration through cluster 
formation and chain development require professional skills and knowledge. Naïve or opportunistic and 
amateurish facilitators often do more harm than good; (2) For adequate facilitation, some level of 
freedom to reflect and to act is crucial; the facilitator, who is also a cluster and chain actor, may be quite 




Deliberate and proactive facilitation should only last for a certain period of time. After a few years, 
facilitation or support to local actors should assume a more demand-driven character. This means that 
on the basis of their needs, local actors or their organizations contact local and (sub-)national level BSSs 





In Togo, an experiment was started to use 
bicycles to supply soybean products (soy 






7.  ‘From Thousands to Millions’ (1,000s+). A farmer-led project to 
scale up the CASE approach  
 
7.1 Introduction to the 1,000s+ project 
 
The 1,000s+ project aims to scale up the CASE approach in West Africa (focusing on Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo) and transform the rural livelihoods of at 
least one million farmers. The 1,000s+ project is a farmer-led initiative:  
 
 At the local level, farmer organizations are the key drivers in the agribusiness cluster 
formation process.  
 POs at the national levels chair a multi-stakeholder committee responsible for the 
selection of business ideas and the agribusiness clusters and value chains that will receive 




Figure 17. Steering and guidance through POs (ROPPA is a network of POs in West Africa) 
 
 
The CASE approach initially developed through a rather ad-hoc decision-making process, largely 
based on personal contacts of IFDC staff and discoveries in the region, but a more ‘formal’ 
framework was needed to enable national-level stakeholders to actively participate in the 
selection of cluster formation ideas and to strengthen the leading role of POs. The institutional 
National Steering Committee – chaired by national-
level POs 
  Agribusiness Clusters 
Cluster Advisors and 
Regional Specialists 
1,000s+  
Regional Consultative Committee – chaired by ROPPA 
Strategic choices with regard to agribusiness 
cluster portfolio (per country)  
Many homegrown initiatives  
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framework for the 1,000s+ project is schematically presented in Figure 17. The national 
steering committees, chaired by a national-level PO, play a pivotal role in 1,000s+. It is at this 
level that the (strategic) decisions with regard to the commodities and regions are made. The 
process to establish the national-level steering committees was not simple. One of the major 
problems was the identification of the national-level PO that should lead the committee. The 
selection of other stakeholders proved equally difficult, leading sometimes to propositions of 
committees with an unworkable number of members. Likewise, not all stakeholders approved 
the fact of being ‘led’ by a PO as chair of the committee. The most important challenge 
continues to exist, however: to ensure that committee members choose the most ‘competitive’ 
proposals transparently. Given the importance of (social) relationships, it should be no surprise 
that the selection process is often seen as a networking opportunity. There are probably no 
easy solutions to this problem except clever facilitation and firmness with regard to the joint 
establishment beforehand and consistent use of a list with strict selection criteria.  
 
The project fosters demand-oriented action: farmers and local entrepreneurs are perceived as 
the principal actors in the scaling-up of the CASE approach. The project team provides 
guidance to the national platforms to ensure that farmers and/or local entrepreneurs 
themselves develop action plans for cluster formation and link with other actors and 
stakeholders in the process. The project develops and uses organizational capacity by providing 
small grants to local and (sub-)national partner institutions, such as POs, BSSs, business 
associations, etc. Grants for cluster formation and value chain development activities generally 
do not exceed $10,000–$20,000 per year; this is to avoid dependency of cluster actors on 
project funding and to stimulate replication of efforts by others. Grants are monitored by 
project staff and the local POs; client–oriented mechanisms to strengthen feedback on the 
quality of services provided are actively promoted. The project adheres to the principle of 
‘subsidiarity,’ i.e., what can be done at a local level will not be done by organizations operating 
at (sub-)national levels, and what can be done by (sub-)national-level organizations will not be 
done by IFDC staff. Consequently, 1,000s+ staff are almost exclusively involved in the training 
of facilitators of agribusiness cluster formation and value chain development. It is our hope that 
gradually a virtuous spiral will develop with strong empowered local actors, asking for even 
better BSSs; and strong local BSSs enabling farmers and local entrepreneurs to develop and 
maintain competitive edge within targeted value chains. 
 
7.2 Scaling-up and out of the CASE approach 
 
The 1,000s+ project nurtures an inside-out (or ‘bottom-up’) process but aims at the same time 
to develop a rich ‘portfolio’ of agribusiness clusters and chains that covers to at least some 
extent, the territory of each country. A three-pronged strategy is being implemented to 
develop this rich portfolio and to continue to engage a growing number of farmers: 
 
1. Multiplication of agribusiness clusters, through proactive mobilization of business ideas 
2. Expansion of the number of local actors involved in ‘existing’ and successful agribusiness 
cluster formation processes  
80 
 
3. Marketing of the CASE approach at (sub-)national levels and training of interested staff 
from national and (sub-)national stakeholders to develop the critical mass needed to 




















Multiplication of agribusiness clusters  
The committee decides on the 1,000s+ cluster portfolio essentially through careful selection of 
cluster formation ‘concept notes’ (Figure 17). These concept notes are based on a business 
idea; any local actor (producer, entrepreneur) can submit a business idea. All members of the 
multi-stakeholder committee (POs, entrepreneurial networks and associations, NGOs, 
Chambers of Agriculture, Ministry of Food and Agriculture) are invited to mobilize their 
network and identify local champions that might need and qualify for support. The ‘old’ way, 
involving personal contacts and discoveries through IFDC staff and/or others, is being used as 
well. The format for a business idea is kept very simple to ensure that as many people as 
possible can apply for support. All the applicants of sensible ideas (i.e., no wish lists, realistic, 
and with some indication of an entrepreneurial spirit) are visited and assisted to develop their 
idea into a more elaborate concept note. Once the national committee has selected the 
concept note, a detailed action plan is developed through workshops and (hands-on) training. 
Between 2006 and 2008, 65 cluster formation plans had been approved; they covered a wide 
area, concerned various products (cereals, ‘niche’ crops/products, dairy and fish products, 
processed/packaged) and targeted different market segments (mainly within SSA!). 
Potatoes grown in southern Mali. The potato 
cluster in Mali faces immensely interesting 
challenges, which comprise among others: 
productivity aspects (adoption of ISFM and clever 
rotation schemes to maintain fertility and fight 
diseases); quality concerns (storage characteristics 
to extend the period of supply); channel issues 
(which markets – domestic, and regional – to serve 
and through what kind of networks); chain 
empowerment issues (POs examining the 
opportunities to engage in marketing themselves); 
and problems related to access to inputs (in 
particular potato seeds – which are still imported – 
and ‘specific’ fertilizers) and finance.  
 
The photograph also illustrates the two major ways 
through which 1,000s+ intends to scale up the 
CASE approach: through multiple and ever larger 




Project Team: advice/assistance, networking, training and grants  
Farmer-led multi-
actor process 
           Cluster building 
Selected cluster actors and stakeholders 
formulate detailed cluster formation 
action plans (3) 
Together with BSSs, local actors 
prepare concept notes for a cluster 
formation action plan (2) 
Local-level actors (producer organizations, 
entrepreneurs) submit ‘cluster formation 
ideas’ (1) 
Screening (using a set of criteria 
developed with the project team to 
ensure feasibility of choices, and to 
































Figure 18. A three-stage farmer-led planning process to mobilize cluster formation action plans 
 
 
Bridging the gap: information to relevant local 
actors to produce business plans for cluster 
formation 
 
(Simple formats – to generate creative ideas 
from the grassroots, and limit the barrier to 
entry) 
 




Some examples of cluster activities are shown in the following photos: 
 
Cowpea producers in southern Mali 
received individual (calculation of activity 
budgets) and organizational support and 
established linkages with several traders. In 
the first photo, a producer is presenting 
part of his harvest at a trade fair in Koutiala 
(Mali). The trade fair was organized by a 
local BSS and was used to discuss 
experiences and lessons learned with 
agribusiness cluster actors. In the second 
photograph, producers are negotiating with 
traders during a ‘commercial’ meeting’. 
(Photographs by Alain S. Traore) 
 
Several small-scale enterprises in Togo were 
supported to present their products at an 
international trade fair. They also received 
training in business management and 
marketing through a sub-national BSS. 









In northern Togo, experiments have started 
to process tomatoes – to add value, and to 
expand the period during which tomato 
products can be sold. The tomato producers 
face severe difficulties to smooth supply and 
avoid over-flooding of both local and urban 
markets. The first photo shows small-scale 
tomato dryers; the second photo is a 
training session on tomato processing. 
(Photographs by Udo Rudiger)  
 
See Chapter 9 for a discussion on the 
tomato industry in northern Togo. 
 
 
Producers visit SITRAC, a medium-scale 
food processing enterprise in Burkina Faso. 
SITRAC is negotiating with POs in several 
provinces to ensure a stable supply of maize, 
which is processed into flour. 1,000s+ 
supports producers and SITRAC to come to 
an agreement, and strengthens capacities of 
POs to collaborate and negotiate prices and 
conditions collectively (including additional 
services, e.g., access to seeds/inputs through 













International CASE training organized 
on behalf of the Eastern Africa 
Farmers Federation (EAFF), Nairobi, 
Kenya, 2006. The first photo shows a 
field trip; the second a work group. 
 
(Photographs by Ted Schrader, CDI) 
  
Mango producers were linked to a 
BSS to improve packaging and 
transportation of mangos to 
northern (local) markets. 




Expansion of number of actors involved in agribusiness clusters 
Expansion of the number of actors within an existing agribusiness cluster essentially relies on 
communication. However, sustained success requires a dynamic, endogenously driven process 
of continued innovation and specialization. It may take some time for local actors to move out 
of a self-subsistence orientation and to sidestep an over-cautious and primarily defensive 
attitude toward increased market integration (and dependence). Expansion of the number of 
local actors involved in the same business widens the network for interactive learning and 
coordinated action; clusters may become stronger when vertical integration becomes feasible, 
or when the scale of operations attracts the establishment of other (vertically linked) 
enterprises, BSSs or MFIs. Some caution may be needed as well, particularly when some 
business attracts huge numbers of copy-cats. The tricky issue is that successful innovation and 
increased competitiveness require processes that are to a large extent exclusive and not easy 
to replicate. The case of the tomato producers in northern Togo (Chapter 9) provides a good 
example. Once they succeeded to enter the Lomé market, other producers in similar – 
sometimes even better located areas – quickly started growing similar quality tomatoes for the 
same market. This soon led to over-flooding of the targeted market segments, and for the 
producers concerned, to rapidly decreasing bargaining power and lower profits. The latter 






Again, there are no easy recipes to avoid the zémidjan syndrome, other than a continuous 
search for even more inter-related competitive advantages that are less easy to copy and 
succeed in satisfying market demand.  
 
 
Critical mass for CASE or similar approaches 
The 1,000s+ project implements an ambitious training program to strengthen capacities of the 
BSSs. There are not many BSSs capable to provide CASE facilitation services, e.g., 
brokering/networking, facilitating interactive learning or training and coaching of coordinated 
action in agribusiness (see the following discussion point).  
 
Zémidjan is the motor-taxi in Cotonou, 
Bénin. A brilliant idea, the motor-taxi is well 
adapted to the weather and road conditions 
in and around Cotonou; they could operate 
in places that were difficult to reach for a 
normal taxi. However, an enormous 
number of motor-taxis are in Cotonou 
today because of the simplicity of the idea, 
the minimal capital required to start a 
motor-taxi service (many rented a motor-
taxi first, with the aim of repaying later) and 
the large number of unemployed. 






Although the 1,000s+ project concentrates on action at the grassroots levels, it values and 
understands the importance of interacting with national- and international-level structures. Such 
interaction might, for instance, foster leadership in political and economic networks and 
organizations in support of grassroots-based action, or might simply help to create more 
awareness of the transformational potential of local economic (agribusiness) development. The 
1,000s+ project will give some specific attention to the educational system as well, and in 
particular to those university departments and professional business schools that will supply the 
personnel for the next generation(s) of BSSs.  
 
For example, the integration of (local) producers in input supply value chains (downward 
linkages) is often hampered by national-level constraints (inadequate/bureaucratic regulations, 
corruption, lack of transparency and monopolistic business networks). These constraints add 
up to limit overall accessibility and availability of inputs within the country. In such cases, 
national-level capacity-building and advocacy are required. In the following example, a short 
overview of three activities which aim to improve linkages between input dealer associations 
and POs at the national level (through training of marketing agents – linking local POs to input 
dealers – trust-building and a series of training programs intended for POs as well as for input 
dealers and their associations) , is presented. 
ICRA provides training and capacity-
building to (sub-)national staff members 
of key stakeholders in rural innovation 
– including CASE. In the photograph are 




Strengthening linkages of local POs to input supply chains 
 
 
With funds from IFA, 1,000s+ specifically focuses on input value chains and on the linkages between POs 
and the other actors involved in input supply and provisioning. This includes advisory services to 
promote and disseminate information on proper and efficient use of ‘external’ inputs. In addition, to 
conform to the recommendations of the Abuja Declaration on Fertilizers, emphasis is given to input dealer 
Input distribution from truck 
(distribution point) to farmer. 
 
Farmers use motorbikes, bicycles, 
donkey carts and – though not 
pictured here – their heads, to 
transport the fertilizer from the 
distribution point to the compound.  
 
Photo of a Cotton farmer association 
in Kenedougou province, Burkina Faso. 
(Photographs by Yves Duplessis)  
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training (preferably through national input dealer associations; IFDC trains the trainers of these 
associations) and brokering services linking farmer groups and cooperatives to input dealers/retailers 
and financing institutions. The downward linkages of farmers (and agribusiness clusters) are 
strengthened mainly through the development of professional input supply chains in the target regions. 
The development of input suppliers into private extension agents for their farmer clients is a concept 
taken from previous IFDC projects in SSA. This involves, among others, a series of training programs 
oriented toward the private sector agents, including:  
 
1. Managing your business 
2. Knowing your products and services 
3. Winning and maintaining customers 
4. Financing your business 
 
In addition, follow-up visits and support to business groups provide ‘hands-on’ guidance, in particular to 
translate the topics of the classroom training into current practice. Audio-visual aids may be developed 
(e.g., pamphlets on various products in local languages) to support the extension agents. The 1,000s+ 
project modified the typical capacity-building program to include agents from national-level POs, who 
would subsequently serve as marketing agents, linking POs and input dealers. Additionally, the marketing 
agents were supported to organize local-level workshops involving producer groups and local input 
dealers. During these workshops, information was given on ISFM and various external inputs available. 

























In Burkina Faso, support was provided to FEPAB (national-level farmer union, with members in 37 of the 
45 provinces in Burkina Faso) and AGRODIA (an input dealer association) to strengthen input supply to 
non-cotton producer groups. The support comprised the training of eight marketing agents (staff 
selected by AGRODIA) who in turn visited FEPAB member organizations to estimate demand and 
Losses occur at various stages within the input value chain. Careless loading of trucks is only  




establish procedures for agro-input distribution involving both members of AGRODIA and the FEPAB 
producer groups. The procedures that followed and the confidence established between FEPAB and 
AGRODIA (as formalized in a joint MOU) provided sufficient incentive for the BRS to accept a loan 
application from FEPAB worth 100 million FCFA (about US $200,000). Despite these efforts, only half of 
the ordered agro-inputs were delivered to the producer groups (about 100 mt of NPK and 75 mt of 
urea), and some were delivered with a significant delay; additionally, in some cases demand for a specific 
fertilizer formula was not respected.  
 
The experience emphasizes the need for even more rigorous and timely planning. In addition, FEPAB 
members may pursue direct contracts with individual input dealers and foster separate contracts for 
different regions and/or agro-inputs. AGRODIA in turn could make better use of its marketing agents to 
forecast (effective) demand, train agro-input dealers (particularly at the retailer level) and maintain a 
database of stocks available – enabling timely adjustments in case individual agro-input dealers have 
insufficient stock. IFDC will continue to provide intensive coaching to FEPAB and AGRODIA, also 
involving the BRS, to strengthen input supply for non-cotton inputs. Despite the problems cited above, 
all parties concerned are enthusiastic and willing to strengthen collaboration further.  
 
In Mali, the project established and trained marketing agents acting on behalf of a national-level farmer 
federation (AOPP), which re-groups about 170 POs throughout the whole territory of Mali, and two 
input dealer associations (CropLife Mali). As in Burkina Faso, the marketing agents (six) followed an 
intensive training program provided by IFDC. In turn, the marketing agents organized a series of 
workshops at the provincial level involving member organizations of AOPP and agro-input dealers. As a 
result, 51 subcontracts were established between POs and agro-input dealers, involving the delivery of 
2,000 mt of NPK and 1,000 mt of urea (principally on commission [‘depot-vente’]). AOPP and CropLife 




7.3 Some observations on the road taken 
 
At the end of 2008, the 1,000s+ project was working with an estimated 250,000 farm 
households.38 Family incomes had increased by 30 to 50 percent due to improved access to 
inputs, technology and market outlets. Income increases due to improved post-harvest and 
other value-addition methods were not integrated in these measures. About 1,000 local 
entrepreneurs, including farmer cooperatives, engaged in specific agriculturally linked economic 
activities, and participated in agribusiness cluster formation. On average, they had been able to 
increase their sales by 50 percent. Close to 100 BSSs were in some way involved in cluster 
formation and value chain development activities; most of these BSSs also profited from training 
and/or coaching to strengthen their core competencies. 
                                            
38 The information in this section is based on information from the M&E unit of the 1,000s+ project, which receives 
its information directly from 1,000s+ partner organizations and a small group of ‘external’ consultants; all partner 
organizations involved in M&E have received training in data collection, and analysis. The data are validated by the 
actors supported through the cluster formation activities. See Kondo (2007) for more information on the M&E 
system (or mail: kkondo@ifdc.org). It is noted that the M&E system mainly collects information at the cluster level 
(capacities, impact) and to a much lesser degree at the value chain level (e.g., increased efficiency, reduced 
transaction costs). For the latter, separate case studies are foreseen. 
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It is noted that the 1,000s+ project essentially strengthens individual and collective capacity at 
the cluster level (primarily) and along value chains. Cluster and value chain actors themselves 
are responsible for making the best possible use of newly acquired knowledge, skills and/or 
relationships. The anticipated relationship between ‘new’ competencies and results, in terms of 
individual and collective performance levels (including improved productivity, lower costs or 
better quality of the targeted commodity and higher profits), is schematically presented in 




Figure 19. Schematic representation of the relationship between competencies (direct 
influence of project activities) and the results, as obtained by local actors 
themselves 
 
It is certainly too early for any firm allegation with regard to the sustainability of the 
agribusiness clusters that have been and are being supported. We will likely witness failure, e.g., 
local actors and stakeholders that do not succeed in learning ‘jointly’ and who will fail to 
implement anything close to coordinated action; agribusiness clusters that establish themselves 
but appear not to be competitive enough. Failure has been factored into 1,000s+; the rich 
portfolio of agribusiness clusters however will hopefully produce many more successes. We are 
convinced that strong local actors are critical for a flourishing agricultural sector and for 
sustained agribusiness development. Obviously, there is a long way ahead for farmers, 
entrepreneurs, bankers and facilitators of change before all conditions for such sustained 
growth are met. Real progress, however, ultimately depends on the combined effort of creative 
local and non-local (chain) actors, ‘poor’ and ‘richer’ consumers in SSA buying locally produced 





Incomes increase gradually through improved 







Discussion: How do you manage a rich and diverse portfolio? 
 
The 1,000s+ project has limited staff. In each target country, there is one main facilitator, called the 
agribusiness cluster advisor. The project also employs a small team of regional specialists; they provide 
training and advice on specific themes (gender/empowerment, finance, marketing, M&E). This is 
essentially the core team that coordinates and implements CASE, although they receive assistance and 
guidance from the national steering committee members.39 The management team of 1,000s+ comprises 
four members, a coordinator (the Chief of Party), an agribusiness team leader overseeing the overall 
cluster portfolio (all seven countries), and its development and administrative staff (subcontracting, 
accounting). 
 
In early 2008, each cluster advisor managed about 10 clusters in and this was supposed to increase to 
between 30 and 60. Obviously, no cluster advisor will be able to manage such a portfolio if he/she wants 
to have in-depth interference with even only the major actors and stakeholders in each cluster and 
those involved in the upward (i.e., inputs) and downward value chains. On the other hand, we didn’t 
want to grow much bigger; and in particular we wanted to avoid ‘doing too much ourselves,’ thereby 
substituting for local or regional BSSs. The experience in agribusiness development of most BSSs is very 
limited, however. Most of them have a history in either the facilitation of more or less participatory 
trials to raise agricultural productivity, in community-based natural resource management, or in social 
and educational activities. Some BSSs had a background in organizational strengthening as well. Most 
BSSs lack staff conversant in private sector development, marketing, business negotiation or any other 
profession close to agribusiness (except agronomy). As a result, much attention has been given to the 
training of BSS staff, and later to the training of the best of these, to become so-called agribusiness 
coaches. The cluster advisors manage the portfolio through this network. 
 
An issue that frequently raises some questions is how management controls portfolio development, 
including selection, action planning and implementation processes. The honest answer is that 
management is not controlling any process upfront; instead, it inspires the overall process through 
coaching. The communication is intensive and involves both the coordinator (strategy, vision) and the 
agribusiness team leader (coaching of cluster advisors on a daily basis; advice when requested). The 
monitoring is results-oriented: i.e., what are the clusters that were selected and why?; what support 
activities have been agreed upon?; in which area do they belong, e.g., productivity (farming, processing), 
marketing/market analyzes, brokering? Cluster advisors have considerable autonomy. The role of the 
regional advisors is particular too: they essentially support the cluster advisor through advice and 
training of targeted BSSs or other actor groups on specific themes and require expertise that cannot be 
found within the country. This may seem normal, but that is not true at all. Development projects are 
often organized along strict hierarchical lines; decisions can only be made when approved at the ‘top’; 
and the top only approves something when it has all the relevant information. We have all seen the 
bureaucracy, the fear for initiative (and errors!) and the heavy emphasis on M&E that develops out of 
such systems. Definitely, such an organizational strategy and process will never result in a ‘rich’ 
portfolio.   
 
                                            
39 Each cluster advisor would be accompanied by a counterpart from a national-level PO (and member of the 
steering committee). Financial support for these counterparts was to be organized by Agriterra, a Dutch agri-



























Udo Rüdiger (left), Agribusiness Cluster Advisor 
for Togo.  
Kodjo Kondo (standing), Monitoring 
and Evaluation Specialist.  
Aissatou Nobre (sitting at the right),  
Gender Specialist.  
Victor A. Clottey (standing in the middle), 



































Moussa Kabore (right), Marketing Specialist.  
Asseta Diallo (left), Agribusiness Cluster Advisor 
for Burkina Faso.  
Kokou Djagni (standing in the middle taking 
notes), Agribusiness Cluster Advisor for Benin 
and Niger.  
 





















Fatoumata Keita (left), Research Assistant.  
Abdou Konlambigue (sitting on the left), 
Rural Finance Specialist. 
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8.  Cross-cutting themes in 1,000s+: finances, information  
 
This chapter concludes Part 2 and focuses on finance and information. Finance and information 
are the ‘oils of business,’ but mobilizing finance for cluster and chain actors requires a strategy 
that combines grassroots action with specific cross-cutting action on financing services; the 
same holds for information.40 Business intelligence requires action at local and regional levels 
and involves the private and public sector. Finances and business intelligence are special cross-
cutting themes in 1,000s+; for both themes, the interaction between local- and (sub-)regional-




Financing plays a crucial role in agribusiness development, bot at cluster and at value chain 
levels. Finance institutions at the local level stimulate business thinking (by imposing business 
plans to support loan applications) and strengthen linkages and partnership thinking. Financing 
institutions, particularly MFIs, have developed a range of additional coaching and monitoring 
products to strengthen financial management of rural stakeholders. The story of financing in the 
rural agricultural sector is not yet a great one, however. There is considerable hesitation among 
formal credit and saving banks to provide credit to smallholder farmers. This is mainly because 
of the high transaction costs involved in processing and monitoring credits to a large number of 
small and often remote farmers, and because of perceived high risks of loan default (in the case 
of prolonged drought, etc.). Informal lending systems dominate the rural landscape, often using 
high interest rates; they are only accessible for farmers that are well-known by the lender. 
Rural credit and saving banks have grown rapidly over the last few years in West Africa, but the 
volume of loans is still very much behind demand and often limited to short-term commercial 
loans. 
 
Yet, the factors that largely constrain rural credit and saving institutions from investment in the 
rural sector are lack of knowledge and lack of capital. Bankers do not know the smallholder 
farmer or the agricultural sector well enough. The MFIs that 1,000s+ has approached readily 
acknowledge that they fear the costs, risks and the trouble of appreciating both the loan 
applicants (character, capital, collateral) and their business plans under such uncertainty 
(Figure 20). Capital is a problem as well. Most MFIs in SSA have difficulty mobilizing savings; 
most of their capital comes from ‘external’ sources, e.g., from national, regional or international 
banks or international NGOs/donors. Such money is either targeted for specific purposes or 
channeled to short-term commercial loans (lower risks, high turnover).  
 
                                            
40 We have occasionally labeled trust as an ‘oil of business’ as well, and rightfully so! Trust is, however, both a 
result and a major element of transaction governance capacity (TGC); we have discussed TGC and trust in 






























Figure 20. Why MFIs may be reluctant to finance smallholder producers  
 
 
Some strategies to strengthen access to finance for smallholder farmers are:  
 
 Producers to integrate horizontally (POs) and to ensure professionalism including 
safeguarding the four Cs that every banker wants to be assured of: character (reliability), 
competence, capital (co-investment) and collateral (e.g., through saving that serve as a 
partial guarantee) 
 MFIs to develop financial products that are adequate for producers involved in agribusiness 
and at the same time reduce transaction risks (e.g., inventory credit systems) 
 MFIs, national and regional banks to develop interlocked cluster and/or chain financing 
mechanisms and cluster and chain actors to propose joint (coordinated) business and 
investment plans (the example at the end of Section 4.2)  
 National and international (agricultural) banks to support and coach MFI staff and to 
increase the amount of capital that MFIs can invest in agribusiness 
 
It is emphasized that both national- and local-level financing institutes are concerned with the 
development of new products and the scaling up of investment in agribusiness. The financing 




d?? c? a? b? 
Some questions that the MFI may have: 
a? : Will the farmer be able to get the necessary agro-inputs, even with the loan? 
b? : What is the capacity of the farmer to execute his/her business plan? Is it realistic? Does the farmer 
really need the amount he/she is asking for? 
c? : Will the farmer be able to find a buyer? Is the farmer able to store his/her product and wait for better 
prices in case the price proposed is exceptionally low? 
d? : What is the size of the market? Does the producer have a competitive edge to link to this market in 
the coming period? Is the chain efficiently organized?  
e? : Should the loan be sourced to every individual producer? Or to a PO? Would a collective loan reduce 





specialist of 1,000s+ therefore works at both levels. Contacts have also been made to engage 
international agricultural banks in a joint effort.  
 
The 1,000s+ project has experimented with inventory credit systems. Inventory credit has 
proven to be effective in strengthening producers’ access to finance while at the same time 
assuring MFIs of collateral.41 As indicated in the following example, there are various ways to 





Example: Inventory credit in western Africa 
 
The inventory credit system is one of several alternative schemes to facilitate access to credit for 
farmers. Its implementation involves several actors, farmers’ organizations, traders and banks or MFIs. 
The relationships within the inventory credit systems as tested in West Africa are schematically 

























Figure 21. Inventory credit system as experimented by the 1,000s+ project in West Africa – inter-
relationships (when all producers reimburse their loans) 
                                            
















4a Loan reimbursement 
4b Return deposit certificate 
5a Presentation of certificate (to PO)  
5b Withdrawal of grain from stock 
6 Purchases of grain 







1a Deposit grains     
1b Deposit certificate (PO to producer)  
2a Presentation deposit certificate (to MFI) 
2b Loan (MFI to producer) – for consumption 
2c Loan (MFI to producer/PO) – for inputs 
3a Pooling of demand/negotiation  
3b Delivery of inputs 




There are various ways to organize inventory credit systems. Well in advance of the harvest, a tripartite 
agreement is negotiated with the bank, borrower (producers and PO) and warehouse operator. At 
harvest time, the borrower (PO) who wishes to get credit from the financial institution collects the 
grain from its members (producers). After drying and cleaning the grain, the produce is taken to the 
warehouse. The warehouse operator checks that the grain meets quality standards. If it does, the grain 
is stored and the producer is given a warehouse receipt showing the number of bags, the weight and the 
quality of the produce received. The borrower presents the receipt to the bank as security for the loan. 
The bank provides credit to the borrower; the amount is based on the market value of the grain at the 
time of the loan. The term of the loan will be related to the annual price pattern; the borrower is 
required to repay before the period when prices are expected to reach their seasonal peak.  
 
The inventory credit system has been adapted in West Africa with two main characteristics to facilitate 
access to agricultural inputs. Instead of a professional operator warehouse (which is often not available), 
the grain is stored in the warehouse of the PO and locked by two padlocks, one for the PO and one for 
the financial institution. The loan obtained from the financial institution is divided into two parts. The 
first part is used to order agricultural inputs (well in time), and the second part may be used for family 
consumption and/or other economic activities. As soon as the loan and the storage fees are paid back, 
the grain is released. The PO will sell the remaining cereals of those producers that have not been able 
to reimburse their loans, and pay back the MFI before distributing any additional profits that result from 
the price increases of the cereals sold within the ‘peak’ season.  
 
IFDC, and in particular the 1,000s+ project, are testing the inventory credit system in Niger (millet, 
rice), Togo (maize) and Mali (rice). In Mali, three areas were selected for action/research in 2008. In 
Kouroumari (Niono), 113 members of the cooperative SOCOAK received 40 million FSFA as a loan 
from the MFI Faso Jiginew. In the case of Kokry (Macina), 72 members of the association Gandakoye 
stored 341 mt of rice and an agreement was reached with the MFI Nyesigiso to loan 25 million FCFA. In 
the last case, two women organizations (COFRN and Fokaben) at Niéna and Loutouna are involved but 






An entrepreneur in SSA operates in an extremely dynamic and uncertain environment. Market 
conditions and consumer behavior may change from one day to another. Chain partners 
(suppliers, buyers) may suddenly disappear or become engaged in competing alliances. Even at 
the local (cluster) level there will be changes: changes that widen the scope for interactive 
learning and innovation or changes that undermine the capacity to maintain a competitive edge. 
Adequate information is valuable. The information that a local entrepreneur needs to be able to 
operate his/her business includes:  
 
 A proper understanding of one’s own enterprise (performance) 
 Understanding of the costs and profits involved for various actors and groups of actors, 
along the value chain 
 Information on the capacity (i.e., capacity to deliver) and reliability of actual and potential 
business partners within the cluster and along the input supply and commodity value chains 
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 Information on prices for agro-inputs and for the specific commodity at different 
(accessible/reachable) markets 
 Information on consumer characteristics (preferences, and requirements in terms of 
affordability – price – and availability in time and space) and possible trends. 
 Information on competitor strategies 
 Information on alternative channel options (to supply the commodity to a targeted market 
segment) 
 Information on (upcoming) regulations and policy measures that may influence the business 
environment  
 
We call this business intelligence. Business intelligence can be divided into the following two 
categories:  
 
1. Internal enterprise, cluster or chain information, which essentially comprises 
performance-related issues: productivity measures (yields, labor productivity), efficiency 
of agro-inputs, profits and unit costs and effectiveness (quality, volumes supplied) 
2. External, competitive information or intelligence, which ranges from information on the 
capacity of business partners and the preferences of targeted consumer segments to 
information on alternative options and competitor strategies  
 
 
Business intelligence ultimately aims to improve decision-making and to inform competitive 
strategy. This may include exploring new alliances to improve bargaining power or to access 
new markets, or the design and implementation of alternative arrangements to improve 
coordination within a specific agribusiness cluster or value chain. Business information can be 
collected through web-based searches, surveys and interviews, study of relevant reports (e.g., 
business reports, sector studies) and study tours. Information is essential for the entrepreneur 
but the costs of collecting and analyzing information, either individually or collectively, can be 
PP-C and CC-P 
 
PP-C and CC-P were developed by 1,000s+ staff to kick-start a process of developing the local capacity to 
monitor performance and to build a competitive intelligence system at  cluster level. PP-C (Product-Place-
Cost) stands for the internal performance monitoring system, and CC-P (Consumer-Competitor-Price) 












substantial.42 Government and public institutions often also play a significant role, both in the 
collection, storage and analysis of relevant and accessible business information, as in 
communicating information to the wider audience (or to specific target groups). Readily 
accessible information, such as market prices, regulations regarding certain industries and 
commodity value chains and consumer behavior, contributes to ‘healthy’ competition, reduces 
uncertainty, and increases transparency in business. Public investment in market information 
systems is particularly justified when information asymmetry (i.e., when some actors have more 
or easier access to information than others) leads to unacceptable weak bargaining positions for 
specific actor groups (smallholder farmers), stimulates monopolistic behavior and business 
cartels, or otherwise limits the expansion of trade. There are no clear answers regarding the 
information that public institutions should collect and make available. But there are limits! 
Performance data, for instance, are – in principle – private data, and there is no reason to share 
such information widely. Actors/stakeholders within the same cluster or along a value chain 
may share such information to develop trust for joint learning or to inform a coordinated 
strategy. Governments may, however, decide to publish average and so-called benchmark data 
to stimulate entrepreneurs in the same industry (or sector segment) to improve performance. 
Other competitive information is probably best collected by the entrepreneurs themselves, 
either individually or collectively (e.g., POs, business associations).  
 
 



















The Market Information Systems and Traders Organizations in West Africa (MISTOWA) Project, 
coordinated by IFDC, has made a huge effort to make market information available – for several 
products and markets in West Africa. The information, collected by farmers and traders themselves is 
accessible through the Internet (www.tradenet.biz) and through cell phones. Local-level information 
                                            
42 BSSs may be subcontracted to collect relevant complementary information as well. 
Access to market information (prices) is crucial because it enables local actors to become 
knowledgeable of prices and price trends at various markets and strengthens bargaining power vis-
à-vis downstream processors and traders. 
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points have been established (Agribusiness Information Points, ABIP) to improve accessibility to the 
web. Much still needs to be done to sustain the market information system (websites, ABIPs) and to 
strengthen the capacities of local actors to make adequate use of market information. (Photographs by 




Discussion: M&E and business intelligence: a happy couple? 
 
M&E systems have a long history in project design and implementation. They provide information on key 
indicators to project management and donors. Unfortunately, there is a tendency to stretch the concept 
of M&E to involve target groups (or beneficiaries), with the implicit message that what is relevant for 
donors and managers is probably relevant for them as well.  
 
We do not believe in such a symbiosis. Instead, we believe that it helps to make a clear and non-
hypocritical difference between what donors and project managers would like to know and what 
information really motivates stakeholders at the grassroots level and directly drives innovation. 
Information plays a key role in agribusiness development and the information that empowers 
smallholder farmers and stimulates entrepreneurship can be organized along two lines: performance 
monitoring and market intelligence. Together, we call this business intelligence. The information needed 
for business intelligence is very different from the key indicators that are normally required in project 
M&E.  
 
Moreover, concerns of timeliness, ownership (and accessibility) and sustainability foster business 
intelligence systems that have little or nothing in common with traditional M&E. Performance monitoring 
and market intelligence are necessary to nurture innovation and to develop together with the skills and 
capacities of the rural stakeholders involved. This is quite different from the process by which M&E 








9. Input distribution in Mali 
 
Uncomfortable with the centralized tender system and the prices negotiated through this 
system by the national marketing boards, the MIR project decided to support Faso Jigi, a 
farmer-based organization based in Ségou, Mali, to buy fertilizers directly on the international 
market.43 Faso Jigi is a farmers’ organization created in 1997 and has about 4,500 members. The 
farmers associated with Faso Jigi mainly grow rice, maize, sorghum and millet. The rice is grown 
on irrigated fields along the Niger River. Faso Jigi first concentrated on the collective 
commercialization of rice and maize. Over the last three years, the organization has been 
involved in fertilizer procurement on behalf of its members, i.e., pooling demand, buying (in 
Mali) and distributing fertilizers to its members. The farmers paid for the fertilizers in advance 
(cash).  
 
After a training session on fertilizer procurement, international and regional fertilizer markets 
and negotiation techniques, the project and Faso Jigi signed an agreement to support the 
organization with the procurement of fertilizers during one complete season. In February 2005, 
the first contacts were established between Faso Jigi and international suppliers (visits to 
Bamako, telephone contacts). In March 2005, MIR staff analyzed market prices and trends 
together with Faso Jigi staff. The offers of various suppliers were compared, and negotiations 
took place with the international suppliers and if possible their representatives (e.g., affiliated 
wholesalers) in Bamako. By the end of March, the fertilizers were ordered (2,000 mt of urea, 
600 mt of DAP and 400 mt of NPK). The fertilizers were delivered to the farmers in May. 
Suppliers were paid by the end of June. The facilitated process strengthened the competencies 
of Faso Jigi to purchase fertilizers on the international market, to compare prices and negotiate 
prices with suppliers, and to manage financing. It enabled them to avoid procurement from non-
professional local retailers, to avoid corruption, and to establish contacts with professional 
suppliers. The prices that Faso Jigi was able to negotiate are shown in Table 2. The urea prices 
were at the same level as the prices that CMDT (the Malian cotton marketing company) had to 
pay for urea in the previous year, whereas prices had increased considerably on the world 
market during this period. Moreover, Faso Jigi succeeded in distributing the fertilizers at least 
one month earlier to the farmers than the Office du Niger, which also worked through a 
tender system.  
 
 
Table 2. Comparison of prices obtained by CMDT and Faso Jigi for urea fertilizer 
 
 Date of purchase Quantity (mt) Price (FCFA/mt) 
CMDT 07/2004 (tender) 18,000 236,000 
Faso Jigi  03/2005  2,000 236,000 
Note:  World market prices of urea increased about 30 percent between 07/2004 and 03/2005. Data collected 
by MIR project.  
 
                                            
43 Taken from Leturioner and Maatman (2005). 
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For the MIR project, the success of Faso Jigi demonstrated the potential of direct de-centralized 
fertilizer procurement and its competitiveness vis-à-vis the prevailing tender system. The tender 
system is time-consuming. It takes at least six months between the launching of the tender and 
the delivery of the fertilizers. Non-transparent bureaucratic procedures also offer ample 
opportunities for rent-seeking. Finally, the large volumes tendered by a few marketing boards in 
West Africa induce international suppliers to form coalitions, which reduce competition. 
 
 
There are ample opportunities to decrease fertilizer prices even further, as illustrated in 
Table 3. Major saving can be achieved on FOB (free on board) prices, financing costs, taxes, 
transportation costs, and retailer margins. The FOB price fluctuates, often significantly (yearly 
variations can be ± 30 percent). Decentralized fertilizer procurement will strengthen 
competition between fertilizer buyers (farmer organizations, retailers/input dealers) and 
stimulate buyers to monitor markets closely and negotiate prices when they are relatively 
favorable. Decentralized fertilizer procurement is less time-consuming, which adds flexibility in 
timing of fertilizer purchases. If the time between the order, delivery and payment of suppliers 
decreases, financing costs will decrease as well. Payment in Euros may also decrease financial 
costs. Taxes can be reduced – particularly for urea – to stimulate fertilizer consumption. This 
requires lobbying at national and international (e.g., Economic Community of West African 
States) policymaking levels. Transportation costs are relatively high, as a large part of the trucks 
return empty (70 percent of trucks delivering cotton fertilizers in Mali return empty). This 
situation, partly due to the monopoly of CMDT to transport cotton, may be improved. Retailer 
margins are artificially high in the tender system, particularly as most of the work is carried out 
by the international suppliers themselves. Strengthening competition among retailers, local input 
dealers and farmer-based organizations capable of purchasing fertilizers themselves (if required), 
will improve the efficiency in the fertilizer supply chain and reduce unnecessary transaction 
costs and artificially set margins. It is estimated that increases in efficiency and reduction of 
taxes could bring a saving of between 20 to 30 percent of the total price paid by farmers. 
Stand of Faso Jigi at the ‘Salon 
International de l’Agriculture,’ 
Bamako, Mali, 2006. 






Table 3. Breakdown of fertilizer (urea) procurement costs – based on a tender system 
 




FOB Ukraine 230.00  Yes (1) 
Sea freight 120.00   
c.i.f. Abidjan  350.00  
Unloading, transportation to warehouses, storage and 
bagging (incl. 2 percent losses) 10.00   
Cost-price (Abidjan)  360.00  
Gross margin supplier (5 percent) 18.00   
8 months financial costs (8 percent) 28.80  Yes (2) 
Official taxes (15 percent of FOB price) 34.50  Yes (3) 
Ex works Abidjan price  441.30  
Transportation to Mali 78.00  Yes (4) 
Non-official taxes 6.50  Yes (5) 
Retailer margin (10 percent of Ex Works Abidjan price) 44.10  Yes (6) 
Sale price to cotton companies/farmer organizations  569.60  
Note: Prices in US$/mt Urea (April 2005 real prices). 
 
To promote a decentralized fertilizer supply chain, retailers and local input dealers need to 
strengthen their capacities in business and financial management and customer relationships. 
Farmer-based organizations may want to engage directly in fertilizer procurement in 
international markets or pool demand and work together with professional retailers. Increased 
competition between farmer-based organizations and retailers and local input dealers will 
probably only improve the effectiveness of the fertilizer supply system. However, the more 
professional the retailers and local input dealers become, the more difficult it will be for general 
purpose farmer-based organizations to stay in the business of fertilizer procurement. West 
African countries are still quite far away from such a situation. Hopefully, the example of Faso 
Jigi inspires the various stakeholders involved in the fertilizer supply chain in Mali and elsewhere 
to re-orient fertilizer procurement and develop complementary strategies to build the 
competencies that are required for efficient decentralized input supply systems. For such 
change to happen, a reversal in thinking and vision is required. Behind the success of Faso Jigi 
lies the idea that decentralized planning and decision-making structures and more direct and 
proactive involvement of farmers and (local) entrepreneurs benefit economic growth – an idea 




10. Tomato producers in northern Togo 
 
In the mid-1990s, the tomato project started by Research, Support and Training for the 
Initiatives of Self-Development (RAFIA), an NGO in northern Togo, aimed to keep young 
farmers in the northern region after the agricultural season.44 The idea behind the project was 
quite simple and based on the both the relative abundance of lowlands in the region and the 
recognition that most of the tomatoes consumed in Lomé came primarily from Burkina Faso 
(Kompienga, at 70 km from Dapaong) and also Ghana and Benin. Truckloads of tomatoes 
passed through the region on their way to Lomé. RAFIA first organized a series of study tours 
to Burkina Faso and Benin with representatives from farmer organizations and village groups to 
see how farmers were exploiting the lowlands. Subsequently, a specific program was developed 
to assist farmers with the development of horticultural production. Wells were constructed 
with financial assistance from VECO, a Belgium NGO, and INTERMON, a Spanish NGO. RAFIA 
provided technical advice to farmers – from simple measures to harvest and retain water to the 
digging and maintenance of irrigation canals; advice on agricultural techniques was also 
provided. Although diagnostic studies indicated a large potential for several other horticultural 
crops (like onions and cabbage), most farmers chose tomatoes as their principal crop. 
 
In 1994, a small group of farmers started to grow tomatoes on about 15 ha. RAFIA was asked 
to assist in the marketing of the agricultural produce and in connecting farmers with larger 
traders. RAFIA quickly succeeded in diverting some large-scale female traders from their usual 
collection sites in Burkina Faso to the producers in the northern region. The anticipated 
decrease in transportation costs and avoidance of customs duties were attractive, but the 
farmers generally received very low prices because of a lack of coordination between the 
farmer groups and insufficient knowledge of prices and market outlets. With assistance from 
RAFIA, farmer-based committees were set up to organize the marketing of the vegetables 
produced (‘Comité de Commercialization des Produits Maraîchers,’ CCPM). The role of these 
committees was to collect information on prices and market outlets, contact traders and 
negotiate with traders on behalf of specific farmer groups. Although the negotiation process 
took place in the town of Dapaong, many farmers felt that they lost control, and they were also 
often not satisfied with the final result. Some farmers even believed that the committees were 
cheating them, as one farmer stated: “According to the CCPM we get 6,000 FCFA/basket, but I 
have heard that traders pay 8,000 FCFA/basket. Apparently they share the difference together.” 
Because there were many CCPMs (one for each farmer group), traders could easily play farmer 
groups against one another. To improve both bargaining power and control of the negotiation 
process, a new institution was created: the Committee of Horticultural Activities (Commission 
des Activités Maraîchères, CAM). The CAM is directly affiliated to Centrales d’Autopromotion 
Pyasanne (CAP) and covers many village groups and CCPMs. Traders now first discuss prices 
(bottom and ceiling prices) with the ‘interlocuteurs’ of the CAM. Results of these negotiations 
are communicated to all the members before the traders make the final deal with the farmer 
groups (and the CCPMs that are still there). Today, the farmers all seem to be quite satisfied 
                                            
44 This section is largely taken from Maatman and Konlambigue (2005). 
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with their ‘interlocuteurs,’ though some of them feel that the CAMs could be more proactive in 
identifying alternative marketing channels. 
 
As from 2003/04, over 20 farmer groups and about 3,000 farmers (mainly young men) are 
involved in horticultural production in this area and linked to the CAPs/CAMs. The 
horticultural season covers the period between October and February, sometimes March. In 
the 2001/02 season, tomatoes suffered from insect attacks, and this severely reduced 
production and incomes. With assistance from RAFIA technical staff, farmers are now 
implementing a rotation scheme, combined with other methods to reduce insect damage. In the 
beginning, farmers were quite reluctant to apply rotation schemes and lose money (in their 
opinion). Tomatoes still occupy about 70 percent of the total cropped area. Yields vary 
between 30 and 40 mt/ha if crops are not damaged by pests/insects. Rural radio has also played 
an important role in dissemination of i Information on prices of horticultural crops in various 
markets, including the Lomé market. As farmers are better informed about the prices in various 
markets, they are also better equipped to interact with their ‘interlocuteurs’ at the CAMs and 
the CCPMs. To improve the competitive position of smallholder farmers in the northern 
region, significant attention has been given to cost leadership. Participatory learning and action, 
research programs and farmer-to-farmer extension methods have been used to develop and 
disseminate effective agricultural technologies, specifically fostering optimal efficiency of 
external inputs. Tomato producers have been able to develop cost leadership vis-à-vis their 




Table 4. Production costs, farm-gate prices and marketing costs for tomatoes produced in 
Burkina Faso (Kompienga area), Ghana and Togo (northern region) 
 




Production costs  
- Labor 
- Inputs 
- Other costs 
- Total 
No Data No Data  
3,500 - 5,000 
5,000 - 7,500 
1,500 - 3,000 
10,000 - 15,000 





22,000 - 30,000 
15,000 
55,000 - 75,000 
 
60,000 (at Kumasi 
market; prices go up 
after December) 
 
24,000 - 32,000 
15,000 
80,000 
Transportation costs 20,000 - 25,000 5,000 - 7,500 17,500 
Customs/road blocks 4,500 - 5,500 3,500 1,000 
Handling/packaging, etc. 1,600 1,600 1,600 













50,000 - 60,000 
120,000 
Producer benefit  
- January/February 
- -  
> 10,000 … 
Trader benefit 







Source: Interviews with traders in Lomé and farmer groups in the northern region, Togo (2005).  
 
There are some differences in the quality of tomatoes produced in the various areas, probably 
related to differences in ecology and/or fertilization methods. “The quality of the Dapaong 
tomatoes is better than those from Kompienga. Tomatoes from Kompienga have plenty of 
water, and it is difficult to keep them well during transportation,” one of the ‘interlocuteurs’ of 
the Dapaong farmers explained. In itself, this would probably not have been enough to increase 
the margins of smallholder farmers in the northern region who produce tomatoes because 
traders would still have been able to use their bargaining power to keep the margins low. 
However, coordination between the farmers and improved knowledge and information of 
market outlets (alternative trader networks) and prices have balanced the power relationships 
between the traders and farmers. 
 
In Michael Porter’s parlance, the smallholder farmers in the northern region have developed 
something close to a system of ‘healthy competition,’ i.e., collaboration (and/or coordination) 
externally to attract new traders and deal with downstream and upstream value chains, and 
competition ‘internally’ on production technologies/innovation (Porter, 1985). Facilitating 
institutions have played an important role in this process – linking complex farming systems, 
producing a wide range of products for a diverse range of purposes – with commodity-specific 
trader networks. The solutions found to date will have to be adapted for tomorrow’s world. In 
fact, the type of linkages that have been developed may well provide only an intermediate 
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short-term solution. As with growing competition and increased market integration, some kind 
of specialization will probably be needed. A last word on collaboration externally: According to 
Porter, such collaboration may also be useful to ensure effective delivery of orders. The latter, 
in our case of tomato production, is very important but still a problem. Farmers are only 
gradually becoming used to producing constant quality and coordinating delivery in order to live 
up to the expectations of the traders. There is still a large difference between the traders who 
think in ‘days’ and ‘truckloads’ and smallholder farmers who just want to sell some ‘baskets’ of 
tomatoes and may face difficulties delivering on a specified day. However, unreliable delivery 
(varying volumes, etc.) increases the costs of traders to collect the tomatoes and may tempt 
them to look for other potential producers or producer areas. Training of the farmer 
representatives in the CAMs in management tools is therefore essential to improve mutual 








The farmers in the northern region have successfully integrated multiple tomato supply value 
chains in Togo (value chains that are serving different markets). However, the sustainability of 
their strategy not only depends on their relative competitive position within the industry (vis-à-
Baskets of tomatoes at the roadside in 
northern Togo – waiting for the trucks 





vis other competing tomato producers) but also on the long-term profitability of the whole 
industry. Two of the most important factors determining long-term profitability are the buyers’ 
bargaining power (in this case the bargaining power of the traders vis-à-vis the producers and 
their competitors in other regions) and the threat of new entries. Farmers in the northern 
region essentially have three potential market outlets: (1) the Lomé Market, (2) the Kara 
Market and (3) the Dapaong Market. Kara and Dapaong only provide small markets. The Lomé 
Market is therefore the main market outlet. Trader networks in West Africa often obey a 
strict, informal hierarchical structure and consequently may have a large advantage when 
negotiating prices. However, interviews with traders in Lomé made it very clear that 
considerable competition exists within their networks. Traders have their own cars or 
transporters they work with, and though they often agree beforehand on ceiling prices, they 
compete heavily to link up with retailers and consumers. In Lomé, there are two trade unions 
for tomato traders who are operating independently. This has increased competition between 
the traders and improved the bargaining power of farmers. Competition has also increased 
because individual traders not connected to any of the trade unions have entered the market. 
These traders are merely grasping an opportunity and do not yet constitute very secure 
marketing channels, however. In the northern region, growth of tomato production is 
constrained by access to water (wells). Because many NGOs and development 
projects/programs are interested in horticultural development, investments in wells and related 
irrigation infrastructure and equipment are increasing– also in other areas that could compete 
with the northern region for the Lomé Market. Without considerable growth on the demand 
side, the industry risks sharp price declines in the near future. Farmers are already trying to be 
the first to bring tomatoes on the markets or to extend the period of cultivation beyond the 
peak periods to get the highest possible prices. There is a growing pressure from farmers on 
RAFIA and other institutions to undertake studies and attract donors to invest in tomato 
processing industries. At a regional level, this may not yet be very realistic, but at both regional 

















Fruits and vegetables stand in Lomé. 




11.  Soybean producers in northern Nigeria  
 
Collaborative activities in northern Nigeria started in 1998. Whereas activities first focused 
mainly on developing more intensive cropping systems based particularly on maize and soybean 
alley cropping systems and rotating fertilizer applications, they gradually shifted to market 
integration and linkages of farmers with input dealers, rural bankers and traders. The Institute 
for Agricultural Research (IAR) of the Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) in Zaria implements the 
project in close collaboration with the Katsina State Agricultural and Rural Development 
Authority and local and regional authorities within Kaduna State (in particular the Danja Local 
Government Council – the Danja area has been selected as the main pilot area). Intensive 
mutual learning efforts on ISFM technologies and agricultural intensification (the so-called 
‘learning plot’ exercises) started in seven pilot villages, with progressive extension to other 
villages, both within and outside the Danja area. The participating villages all formed farmer 
groups, which monitored and took the lead in the learning plot exercises, but also took up 
tasks such as input provisioning and financial intermediation. Some female farmer groups were 
established as well, such as the ‘Unguwar Madaki Dararafe’ women farmer association. Whereas 
the activities started with about 200 pilot farmers who received considerable training in ISFM 
technologies, sourcing of inputs, financing mechanisms, submission of requests for credits and 
post-harvesting techniques (processing and marketing of soybeans), the number of farmers that 






ISFM technologies that have been developed together with pilot farmers include: strip crop 
rotation of soybeans and maize or soybeans and sorghum; strip crop rotation of cocoyam and 
soybeans, planting of early tomatoes on ridges and sorghum in furrows; inter-planting of early 
groundnut and sorghum; and flat, strip crop rotation of soybean and groundnut with sorghum 
planted across the legumes (‘Girchi’). Fertilizer applications include the application of 
Crystallizer Super fertilizer (a phosphate fertilizer used on soybean strips to improve nitrogen 
fixation) next to urea and mixed NPK fertilizers. Methods including improved recycling of crop 
residues and the use of composting and/or animal manure (while using crop residues and leaves 
Strip crop rotation of maize and 
soybean in northern Nigeria.  




as fodder) have been tested and adapted. Varieties were carefully chosen (see below) as well as 
distances between strips and IPM methods to reduce weed infestation and attacks of ‘striga.’ 
Farmers that adopted ISFM technologies have experienced increasing yields and have been able 
to improve food security as well as cash incomes. Some farmers have invested in storage places 
and houses whereas others went on pilgrimage. Results with the pilot farmers have been 
extremely well communicated to local and regional authorities, and the large scale and 
consequent organization of open field days has had a huge impact on both adoption within the 
pilot region and on the degree of sensibility and support from authorities and management staff 
of research and extension services for the project.  
 
Increased soybean production also resulted from research conducted by the International 
Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA). IITA and other research institutes have produced new 
plant varieties that could cope with high disease pressure, compete with parasitic weeds and 
grow in various soils. The new varieties have made it possible to expand soybean farming 
across large parts of the country. Soya bean is now grown beyond the traditional middle belt of 
Nigeria. Benue, Kaduna, Taraba, Kano and Kwara States remain the major producers. Statistics 
are scarce, but those who have seen the economic potential in this crop are expanding 
production fast. Soybean has quickly become an important part of the farming systems in 
northern Nigeria. Depending on the area, soybeans may be the first, second or third cash crop. 
 
Introduced merely as a leguminous crop enhancing soil fertility through its nitrogen-fixing ability 
and biomass production, soybean has become a highly rewarding commercial venture. Training 
on the various uses of the soybean crop has stimulated farmers’ wives to engage in value-added 
processing. Some of them have developed new recipes of soy-based snacks and food, which are 
consumed within the family or sold. In addition, farmers are using the soybean biomass (leaves) 
for forage instead of recycling it through composting or leaving it on the field as was originally 
proposed by the technical advisors. There also is a large pool of local processors who utilize 
soybeans to produce condiments such as dadawa and awara and soy-fortified recipes for people 
with diabetes and HIV/AIDS and the less privileged to cheaply augment their protein intake. 
Locally produced soy milk has become a common product in some local communities. It is 
produced in small quantities at a time because it does not store for long.  
 
The steady growth in poultry farming is increasing the demand for soybeans (both whole and 
cake) as well. This demand is in addition to the introduction of soy-based processed products 
for human consumption. The increase in fish cultivation has led to the local production of fish 
feeds, which require high protein crops including soybean as well. Grand Cereals & Oil Mills 
Limited (GCOLM), a Nigerian integrated foods company, is currently installing machinery for 
fish feed production. 
 
The soybean industry (Figure 22) is made up of a dominant traditional (informal) sector 
consisting of a large number of small operators, and a modern sector handling supplies to 
industrial users and large merchants. The traditional chain supplies the household and catering 
sectors, whereas the modern sector mainly sells to poultry farmers and industrial end-users. 
Informal traders make extensive use of local markets. Modern traders, on the other hand, 
contract agents who buy from the local markets, clean and repackage for supply to their clients. 
The informal chain starts with assemblers of various sizes who buy directly from farmers. They 
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finance their activities mainly from their own resources and sometimes with advances provided 
by other traders. Buying from these and also directly from farmers, secondary assemblers ship 
produce to central supply (wholesale). Farmers store part of their crop to take advantage of 
seasonal price rises. Larger farmers are better able to do this than smaller farmers; the latter 
will have to sell at low prices during the harvest season to be able to pay school fees and other 
demands. Most farmers sell their produce individually. Because of the small volume of produce, 
each farmer bears the costs of transportation. Efforts are made to strengthen trust among 
cluster members to work as teams to benefit maximally. Cooperatives that are too weak to 
deal directly with industrial users are being linked up with major traders; some cooperatives 
have also started to buy their inputs en-bloc from input dealers. 
 
 
Figure 22. Examples of linkages between soybean production and soy industry in Nigeria 
 
The federal government has been adopting policies meant to revive industries that are utilizing 
locally produced agricultural products. In addition to the agricultural banks, the Central Bank 
and various state governments have made resources available to participating commercial banks 
to serve as collateral in the agricultural sector of the economy. It is expected that many of the 
oil seed processing plants that have been down in the last years will take advantage of this 
window of opportunity to revive their operations, which will positively impact the demand for 
soybeans and similar crops. Viable community banks that had been scattered all over the 
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financial institutions are therefore better able to finance good proposals from the agricultural 
and agribusiness sector. Agricultural input supply, especially for fertilizer, has been driven by the 
public sector. Whereas there is no barrier to the activities of the private sector, the subsidy 
and corruption which have been the bane of fertilizer supply, are being reviewed to reduce 
adulteration and importation of substandard fertilizers and agro-chemicals. A voucher scheme 
advocated by IFDC and other stakeholders was tried for the first time in 2008. The seed 
companies have been coping in producing certified seeds. Some of the agricultural development 
programs have also gone into seed multiplication but at a small scale only, so far. Farmers are 
being sensitized on the need to buy certified seeds for each planting season. There have 
however been reported cases of adulteration by traders/intermediaries. It is hoped that the 






The 1,000s+ project in Nigeria is preparing for scaling-up. Strategies to promote ISFM 
technologies, which have been based on open field days, informal farmer-to-farmer extension, 
and training of extension officers working throughout Kaduna state, will be more explicitly 
based on farmer-to-farmer extension (with well-trained farmers working in close collaboration 
with extension services) and more efficient use of mass media (rural radio, etc.). The 
agribusiness aspects are being strengthened, particularly for market outlets and for value-adding 
storage and processing. The most important challenge is in the strengthening of forward 
linkages and the competencies of traders and intermediate processing firms. 
 
The soybean story in northern Nigeria provides both a good example of agribusiness 
development and food for thought. Soybean production has profited from the ban on vegetable 
oil imports but the supply value chain is still largely uncoordinated. Farmers are under-informed 
and mainly sell their soybean production in the local markets. Assemblers are poorly organized, 
try to exercise ‘monopsonistic’ buying power and have limited success in stimulating 
production. Linkages with end-user markets are poorly developed, and the competitive position 
of the edible oil industry vis-à-vis competing industries in other parts of the world is very 
delicate and exclusively based on low labor and energy prices (comparative advantages). This 
Farmers visiting Grand Oil Mills, 
a large processor in northern 





gives Nigerian edible oils almost no chance to compete effectively in intra- and inter-regional 
Central and West African markets. Whereas the ban on vegetable oils may create some 
comparative advantages for the soy industry, it may also support an inward-looking, inefficient 
industry, which will rapidly be taken over if bans are lifted, and will not enable Nigeria to 
become a competitive player in the region. Strategic targeting of end-user markets and product 
differentiation are needed to strengthen the soy industry in Nigeria and to carry it beyond its 
current status. Building the awareness and capacity of leaders from the soy industry and farmer 
and trader organizations is needed to develop new frames of reference, to envision strategies 




12. Pepper dryers in northern Ghana 
 
Whereas research-action in northern Ghana first concentrated on ISFM options for sorghum 
and groundnuts, farmers themselves proposed to concentrate on pepper, which was already a 
major cash crop. Actors in pepper production are mainly male small-scale farmers. Farm sizes 
range from 0.25 to 3.5 acres. Farmers claim that income from pepper constitutes 60 to 70 
percent of farm income. Most farmers sell their produce in their communities and neighboring 
village markets, where they sell to local traders as well as to traders from the city and from 
outside the region. Some farmers and traders in the villages send their produce to the city 
markets and as far as Kumasi and Accra to sell to wholesalers and retailers. The pepper 
producers are not organized into producer associations. In some communities there are weakly 
organized farmers’ associations, however, that could serve as the platform for mobilizing the 





The pepper wholesale and retail markets (for both fresh and dry pepper) are dominated by 
women. Public transport is the major means of transporting pepper from the farm gate to 
wholesale markets. Traders work individually. Each wholesaler, however, belongs to a pepper 
traders’ association, often headed by the commodity (pepper) ‘queen’. The queen function 
exists for all farm produce sold on urban markets in Ghana and includes establishing informal 
commodity market rules (including setting the price for pepper as well as authorizing the 
entrance of new members) that are binding on all its members. Retailers are not necessarily 
organized or under the influence of the queen, although she is said to control entry into the 
trade. Few traders also dry the fresh pepper to add value. There are others who specialize in 
processing (grinding) the dry pepper into powder, which they sell to both retailers and 
Experimental plot with pepper.  




consumers. A most popular processed form of pepper is the pepper sauce referred to as 
‘Shito.’ Consumers of pepper and pepper products are individuals buying it for home 
consumption, restaurant/‘chop’ bar operators, domestic bursars of schools and colleges and 
other institutions.  
 
Drying pepper at the farm gate was noted as a price stabilizing factor that works in favor of 
farmers. A racked solar dryer was demonstrated to the farmers but the capacity was a limiting 
factor to a wide adoption. With IFDC and CIDA (Canadian International Development Agency) 
support, a greenhouse drying facility was developed at the Savanna Agricultural Research 
Institute and tested in the field. This facility is roomier and more durable, drying a 10 times 
higher volume than the racked solar dryer. This capacity is adequate for the staggered picking 
from a two-acre farm which yields about seven bags of fresh pepper a week. The costs of this 
drier and the average cost of drying one bag of pepper are estimated in Table 5. The analysis is 
centered on a farmer who cultivates the finger-like variety (Capsicum frutescens), commonly 
cultivated for drying. 
 
Table 5. Estimated cost of a greenhouse drier and processing cost per bag of dried pepper 
Notes: 
* Excludes in-kind (labor) contributions of beneficiary communities. Research cost incurred only involves cost of 
fuel for supervising the construction. 


















Share# Value per 
year GH¢ 
Construction and maintenance materials 1,010 10 1 101 
Research effort and workmanship* 150 10 1 15 
Cost of water and fuel wood for blanching per 
season 
60   60 
Total 1,220   176 
Harvesting period = 4 months  
Drying time = 8 days 
Capacity = 5 dried bags/drying 
Capacity utilization = 75 bags per season 
Cost of drying per bag/year (176/75) =  GH¢2.35 
Farmers inspecting the drying process of 




The full potential of the drier can be exploited if an active ventilator is attached to it. This will 
shorten the drying time to about three or four days and enable the dryer to be used to process 
the produce from four acres of a pepper farm over a period of four months. The cost of the 
drier can be shared by two to four farm families reducing the cost of construction and 
maintenance per household considerably. To ensure uniform drying and high quality products, 
action-research on varietal selection and purification of seed stock is carried out with farmers’ 
participation. The finger-like ‘Legon 18’ and ‘Shito Adope’ varieties that have export values have 
started to increase in acreages among the target farmers as they have realized the market 
potential of these varieties. A seed farm that was established in 2007 was affected by a 40-day 
drought yet there was sufficient seed left for 2008. The gradual shift in the production pattern 
of farmers from the fresh pepper to dried pepper is guided by the following analysis. 
 
Retailers of agro-chemicals in farming communities and village markets buy different agro-inputs 
needed for pepper production from distributors and wholesalers; the agro-inputs are then sold 
to farmers with an average markup of about 25 percent. Largely, farmers’ costs in the study 
zone are related to inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, fungicides, seeds, labor for land 
preparation, nurseries, watering, weeding and harvesting. The ratio of one fresh to 0.75 dried 
pepper achieved using a greenhouse drying facility implies that 28 bags per acre of fingerlike 
variety will yield 21 bags of dry pepper. The cost per bag of producing one acre of dried pepper 
was estimated to be GH¢12.72, with a drying and handling cost of GH¢2.35 (see Table 5). With 
the mean selling price of GH¢40.30 to wholesalers, farmers make a turnover of GH¢18.50 
(Table 6). The average cost per bag of wholesale, covering transaction cost (transport cost, 
market tolls, storage charges and miscellaneous cost) and purchasing price of the pepper 
amounts to GH¢41.30. A revenue of GH¢51.20 implies that the wholesaler makes GH¢9.90 per 
bag. Additional retail cost is estimated to be GH¢0.30. Consumers pay GH¢61.70 per bag of 
dried pepper, resulting in a turnover of GH¢10.20 per bag. 
 
Table 6. Shares of value created along the dry pepper chain in northern Ghana 
 
  Input 
Dealer 
Producer Wholesaler Retailer Consumer 
Cost (value in process) 3.97 6.73 40.30 51.20 61.70 
Value Addition (production 
& handling) 
1.08 15.07 1.00 0.30  
Margin 1.68 18.50 9.90 10.20  
 
 
It is clear from the analysis that the value addition process has resulted in higher margins for 
the actors engaged in the dry pepper chain compared with the margins of GH¢0.40, 5.62, 5.80, 
8.70 that, respectively, accrued to input dealers, producers, wholesalers and retailers engaged in 
the fresh pepper value chain in the same season. Farmers earn more by integrating production 
and processing steps in the chain (i.e., adding the additional activity of drying the pepper). The 
ability of producers to upgrade their activities is of vital importance to increase their shares in 
the values created in the pepper value chain. Upgrading the skills of farmers in the drying 





We would like to express our deepest gratitude to our partners, actors and stakeholders in 
1,000s+, as they are our principal source of inspiration, learning and motivation. The guidance 
of the members of the various regional and (sub-)national stakeholder committees who, among 
others, play a crucial role in mobilizing and selecting cluster formation and business plans is also 
gratefully acknowledged. Many thanks also to Dr. Amit Roy, IFDC President, CEO, Rob Groot, 
Director of IFDC’s East and Southern Africa Division,  and Marjatta Eilittä, at the time of 
writing Director of IFDC’s North and West Africa Division, for their support and critical 
encouragement. The support from DGIS and the constructive feedback from Monique Calon, 
Senior Policy Advisor of the Sustainable Economic Development Department of DGIS, The 
Netherlands, are highly appreciated, as is the additional financial support from IFA, USAID and 
the Dutch Embassy in Cotonou (Benin). Regina (‘Gigi’) Dupuy edited a large part of this text 
and did a great job; all remaining errors and strange (‘Dutch-English’ or ‘French-English’) 







Arthur, W.B., 1988, Self-reinforcing mechanisms in economics. In: Anderson, P.W., Arrow, K.J. 
and D. Pines (Eds.), The economy as an evolving complex system. Addison-Wesley. 
Bates, R., 1997, Institutions as investments. Journal of African Economies 6 (3). 
Bijman, J., Omta, S.W.F., Trienekens, J.H., Wijnands, J.H.M. and E.F.M. Wubben, (Eds.) 2006, 
International agri-food chains and networks. Management and organization. Wageningen 
Academic Publishers, The Netherlands.  
Binswanger, H.P. and S.S. Atyar, 2003, Scaling up of community driven development. 
Theoretical underpinnings and program design implications. Policy Research Working Paper, 
3039. The World Bank, USA. 
Breman, H., and S.K. Debrah, 2003, Improving African food security. SAIS review. A Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 23 (1). 
Cabral, L., Farrington, J. and E. Lundi, 2006, The millennium villages project – a new approach to 
ending rural poverty in Africa. Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Natural Resource 
Perspectives 101. UK. 
Chabal, P, and J.P. Daloz, 1999, Africa works. Disorder as political instrument. African Issues. 
James Curry, UK. 
Chazan, N., 1997, Civil society, ethnicity and the state: some observations on Africa and the 
Middle East. In: Schoenmakers, H. and W. Salverda (Eds.), State, society and ethnicity in 
developing countries. Lessons from the 1990s. Centre for Development Studies, University 
of Groningen, The Netherlands. 
Checkland, P.B. and Scholes, J., 1999, Soft systems methodology in action. John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd., UK.  
Clottey, V.C., Agyare, W.A., Gyasi, K.O., Schreurs, M., Maatman, A., Abdulai, H. and R.H. 
Dinku, 2006, Composting to ensure food security. Learning by doing. Livestock Research 
for Rural Development (18).  
Collier, P., Guillamont, P., Guillamont, S., and J.W. Gunning, 1997, Redesigning conditionality. 
Centre for the Study of African Economies. Oxford University.  
Collier, P., 2007, The bottom billion. Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be 
done about it. Oxford University Press, UK.  
Cooke, B. and U. Kothari (Eds.), 2001. Participation, a new tyranny? Zed books, UK. 
Dangbegnon, C., Maatman, A. and A. Nobre, 2003, Foncier rural et Intensification Agricole en 
Afrique de l’Ouest. Paper presented at PRAIA + 9 Conference, organized by CILSS, Palais 
de Congrès, Bamako, 17 - 22 October, Mali, CILSS and GTZ. 
Defoer, T. and A. Budelman (Eds.), 2000, Managing soil fertility in the tropics. A resource guide 
for participatory learning and action research. Royal Tropical Institute, The Netherlands. 
Delgado, L.C., J. Hopkins and V.A. Kelly, 1998, Agricultural growth linkages in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. IFPRI Research Report 107, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 
USA. 
Diaz, L.C. and J.E. Hansel, 2007, Practitioner-led action research: Managing risk sharing models 
work with farmers, agribusiness and financial institutions. International Conference on Rural 
Finance Research, Moving Results into Policies and Practice, FAO. The Seep Network, USA. 
Dorward, A., Kydd, J. and C. Poulton, 1998 (Eds.), Smallholder cash crop production under 
market liberalization. A new institutional economic perspective. CAB International, UK. 
 
121
Dorward, A., Kydd, J., Poulton, C. and M. Stockbridge, 2004, Agricultural liberalization in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Final report prepared for EC-PREP. Centre for Development and Poverty 
Reduction, Imperial College London. 
Dorward, A., Kydd, J., Morrison, J. and C. Poulton, 2005, Institutions, markets and economic 
coordination: linking development policy to theory and praxis. Development and Change, 
36 (1).  
Douthwaite, B., 2002, Enabling innovation. A practical guide to understanding and fostering 
technological change. Zed Books, in association with CAMBIA, Australia. 
Easterly, W.E., 2006, The white man’s burden. Why the West’s efforts to aid the rest have 
done so much ill and so little good. Penguin Books. 
Economist, The, 2004, How to make Africa smile. A survey of Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
Economist, UK. 
Engel, P.G.H. and M.L. Salomon, Facilitating innovation for development. A RAAKS resource 
box. Royal Tropical Institute, the Netherlands. 
Fafchamps, M., 2004, Market institutions and Sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and evidence, MIT 
Press. 
Fafchamps, M., 1999, Networks, communities, and markets in Sub-Saharan Africa: implications 
for firm growth and investment. Centre for the Study of African Economies. Working Paper 
Series, Paper 108. Oxford University.  
FAO, 2000, Guidelines and reference material on integrated soil and nutrient management and 
conservation for farmer field schools. Rome, FAO. 
Ferris, S., Kaganzi, E., Best, R., Ostertag, C., Lundy, M. and T. Wandschneider, 2006, A market 
facilitator’s guide to participatory agroenterprise development. CIAT Enabling Rural 
Innovation (ERI), International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), Uganda. 
Fresco, L.O., Stroosnijder, L., Bouma, J. and H. van Keulen, (Eds.), 1994, The future of the land. 
Mobilising and integrating knowledge for land use options. John Wiley & Sons, UK. 
Gabre-Mahin, E.Z. and S. Haggblade, 2004, Successes in African agriculture: Results of an expert 
survey. World Development 32 (5).  
Gittinger, J.P., 1982, Economic analysis of agricultural projects. EDI Series in Economic 
Development, World Bank. Johns Hopkins University Press, USA. 
Gross, M., Maatman, A. and C. Clottey, 2005, Fields and markets. Learning plots as an entry 
point methodology to promote sustainable agricultural intensification. IFDC Africa Division. 
Haggblade, S., 2004, Building on successes in African agriculture. Focus 12. International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), USA. 
Hazell, P., Poulton, C., Wiggins, S. and A. Dorward, 2006, The future of small farms for poverty 
reduction and growth. 2020 Discussion Paper 42. International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI). 
Hogan, 2000, Facilitating empowerment. A handbook for facilitators, trainers & individuals. Kogan 
Page Ltd., UK. 
Hope, A. and S. Timmel, 1996, Training for transformation; a handbook for community workers 
(revised edition). Mambo Press, Zimbabwe. 
IAC, 2004, Realizing the promise and potential of African agriculture. Science and technology 
strategies for improving agricultural productivity and food security in Africa. InterAcademy 
Council, The Netherlands. 
IFDC, 2005, Development and dissemination of sustainable integrated soil fertility management 
practices for smallholder farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa. IFDC, USA.  
 
122
IIRR and Citigroup Foundation, 2001, Best practices and strategies in microenterprise 
development. Citigroup Foundation and International Institute for Rural Reconstruction, 
Philippines. 
Jayne, T.S., Govereh, J., Mwanaumo, A., Chapoto, A. and J.K. Nyoro, 2002, False promise or false 
premise? The experience of food and input market reform in Eastern and Southern Africa. 
World Development 30 (11). 
Jiggens, J. and H. De Zeeuw, 1992, Participatory technology devlopment in practice: process and 
methods. In: Reijntjes, C., Haverkort, B. and A. Water-Bayers (Eds.), 1992, Farming for the 
future: an introduction to low-external-input and sustainable agriculture. Macmillan, UK. 
Kaplinsky, R. and M. Morris, 2000. A handbook for value chain research. IDRC, Canada.  
Kherallah, M., Delgado, C., Gabre-Madhin, E., Minot, N. and M. Johnson, 2000, The road half-
travelled: agricultural market reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. Food Policy Report. International 
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), USA. 
KIT, FAIDA, IIRR, 2006, Chain empowerment. Supporting African farmers to develop markets. 
Royal Tropical Institute (KIT), The Netherlands, FAIDA Market Link Company Ltd., Tanzania, 
and International Institute of Rural Reconstruction, Kenya. 
Kolb, D.A., 1984, Experiential learning: experience as the source for learning and development. 
Prentice-Hall.  
Kydd, J., Dorward, A., Morrison, J. and G. Cadisch, 2002, Agricultural development and pro-
poor economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: potential and policy. ADU Working paper 
02/04, Imperial College Wye. 
Kydd, J. and A. Dorward, 2004, Implications of market and coordination failures for rural 
development in least developed countries. Journal of International Development, 16.  
Leturioner, J. and A. Maatman, 2005, The fertilizer supply chain in Mali. Changing reference 
frameworks. IFDC Africa Division.  
Leeuwis, C., 2004, Communication for rural innovation. Rethinking agricultural extension. Third 
edition. Blackwell, UK. 
Lundy, M., Gottret, M.V., Cifuentes, W., Ostertag, C.F., Best, R., Peters, D. and S. Ferris, 
Increasing the competitiveness of market chains for smallholder producers. A Field guide. 
Rural Agro-Enterprise Development Project. International Center for Tropical Agriculture 
(CIAT), Uganda. 
Maatman, A., 2005, The ISFM project. A review. IFDC Africa Division. 
Maatman A., Wopereis M., Debrah S. and R. Groot, 2007, From thousands to millions, 
Accelerating agricultural intensification and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: 
Bationo, A., Waswa, B., Kihara, J. and J. Kimetu (Eds), Advances in Soil Fertility Research in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges and Opportunities. Springer.  
Maatman, A. and A. Konlambigue, 2005, Competitive strategy through innovative partnerships 
at the regional level: The case of tomatoes and soybean value chains in Northern Togo. In: 
Omare, M.N., Makokha, M.O. and W. Oluoch-Kosura (Eds), Shaping the future of African 
agriculture for development. The role of social scientists. Proceedings of the Inaugural 
Symposium of the Association of African Agricultural Economists (AAAE), 6-8 December, 
2005, Nairobi, Kenya. 




Miehlbradt, A.O. and M. McVay, 2005, Evolution des Services d’Appui aux Entreprises (SAE): 
faire fonctionner les marchés au bénéfice des pauvres. Compte-rendu 2005. Organisation 
Internationale du Travail.  
Mitchell Group, The, 2003, Promoting competitiveness in practice: the manager’s guide to 
cluster-based approaches. USAID, USA. 
Morvant-Roux, S., 2007, Quelle microfinance pour l’agriculture des pays en développement? 
FARM-Foundation. 
Ngeze, P.B., 2001, How to keep farm accounts. Acacia Publishers, Kenya, in collaboration with 
CTA, The Netherlands. 
Omamo, S.W., 2003, Policy research on African agriculture : trends, gaps and challenges. ISNAR 
Research Report 21. International Service for National Agricultural Research, The 
Netherlands. 
Porter, M., 1985, Competitive advantage. Creating and sustaining superior performance. The 
Free Press, USA. 
Porter, M.E., 1998, The competitive advantage of nations. The Free Press, USA (First published 
in 1990, with a new introduction). 
Prahalad, C.K., 2006, Fortune at the bottom of the pyramid. Eradicating poverty through 
profits. Wharton School Publishing, USA. 
Pretty, J.N., Guijt, I., Thompson, J. and I. Scoones, 1995, Participatory learning and action. A 
trainer’s guide. Bert Bakker, The Netherlands. 
Röling, N.G., 1994, Platforms for decision-making about eco-systems. In: Fresco, Stroosnijder, 
Bouma, and Van Keulen (Eds.), The future of the land. Mobilizing and integrating knowledge 
for land use options. John Wiley & Sons, UK. 
Röling, N.G. and M.A.E. Wagemakers, 1998, (Eds.) Facilitating sustainable agriculture. 
Participatory learning and adaptive management in times of environmental uncertainty. 
Cambridge University Press, UK. 
Ruben, R., Van Boekel, M., Van Tilburg, A. and J. Trienekens (Eds), 2007, Tropical food chains. 
Governance regimes for quality management. Wageningen Academic Publishers, The 
Netherlands. 
Sachs, J.D., 2005, The end of poverty. Economic possibilities for our time. Penguin, USA. 
Schon, D., 1983, The reflective practitioner. How professionals think in action. Basic Books Inc., 
USA. 
Schreurs, M.E.A., Maatman, A. and C. Dangbegnon, 2001, In for a penny, in for a pound. 
Strategic site selection as a key element for on-farm research that aims to trigger 
sustainable agricultural intensification in West Africa. In: Vanlauwe, B., Diels, J., Sanginga, N. 
and R. Merckx (Eds.), 2001, Integrated plant nutrient management in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
From concept to practice. CABI publishing, UK, in association with the International 
Institute of Tropical Agriculture, Nigeria. 
Shepherd, A.W., 2007, Approaches to linking producers to markets. A review of experiences to 
date. Agricultural Management, Marketing and Finance Occasional Paper 13, FAO, Italy. 
Stewart, S., 1995, Learning together. The agricultural worker’s participatory sourcebook. 
Littlerock, Heiffer Project International. 
Tanburn, J., Trah, G. and K. Hallberg, 2001, Business development services for small 
enterprises: Guiding principles for donor intervention. Prepared by the Committee of 
Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development. World Bank, USA. 
 
124
Tiffen, M., Mortimore, M. and F. Gichuki, 1994, More people, less erosion. Environmental 
recovery in Kenya. John Wiley & Sons Ltd., UK. 
Timmer, C.P., 1988, The agricultural transformation. In: Handbook of Development Economics 
(Volume 1), Chenery, H.B. and T.N. Srinivasan (Eds.). Elservier Science Publishers, The 
Netherlands. 
Timmer, C.P., 2003, Agriculture and pro-poor growth. Pro-Poor Economic Growth Research 
Studies, Development Alternatives Inc. and Boston Institute for Developing Economies, 
USA. 
Van Keulen, H. and H. Breman, 1990, Agricultural development in the West African Sahelian 
region: a cure against land hunger? Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment 32. 
Vorley, B., Fearne, A. and D. Ray (Eds.), 2007, Regoverning markets. A place for small-scale 
producers in modern agrifood chains? Gower Publishing Ltd., UK. 
Wiggins, S., 1995, Change in African farming systems between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. 
Journal of International Development 7 (6). 
Wiggins, S., 2002, Smallholder farming in Africa. In: D. Belshaw and I. Livingstone (Eds.) 
Renewing development in Sub-Saharan Africa: policy, performance and prospects. 
Routledge, UK. 
Wopereis, M. and A. Maatman, 2002, Improving farming livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa: the 
case for integrated soil fertility management. International Training Program on Integrated 
Soil Fertility Management in the Tropics, 7-12 October, 2002. IFDC Africa Division. 
World Bank, 2002, Institutions for markets. World Development Report 2001/2002. World 
Bank, USA. 





Appendix. The AISSA network 
 
To enhance learning and dissemination of new ideas, capacity building and exchange between 





Logo AISSA network  
 
In March 2004, IFDC and its partners launched the Network for Agricultural Intensification in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (AISSA). The AISSA network emphasizes institutional development, 
empowerment and strengthening of organizations of farmers and local entrepreneurs rather 
than the more traditional focus on participatory technology development. Network members 
are consultants and BSSs involved in the facilitation of agricultural intensification and market 
development; the latter may include research and extension agencies, NGOs, POs and business 
associations – if equipped with specific training/service units. The objectives of AISSA are to:  
 
1. Provide a platform for information and experience exchange 
2. Develop and disseminate tools that facilitate the development of sustainable agricultural 
systems and competitive rural enterprises45 
3. Join forces to get agricultural intensification on the agenda of decision-makers 
4. Stimulate collaborative activities among members. 
  
AISSA is a common woman’s name in West Africa. There is indeed an intentional link. Through 
this name, the network’s members acknowledge the essential role of women in African 
agriculture and the emphasis that the AISSA network places on gender-related issues in 
agricultural intensification.  
 
AISSA is involved in building competencies for thriving agribusiness clusters and value chains, 
and lobbies, together with the local stakeholders, for enabling business environments. In 
                                            
45 Edited versions of facilitation tools and training guides used (and tested) by the partner institutions have been 
put together in the first edition of the AISSA Toolkit. The AISSA Toolkit is a ‘work in progress,’ and AISSA and 




addition to traditional lobbying subjects, AISSA aims to promote a constructive dialogue 
between the private and public sector to raise consciousness regarding the micro-economic 
foundations of national-level competitiveness and related policy consequences. AISSA aims to 
become a unique and exclusive network that unites all types of institutions involved in the 
facilitation of agricultural intensification and market development (from the grassroots). To this 
end, AISSA will support its members to develop competitive strategies by improving efficiency 
in working together with local actors through leveraging their efforts (training-of-trainer 
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